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Summary 
 
Decision making is a ubiquitous theme in computational neuroscience. Here 
we present novel data and modeling approaches that relate to how the brain 
makes decisions. In the first part of this dissertation we use psychophysics 
to look into how the brain itself does statistics; in the second part we use 
statistical analysis tools to investigate the neural representation of relevant 
variables for decision making.  
Innumerous studies have suggested that people take previously 
accumulated information (prior distribution) as well and new information (the 
likelihood) into account when making a decision.  Here we start by asking 
where do prior distributions come from; since we are rarely in the exact 
same situation twice, how is the prior, used in a particular decision, 
generalized from previous similar experiences? Using a movement 
experiment we found differences between the generalization of the mean 
and variance of the prior distribution.  
We continue by asking how the brain makes a decision when choosing 
between two alternatives in a two-alternative-forced-choice (2AFC) task. 
The 2AFC paradigm is often assumed to measure sensory (likelihood) 
uncertainty independently of prior uncertainty. Here we test this assumption 
by looking into the algorithms the brain might use when choosing between 
the two alternatives in a 2AFC task. Specifically, after combining the prior 
and likelihood into a posterior distribution, is the decision based on the 
maximum of the posterior (the MAP hypothesis) or do humans sample from 
the posterior distribution (the sampling/matching hypothesis)? We show that 
in investigating this question we simultaneously test whether the 2AFC 
paradigm can be used to measure sensory uncertainty independently of 
prior uncertainty. Our experimental results favor the MAP hypothesis and 
hence the validity of the assumption. 
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Finally, we use probabilistic models to investigate whether neurons in the 
frontal eye field (FEF) represent bottom-up saliency when monkeys are 
searching a natural scene. Understanding what the brain represents/does 
ultimately involves understanding how it represents the kind of stimuli it has 
evolved to represent. Here we use natural scenes and an objective 
definition of bottom-up saliency that has been shown to predict saccade 
choices of both humans and monkeys during free-viewing of natural scenes. 
We found that although saliency appears to be used in deciding where to 
look next and predicts neural activity of FEF neurons, its predictive power is 
explained away if we take into account other saccade related covariates. 
This thesis provides important insights into several aspects of decision 
making. At a higher level it provides data for constraining models of 
generalization of uncertainty; it tests theories that relate to which kind of 
decision-making algorithms the brain implements; and finally it looks into 
neural representation of natural stimuli that are relevant for decision making. 
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Resumo 
A tomada de decisão é um tema omnipresente em neurociência 
computacional. Aqui apresentamos novas abordagens e resultados 
relacionados com a forma como o cérebro toma decisões . 
Começamos por fazer perguntas relacionadas com o modo como o próprio 
cérebro faz estatística. Especificamente, perguntamos de onde vêm as 
probabilidades a priori - as distribuições de probabilidade sobre o que 
esperamos que aconteça. Uma vez que raramente nos encontramos na 
mesma exacta situação duas vezes, como é que estas distribuições, 
utilizadas numa decisão particular, são generalizadas a partir de 
experiências semelhantes anteriores? Usando uma experiência de 
movimento encontramos diferenças de abrangência e simetria entre a 
generalização da média e variância da distribuição de probabilidade a priori. 
De seguida perguntamos como é que o cérebro toma uma decisão a partir 
da distribuição de probabilidade a posteriori quando tem de escolher entre 
duas alternativas no paradigma two alternative forced choice (2AFC). Usa o 
máximo da distribuição ou amostra da distribuição? Mostramos que ao 
investigar esta questão estamos simultaneamente a testar a hipótese 
comumente usada, mas não testada sobre este paradigma: que pode ser 
usado para medir a incerteza sensorial independentemente de incerteza 
das expectativas, i.e. independentemente da incerteza na distribuição a 
priori. 
Finalmente, usamos modelos probabilísticos para investigar as 
representações de variáveis relevantes para a tomada de decisão. 
Especificamente, perguntamos se o frontal-eye-field (FEF) de macacos 
representa a saliência de imagens quando os macacos estão à procura de 
um objecto em imagens naturais. Mostramos que, embora a saliência 
pareca ser usada para decidir para onde olhar e prevê a actividade de 
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neurónios no FEF, o seu poder preditivo desaparece (ou é explicado) se 
tomarmos em consideração variáveis relacionadas com o movimento dos 
olhos. 
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1. General Introduction 
 
Understanding decision making in various contexts is fundamental to 
understanding human behavior. This thesis presents several studies that 
examine decision making from many different points of view using a variety 
of research tools.  
In Chapters 2-4, we use human psychophysics, i.e., behavioral experiments 
designed for the quantitative study of the perceptual system. We use some 
of these experiments to characterize the generalization of prior 
expectations/subjective beliefs and to investigate which algorithms the 
nervous system uses for making a decision.  In Chapter 5, we analyze 
neural recordings to understand the representation of relevant neural 
variables for eye-movement decision making. The experiments presented 
here cover a wide range of decisions including motor decisions about where 
to reach (Chapters 2 and 3), sensory discrimination decisions when 
confronted with two choices (Chapter 4), and attention-related oculomotor 
decisions about where to look next (Chapter 5). 
 
1.1 Bayes theorem, priors, likelihood and posterior 
Innumerous studies have suggested that, when making a decision, humans 
take previous accumulated information (their expectations, or the prior 
distribution) as well as new information (the likelihood) into account (for a 
review see Vilares and Kording, 2011). Both of these pieces of information 
have an associated mean and variance (denoted by uncertainty). This 
perspective/modeling approach/description is called Bayesian and owes its 
name to the Bayes theorem: 
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p(s|r)p(r)
p(r|s)=
p(s)
   
When we try to infer what is out there in the world, we are interested is in 
having an accurate measure of what the current reality is given the new 
information arriving to our senses ( p(r|s) , the posterior). Bayes theorem 
tells us how we can obtain it, i.e., how to combine the new piece of sensory 
information ( p(s|r) , the likelihood) with our prior expectations over reality 
(the prior, p(r) ). 
 
1.2 Generalization, where priors come from  
Where do priors come from? As we are never in the exact same situation 
twice, it is useful to generalize about subjective beliefs acquired in one 
situation to be applicable to different but similar situations (Shepard, 1987). 
In Chapters 2 and 3 we address the question of how priors generalize and, 
in particular, how prior variance/uncertainty generalizes.  Several neural 
representation theories have been proposed on how the brain might 
represent/approximate the prior and the likelihood (Deneve, 2008; Fiser et 
al., 2010a; Hinton and Sejnowski, 1983a; Hoyer and Hyvärinen, 2003; Ma et 
al., 2006; Ma, 2010; Sahani and Dayan, 2003; Soltani and Wang, 2009; Wu 
et al., 2003; Zemel et al., 1998). These theories propose diverse, but not 
always mutually exclusive, ways in which uncertainty could be represented 
by populations of neurons. Some propose that it is represented in the width 
of the tuning curves, others in the amplitude of the tuning curves, in the 
firing rate, in the strength of the synapses, in the timing of the firing, etc. To 
our knowledge however, none of theories about the neural representation of 
uncertainty has been extended to incorporate generalization, nor is there 
data on how the variance of the prior distribution generalizes; generalization 
studies typically neglect variability.  
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Our aim was thus to characterize how the prior generalizes, and specifically 
to understand how this generalization depends on uncertainty. Namely, we 
wanted to understand: 1. how the generalization of the mean of the prior is 
affected by different degrees of uncertainty; and 2. how the 
variance/uncertainty of the prior itself generalizes. For that, we used a 
previously established generalization paradigm (Krakauer et al., 2000), 
which consists on a visuomotor rotation during a center-out reaching task, 
and extended it to include uncertainty/variability (Körding and Wolpert, 
2004).  
We found that manipulating the uncertainty level (the variance) of the 
prior does not affect how the mean of the prior generalizes (Chapter 2). We 
find differences in breadth between the generalization of mean and variance 
(uncertainty) and an unexpected asymmetry in the generalization of 
uncertainty (Chapter 3). Using a gradient-descent model we find that this 
asymmetry is consistent with the use of different similarity reference frames 
between the generalization of mean and variance/uncertainty. The results 
from Chapter 2 and 3 characterize differences and similarities between the 
generalization patterns of mean and uncertainty of prior expectations, and 
constrain future extensions of theories of prior representation to include 
effects of learning and generalization. 
 
1.3 How are decisions made? 
Although we know that Bayesian decisions involve a combination of prior 
and likelihood information, there exist several mathematical strategies by 
which an inference/decision could be computed. In Bayesian decision-
theory, after arriving to the posterior distribution, the ultimate decision still 
depends on the cost/reward of each of the possible choices. If everything 
(prior and likelihood) is assumed to be Gaussian, and under reasonable 
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choices of cost function (e.g. the mean squared error), the ideal choice is to 
weight the mean of prior and the mean of the likelihood by their relative 
precisions (the reciprocal of the variances). This choice corresponds to 
choosing the maximum of the posterior distribution (MAP). Do Humans use 
this strategy when deciding between two choices? 
In Chapter 4 we investigate which strategy humans use when 
deciding between two possible choices. Specifically we ask whether the final 
decision is based on the maximum of the posterior distribution (the MAP 
hypothesis), or do humans instead sample from the posterior distribution 
(the sampling and matching hypothesis) (Vul et al., 2009; Vulkan, 2000; 
Wozny et al., 2010). To investigate this we use the two-alternative forced 
choice paradigm (2AFC), a discrimination task that is one of the most used 
paradigms in psychophysics.  
 
1.4 Two-alternative forced choice paradigm and the just-
noticeable difference 
In a 2AFC task, subjects are presented with two alternatives and forced to 
choose between them. For example, subjects may be asked to decide which 
of two tones has a higher pitch. By controlling the discrepancy between 
these tones (the cues), experimenters can obtain a psychometric curve: the 
probability of a subject's response given the discrepancy between cues. 
This curve is often used to quantify the just-noticeable difference (JND), 
which is related to how different the two cues must be before subjects can 
tell them apart. 
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The JND is often assumed to measure sensory uncertainty, i.e., 
uncertainty/variance of the likelihood, independently of the variance of the 
prior. The MAP decision-making hypothesis described above is the implicit 
and untested assumption in studies that use JND for measuring likelihood 
uncertainty -- or at least consistent with that objective. However, as we show 
in Chapter 4, if the sampling/matching hypotheses are true then the JND is 
in fact proportional to perceptual uncertainty (i.e. proportional to the variance 
of the posterior distribution). Importantly this would mean that the JND is 
affected by changes in prior uncertainty and hence that it should be used 
with caution. The prevalence of either of these hypotheses has thus broad 
implications for the interpretability of the 2AFC paradigm.  
In Chapter 4 we present a task that allows manipulation of subjects’ 
prior uncertainty while simultaneously measuring subjects’ JND. Our results 
suggest that prior uncertainty does not affect the subjects’ JND. Hence our 
results support the MAP hypothesis and the use of JND to measure sensory 
uncertainty. Importantly we show how the 2AFC task can be used to test 
these decision-making theories. 
 
1.5 Deciding where to look next  
A big part of our sensory information comes through our retina. When we 
are scanning a visual scene, we are constantly moving our eyes from one 
place to the next. In fact, deciding where to look next might be one of our 
most frequent decisions. How do we accomplish it? In order to understand 
how we chose where to look next, the computational modeling of eye-
fixation choices has found that both bottom-up/task independent image 
features such as bottom-up saliency (Itti and Koch, 2001), as well as top-
down features, such as target similarity (Einhäuser et al., 2008) can predict 
eye movements to some degree.  
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In the second part of the thesis (Chapter 5) we look into neural 
representation of one of these important variables for deciding where to look 
next; bottom-up saliency (Itti and Koch, 2001). We search for neural 
representation of bottom-up saliency in the frontal-eye-field (FEF) while 
monkeys are searching natural scenes for an embedded target (Phillips and 
Segraves, 2010). The FEF is a brain region that is thought to be involved in 
the production of saccades, while at the same time responding to salient 
visual stimuli. However, while some experiments using artificial stimuli 
suggest that saliency is represented in the FEF, understanding what the 
brain represents/does ultimately involves understanding how it represents 
the kind of stimuli it has evolved to represent (Kayser et al., 2003; MacEvoy 
et al., 2008; Theunissen et al., 2000). We use natural scenes and an 
objective definition of bottom-up saliency that has been shown to predict 
both human and monkey’s saccade choices. We find that basic analyses 
suggest that FEF represents both saccade direction and saliency. However, 
by using Generalized Linear Models (Pillow et al., 2008; Saleh et al., 2010; 
Truccolo et al., 2005), specifically linear–nonlinear-Poisson cascade 
models, we show that saccade covariates explain away (Pearl, 1988) 
bottom-up saliency. Hence, even though saliency appears to be used when 
deciding where to look next, it does not seem that FEF neurons actively 
represent it during natural scene search.  
 
1.6 Marr’s levels in this dissertation 
To understand and contextualize the contributions of this dissertation in a 
unified sense, it is useful to group them under Marr’s levels of analysis. 
David Marr (Marr, 1982) introduced a taxonomy of three different levels of 
description/analysis. According to Marr, it is possible to divide models into 
those that deal with the objective of computation (Level 1), the algorithm 
used (Level 2), and the implementation (Level 3). The Level 1 approaches 
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ask which computational problem the nervous system is trying to solve. 
Normative approaches, which ask which kind of computation the brain 
should be solving, are included in the category. A typical example is the 
question of if the nervous system combines cues from different modalities 
taking into account their uncertainty to obtain a minimum variance estimate 
(Kording, 2007). Level 2 models deal with which algorithm or which 
strategies does the nervous system use to solve the computational 
objective. Finally level 3 deals with the precise physical implementation of 
the level 2 algorithms. The implementation can itself be described at many 
levels: molecular, synapses, spikes, etc. A description at level 1 can have 
several descriptions at level 2, and an algorithm at level 2 can have several 
possible implementations at level 3. However a particular implementation 
should originate one algorithm and a particular algorithm is typically solving 
one particular computational objective. Research done at a particular level 
thus constrains the possible descriptions not only at that level but also at the 
other levels and one could argue that the richer approaches are usually the 
ones able to connect different levels. 
The research presented in this dissertation touches several Marr levels. 
While Chapter 2 and 3 are mostly experimental, in these chapters we 
examine the learning and generalization of the prior distribution assuming a 
normative model of decision making: Bayesian decision theory (Marr level 
1). In Chapter 4 we test decision-making algorithms (Marr’s level 2) while 
also using the normative approach of Bayesian decision theory. Finally in 
Chapter 5 we use a computational definition of natural scene saliency that is 
generally used to predict eye movements. Hence, we test a specific 
algorithm (Marr’s level 2) for how the brain decides where to look next. 
While it is difficult to say exactly what mechanism/implementation means in 
Marr’s level 3 — it constitutes many levels of explanation — Chapter 5 
investigates whether and how features of a computational algorithm (Marr’s 
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level 2) for deciding where to look next is implemented in a specific 
population of neurons (Marr’s level 3). 
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2.1 Summary 
Generalization studies examine the influence of perturbations imposed on 
one movement onto other movements. The strength of generalization is 
traditionally interpreted as a reflection of the similarity of the underlying 
neural representations. Uncertainty fundamentally affects both sensory 
integration and learning and is at the heart of many theories of neural 
representation. However, little is known about how uncertainty, resulting 
from variability in the environment, affects generalization curves. Here we 
extend standard movement generalization experiments to ask how 
uncertainty affects the generalization of visuomotor rotations. We find that 
although uncertainty affects how fast subjects learn, the perturbation 
generalizes independently of uncertainty. 
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2.2 Introduction 
A central goal of systems neuroscience in general and motor control 
research in particular is to understand how sensorimotor behaviors, such as 
reaching, are represented and learned. One factor that regularly influences 
movement planning and execution is uncertainty. For example, when we 
grasp objects our hands move very differently depending on our level of 
uncertainty; if we are uncertain about an object’s position, we open our 
hands wider, move more slowly and approach the object with our hands 
aligned with the direction of highest uncertainty (Christopoulos and Schrater, 
2009). This example highlights the fact that variability in the external world 
affects behavior and suggests that uncertainty must be represented in the 
nervous system. 
 Many studies in the field of motor control have used generalization 
experiments to examine the neural representation of movement, asking how 
learning a perturbation in one task affects behavior on novel tasks (Donchin 
et al., 2003; Ghahramani et al., 1996b; Goodbody and Wolpert, 1998a; 
Hwang et al., 2006; Krakauer et al., 2000a; Mattar and Ostry, 2007; Paz et 
al., 2003; Pearson et al., 2010; Shadmehr, 2004; Shadmehr and Moussavi, 
2000; Shadmehr and Mussa-Ivaldi, 1994; Thoroughman and Shadmehr, 
2000; Thoroughman and Taylor, 2005). By studying which aspects of the 
behavior are transferred between tasks and which tasks a behavior 
transfers to, these experiments have investigated how we represent and 
modify movement and task variables. Generalization is sensitive to many 
factors including the coordinate system, nature, and complexity of the 
perturbation (Hwang et al., 2006; Krakauer et al., 2000a; Shadmehr and 
Mussa-Ivaldi, 1994; Thoroughman and Taylor, 2005), movement variables 
such as speed (Goodbody and Wolpert, 1998) and posture (Shadmehr and 
Moussavi, 2000), as well as the extent and type of training and feedback 
(Pearson et al., 2010; Taylor et al.,  2012). However, one factor that has not 
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yet been studied in the context of generalization experiments is uncertainty. 
Many studies have explored how uncertainty affects behavior (Christopoulos 
and Schrater, 2009; Körding and Wolpert, 2004a; Saijo and Gomi, 2012; 
Tassinari et al., 2006), but how uncertainty influences generalization has 
received little attention. 
 From a normative viewpoint, subjects should generalize what they 
have learned about a perturbation in one situation to a novel situation only if 
they expect the perturbation to occur in the novel situation. Behavior in 
novel situations reveals what subjects expected to occur, and these 
expectations may be affected by several factors including task similarity or 
familiarity with the type of perturbation. It has been difficult to formalize this 
normative approach to generalization, since natural movement statistics and 
natural perturbation statistics are difficult to collect. However, any normative 
description of generalization must take uncertainty into account, since 
variability in the external world can have strong effects on behavior; task 
uncertainty (Körding and Wolpert, 2004), sensory uncertainty (Wei and 
Körding, 2010) and motor noise (Harris and Wolpert, 1998; van Beers, 
2009), have all been shown to affect individual movements and learning, 
and may affect the similarity between movements as well as the resulting 
generalization. 
 A common interpretation of generalization from one task to another 
is that stronger generalization indicates a larger overlap in the neural 
representations of the two tasks. For instance, Krakauer et al. (Krakauer et 
al., 2000) measured generalization of planar, center-out reaching 
movements with rotation and gain perturbations. Training with a rotational 
perturbation in one direction produced strong generalization to nearby 
angular targets, but did not affect movements to novel targets with large 
angular separations from the training direction (>45°). On the other hand, 
visuomotor gain perturbations tended to generalize globally, to all reach 
directions. This finding suggests that the internal neural representation that 
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changed in response to these perturbations is activated during movements 
to similar angular directions, and that there may be a polar representation of 
planar reaches, where reach angle and extent are independent. Here we 
extend a visuomotor rotations experiment of Krakauer et al. (Krakauer et al., 
2000) by introducing variability in the perturbations. 
It is not clear, a priori, if and how uncertainty might influence 
generalization. One hypothesis, from a normative perspective, might be that 
task variability will make subjects more conservative and generalization 
narrower. High variability may indicate to subjects that it is less likely that 
the perturbation will be present for novel targets. A second hypothesis is 
that higher uncertainty will result in broader neural representations and that 
these could be reflected in wider generalization patterns. Several theories of 
the neural representation of uncertainty explicitly predict that uncertainty 
changes neural tuning. In particular, these models predict that tuning of 
individual neurons becomes wider with higher uncertainty (Girshick et al., 
2011; Zemel et al., 1998), and there is some experimental data suggesting 
that this may be the case (Barlow et al., 1957; Cisek and Kalaska, 2005) 
(see Discussion). If generalization patterns trivially reflect overlapping neural 
tuning and if neural tuning becomes wider with increasing uncertainty then 
we might expect generalization to become broader with increasing 
uncertainty. However, it is difficult to match behavioral results to precise 
neural mechanisms; generalization between two movements can typically 
only be interpreted in terms of the degree of behavioral similarity between 
the movements or in terms of an abstract similarity between the neural 
representations of the two movements (Poggio, 1990; Poggio and Bizzi, 
2004; Pouget and Snyder, 2000; Thoroughman and Shadmehr, 2000). 
 Here, with the goal of examining how uncertainty influences 
generalization patterns, we designed an experiment to manipulate the mean 
and the variance of noisy visuomotor rotations relative to the central starting 
position while subjects performed center-out reaches. We examined how 
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subjects adapt to distributions of perturbations applied during movement in 
one direction (training direction). On each trial a rotation sampled from a 
Gaussian distribution with fixed mean and variance was applied to a hidden 
cursor controlled by the subjects’ index finger. After the subjects adapt, we 
measure how the learned mean generalizes to movements into other 
directions. The mean perturbation remained the same under the different 
noise conditions. If this mean is the only factor driving generalization 
movements, then we would not expect to see any difference between 
generalization curves. On the other hand, since uncertainty has been shown 
to affect many different types of movement, it is important to test whether or 
not generalization changes under noisy perturbations. We found that the 
mean of the perturbation generalizes with a width of about 30 degrees, in 
line with previous studies (Fernandes et al., 2011; Krakauer et al., 2000a; 
Paz et al., 2005). We found that the variance of the perturbation changes 
the speed and extent of learning, but, importantly, generalization is 
unaffected.  
 
2.3 Results 
Here we ask how a perturbation that varies randomly across trials is learned 
for one direction and how adaptation to this perturbation affects movements 
into other directions. We thus extend movement generalization studies by 
analyzing how uncertainty, induced by variability or noise in the perturbation, 
affects generalization patterns. Subjects controlled the position of a hidden 
cursor with their right index finger by making planar reaches in a projector-
mirror system that blocked the view of the hand (Figure 2.1A). They made 
center-out reaches from the workspace center to one of eight targets while a 
visuomotor rotation, relative to the workspace center position, was applied 
to the hidden cursor position. The visuomotor rotation was drawn randomly 
each trial from a Gaussian distribution with fixed mean and variance (Figure 
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2.1B). During learning subjects were incentivized to make reaches to one of 
the targets and received endpoint feedback about the cursor position that 
allowed them to adapt to the perturbations. During testing subjects made 
reaches to the other targets, without endpoint feedback, allowing us to 
examine the generalization patterns (Figure 2.1C). We then measured how 
learning about the rotations under different variance conditions generalized. 
Subjects (n=16) were confronted with a rotational perturbation that 
caused the cursor to deviate from the true hand position as subjects moved 
away from the center of the workspace. We presented three blocks of 
training with the same absolute mean perturbation (±30 degrees) but 
different variability (standard deviations, 
pσ : 0
o, 4o or 12o). Since the sign of 
the mean of the perturbation was randomly chosen for each subject and 
condition, in order to compare across subjects we transformed the measure 
of generalization so that positive hand position angles always refer to hand 
position angles that counteract the average perturbation – we call this 
measure the absolute angle of final hand position. In agreement with 
previous studies (Berniker et al., 2010b; Burge et al., 2008), we found that 
subjects rapidly adapt to the mean rotation, and, while they initially make 
large errors, subjects learn to counter-act the perturbation so that errors 
become small over the course of a few trials (Figure 2.2). We found that 
learning is fastest (p<0.03, bootstrap) and most complete (p<0.001, 
bootstrap) for the condition with zero variance (see Methods for details). As 
the uncertainty of the perturbation increased learning was both slower and 
less complete. 
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Figure 2.1. Experimental setup, protocol and typical trajectory data. A) 
Experimental setup. Subjects control the position of a hidden cursor on the screen 
with their right index finger. A projector-mirror system allows the image on-screen to 
be perceived as being in the movement plane. Subjects were incentivized to reach 
to a target (yellow) starting from a central target position (blue). The experiment 
assesses generalization of the learned mean under different uncertainty conditions. 
B) Perturbations and block design for an individual subject. Sequence of trials in the 
learning direction and generalizing directions and perturbations applied to trials in 
the learning direction for an individual subject. 
pσ  denotes the standard deviation of 
the distribution of perturbations. Each block is composed of 4 sub-blocks: 
familiarization, baseline, learning and testing. Numbers in the 1
st
 block horizontal 
axis correspond to the total number of trials during each sub-block (no brackets) 
and the number of trials towards the learning direction during each sub-block 
(between brackets).  C) Typical hand and cursor position during a testing sub-block. 
Thin colored lines are movements towards the learning target (colored circles). 
Dashed thick lines are average hand position for reaches in each direction. Black 
circles are targets in generalizing directions. 
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Once subjects learn the perturbation in one direction we assess how 
this learned perturbation generalizes. Using the average final hand position 
during movements to the testing directions as a measure of generalization, 
we found that the generalization patterns are local in all three variance 
conditions (Figure 2.3A-C). This is in line with Krakauer et al. (Krakauer et 
al., 2000) whose main condition was essentially identical to our 
pσ =0
o
 
condition. Given that different subjects have different baseline biases and 
the amount of learning changes depending on subject and condition, we 
subtracted the baseline biases and normalized the generalization by the 
amount of learning in the learning direction – we call this measure the 
percent adaptation relative to the learning direction (Figure 2.3C, see 
Methods). Despite the fact that uncertainty influenced the rate and amount 
of adaptation, we did not find a difference between the generalization curves 
in the three conditions in the absolute angle of final hand position (Figure 
2.3B) (F2,210=1.06, p=0.36, two-way repeated measures ANOVA) or in the 
percent adaptation relative to the learning direction (Figure 2.3C) 
(F2,210=0.11, p=0.89, two-way repeated measures ANOVA). We also did not 
find a significant interaction between uncertainty levels and target angle 
either in the absolute angle of final hand position (F14,210=1.31, p=0.20, two-
way repeated measures ANOVA) or in the percent adaptation relative to the 
learning direction (F14,210=0.63, p=0.84, two-way repeated measures 
ANOVA). These results suggest that the generalization pattern is 
independent of the uncertainty about the perturbation.  
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Figure 2.2. Learning of mean under different variance conditions. A) Learning the 
mean of a perturbation during the first perturbation block for a typical subject. Solid 
lines denote exponential fits. B) Learning the mean of a perturbation during the first 
perturbation block across subjects (n=8, n=4, and n=4 for the standard deviations, 
pσ  of 0
o
, 4
o
 and 12
o
, respectively). Thick lines are average (±SD) across subjects 
considering bins of 5 trials. Thin lines are exponential fits. Grey dashed lines 
indicate the absolute average of the imposed perturbation (30
o
). C) Learning the 
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mean of a perturbation considering all blocks for each variance condition. Thick 
lines denote medians across subjects and trials in a trial window of 5 trials. Shaded 
area is 95% confidence region (bootstrap). D) Variability of angle of final hand 
position. Thick lines denote the interquartile range of the angle of final hand position 
across subjects and a trial window of 5 trials. Shaded area is 95% confidence 
region (bootstrap).  
 
With the exception of the transformed sign of the angle of final hand 
position (for the measures absolute angle and percent adaptation), we have 
thus far ignored the sign of the perturbation (+30o or -30o) in our analysis. 
We can take the sign of the perturbation it into account by reflecting the 
target directions (x-axis in Figure 2.3A-C) of the generalization data relative 
to the learning target direction for those blocks that had a -30o as mean of 
the distribution of perturbations. Given that all sixteen subjects are right-
handed, by ignoring the sign of the mean of the distribution of perturbations 
while combining the data from the different subjects we expect to detect 
biomechanical biases that could eventually scale with the level of variability 
but independently of the sign of the perturbation (Figure 2.3B-C). On the 
other hand if we take into account the sign of the perturbation we test for 
influences of angular direction of the mean of the perturbations on 
generalization and how these might eventually scale with uncertainty 
(Figure 2.3D, see Methods for details). 
When we combine the data across subjects after reflecting of the 
target directions according to the sign of the mean of the perturbation the 
generalization data, we observe an asymmetry in the generalization (Figure 
2.3D). Although we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no effect of 
uncertainty in the three conditions either in the absolute angle of final hand 
position (F2,210=1.06, p=0.35, two-way repeated measures ANOVA) or in the 
percent adaptation relative to the learning direction (F2,210=0.11, p=0.89, 
two-way repeated measures ANOVA), the interaction between uncertainty 
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level and target direction appears to be significant in both in the absolute 
angle of final hand position (F14,210=2.06, p=0.016, two-way repeated 
measures ANOVA) and in the percent adaptation relative to the learning 
direction (F14,210=1.95, p=0.023, two-way repeated measures ANOVA). The 
direction that corresponds to maximum generalization (determined by fitting 
a raised von Mises-like function to each subject and condition data, see 
Methods for details) is not significantly different from zero for the lower 
uncertainty conditions (p=0.07 and p=0.27, for 
pσ =0
o and 4o, respectively; 
one-sided t-test), but it is significantly different from zero for 
pσ =12
o 
(p=0.001, one-sided t-test). Even though it is not consistent with the 
amounts of uncertainty, there appears to be a weak deviation from a 
symmetric generalization curve.  
One possible explanation for the weak asymmetry that we found is 
use-dependent learning (Diedrichsen et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2011; 
Verstynen and Sabes, 2011). Under this hypothesis, subjects will tend to 
bias their reaching towards highly repeated movements. Hand movements 
during the testing trials would be attracted to the direction in which the hand 
moved during learning. To determine whether or not use-dependent learning 
could account for the observed asymmetry, we first plotted a hypothetical 
symmetric generalization curve - the angle of final hand position (relative to 
the angle of the learning target) as a function of target direction (Figure 
2.3E blue dots) for a perturbation with mean of +30o. Use dependent 
learning is expected to bias these symmetric movements towards the hand 
movements during learning (Figure 2.3E red dots). It is difficult to quantify 
this small effect exactly, but we observe that use-dependent learning is 
consistent with the direction of asymmetry that we see in our data. 
 To check for more subtle differences in generalization we 
estimated the width of the generalization curve for each individual subject 
and uncertainty condition (determined by fitting a raised von Mises-like 
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function, see Methods for details). For 
pσ =0
o, 4o and 12o we found 
generalization widths of 27.0±2.2, 24.0±1.1 and 25.4±1.3 (mean±SEM, 
across subjects), respectively. We could not conclude that higher 
uncertainty corresponds to wider generalization for any of the 3 pair-wise 
comparisons (p=0.79, p=0.13 and p=0.92 for 
pσ =12 vs pσ =0
o, 
pσ =12
o vs 
pσ =4
o and 
pσ =4
o vs 
pσ =0
o, respectively; one-sided paired t-test). These 
results suggest that the width of generalization of the mean of a noisy 
visuomotor rotation does not depend on the level of uncertainty in the 
perturbation.  
Finally we did a post-hoc power analysis to compute the minimum 
detectable effect size (see Methods for details). The rationale behind this 
kind of analysis is that there may be a difference in generalization widths 
and that we did not observe it by chance or because the effect size is small 
over the range of noise levels used here. We computed how big the effect 
size should be for us to have a high expectation of observing it using a one-
sided paired t-test with significance level of 0.05. We determined that we 
would expect a probability higher than 0.95 of observing a significant 
difference in the generalization widths, i.e. we would have had sufficient 
power to detect an effect, if the effect sizes (generalization widths) were 
higher than 8.5o, 5.7o and 8.2o for the 12o condition relative to 0o, the 12o 
relative to 4o, and 4o relative to 0o, respectively. Hence we would expect to 
observe a significant difference in the generalization widths even if the effect 
size was relatively small. 
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Figure 2.3. Generalization under different variance conditions. A) Baseline and 
generalization of the mean (±SEM) of a perturbation for a typical subject as 
measured by the absolute angle of final hand position relative to the target. Solid 
lines are generalization patterns after learning and dashed lines denote the pre-
training (baseline) results. B) Average generalization (±SEM) across subjects. Solid 
lines denote generalization patterns after learning and dashed lines denote the pre-
training (baseline) results. C) Percent adaptation (±SEM) in the generalizing 
directions relative to the learning direction. D) Percent adaptation (±SEM) in the 
generalizing directions relative to the learning direction after correcting for the sign 
of the mean of the perturbation; blocks with -30
o
 mean have the target directions (x-
axis) reflected relative to the learning direction. E) Diagram illustrating the direction 
of an asymmetry caused by used-dependent learning. The blue curve denotes a 
symmetric, local generalization pattern - without used-dependent learning. If there is 
used-dependent learning, hand movements in trials towards other targets would be 
attracted towards the direction to which the hand moved during the learning block 
(dashed red line). This effect would predict an asymmetry with the same side as the 
one observed in panel D. 
 
 
2.4 Discussion 
Here we extended traditional movement generalization studies by examining 
how generalization following learning of a visuomotor rotation is affected by 
the introduction of trial-by-trial variability. We found that generalization about 
the mean of a visuomotor rotation is largely unaffected when the 
perturbation is variable – generalization was local under three different 
variance conditions. Adaptation is slower and less complete with increased 
variance level but the width of generalization is unaffected. 
 We could have expected to see differences in generalization widths. 
Narrower or broader generalization could both have been justified based on 
normative arguments or under certain assumptions about the how 
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uncertainty affects overlapping neural representation of movement. 
Furthermore, several previous experiments have shown that generalization 
widths and patterns are neither universally uniform nor immune to changes 
in experimental conditions. Even though the width of generalization seems 
to be consistent across tasks such as reaching and wrist tilting (Fernandes 
et al., 2011; Krakauer et al., 2000), different kinds of perturbations show 
wider generalization; for example, gain perturbations in center-out reaches 
appear to generalize globally (Krakauer et al., 2000). Also, studies that 
manipulate experimental conditions, such as the complexity of the 
perturbation (Thoroughman and Taylor, 2005) show changes in width of 
generalization. Moreover, uncertainty has been shown to affect learning 
(Berniker et al., 2010b; Shea and Kohl, 1990) and retention (Shea and Kohl, 
1990), in particular learning of visuomotor rotations (Saijo and Gomi, 2012; 
Turnham et al., 2012). As uncertainty is important for all of these other 
aspects of motor learning, it may well affect generalization patterns as well. 
Here we have shown that generalization width for visuomotor rotations is not 
affected by changes in variability at least not up to 12 degrees of standard 
deviation. 
A number of models have been proposed for how the nervous 
system might represent and manipulate probability distributions and 
uncertainty (Berkes et al., 2011a; Deneve, 2008; Fiser et al., 2010b; Hinton 
and Sejnowski, 1983b; Hoyer and Hyvarinen, 2003; Ma et al., 2006; Ma, 
2010; Sahani and Dayan, 2003; Zemel et al., 1998). Generally in these 
models, the probability distribution over the set of expected perturbations or 
other environmental variable based on past experience is called the prior. 
After combining the prior expectations with new incoming sensory 
information – the likelihood - a new probability distribution is computed – the 
posterior. By manipulating the variance of stochastic perturbations we are 
modifying the variance of the prior and can alter how much subjects rely on 
new sensory information during single reaches (Körding and Wolpert, 2004). 
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However, depending on how these distributions are represented by a given 
neural model and precise assumptions about the neural basis of 
generalization, these models will make different predictions about 
generalization behavior. 
Some models of neural representation (Girshick et al., 2011; Zemel 
et al., 1998) explicitly propose an encoding scheme where tuning curves 
become wider with increasing uncertainty. Under these models neural 
tuning becomes broader due to the fact that neurons are receiving uncertain 
input (Zemel et al., 1998) or because they are optimizing the representation 
of the prior distribution itself with narrowly tuned neurons representing more 
common directions/orientations (Girshick et al., 2011). Analogous models 
applied to movement direction would predict that higher uncertainty would 
lead to broader tuning curves. There is also some experimental data 
suggesting that individual neurons and populations of neurons are sensitive 
to changes in uncertainty. Receptive fields in the cat’s retina, for instance, 
become wider with decreasing light levels (Barlow et al., 1957) and 
populations of neurons in pre-motor cortex appear to be able to represent 
uncertainty in reach plans (Cisek and Kalaska, 2005). However, there is still 
relatively limited experimental evidence to constrain these models of the 
neural representation of uncertainty, particularly in the movement related 
brain areas. While many electrophysiological experiments have probed how 
single neurons represent movement-related variables such as hand-
direction, speed, or muscle activity (Georgopoulos et al., 1992; Graham et 
al., 2003; Kakei et al., 1999; Moran and Schwartz, 1999; Sergio et al., 2005) 
and even how neural responses change during adaptation to visuomotor 
rotations (Paz et al., 2003), relatively little is known about how neural activity 
changes in the presence of sensorimotor uncertainty (but see Britten et al., 
1992; Cisek and Kalaska, 2002, 2005; Rickert et al., 2009). 
 If it is true that the width of generalization curves reflects the tuning 
widths of the neurons, we did not find signs of such broadening in our 
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generalization study. Importantly, there are three natural interpretations of 
this result. It could be that our study failed to see the effect because we did 
not have the necessary statistical power. However, with 16 subjects we ran 
far more subjects than most movement studies. Also, our power analysis 
revealed that we should have seen even relatively small effects of 
broadening; therefore it seems unlikely that this effect exists and we were 
unable to observe it. Another possibility is that theories that predict 
broadening of tuning curves are wrong, or at least do not apply to simple 
targeted reaching movements. However, none of the theories that deal with 
the representation of uncertainty explicitly mention their predictions of 
generalization and (third interpretation) generalization may be related to 
underlying neural representations in a more complex way than generally 
assumed in motor control research (Donchin et al., 2003; Krakauer et al., 
2000a; Thoroughman and Shadmehr, 2000; Thoroughman and Taylor, 
2005). 
We have found weak signs that generalization curves are slightly 
asymmetric. Use-dependent learning, where subjects are biased to move in 
a way that is similar to how they have been moving previously is one of the 
newly emerging insights in computational motor control (Diedrichsen et al., 
2010; Huang et al., 2011; Verstynen and Sabes, 2011). These theories 
would suggest biases towards the typical direction of hand movement. We 
find that this is consistent with the weak asymmetry that we found in the 
generalization curves. Furthermore it is also a potential explanation for the 
commonly observed adaptation at 180o (Donchin et al., 2003; Fernandes et 
al., 2011; Krakauer et al., 2000), since movements in this direction are 
similar to movements returning from the learning target to the center of the 
working space. Future research would be necessary to clarify which factors 
give rise to this asymmetry. For example, this asymmetry may disappear if 
perturbations are introduced in a gradual manner or if limb mechanics are 
controlled in more detail. 
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For some subjects the simplicity of the task and the salience of the 
perturbations led to cognitive strategies that may have introduced noise in 
the measurements. As such, we found relatively high variability across 
subjects. Gradually introduced perturbations have been shown to lead to a 
more complete adaptation and larger aftereffects (Kagerer et al., 1997; 
Taylor and Ivry, 2011b; Turnham et al., 2012). It would be interesting to test 
if slowly introduced perturbations would reduce the subject-by-subject 
variance and even have some effect in the generalization widths. 
The focus both in behavioral as well as in electrophysiological 
studies in motor control has been on the generalization and representation 
of perturbations without any trial-by-trial variability. While uncertainty has 
been shown to be important in many behavioral settings, variability does not 
appear to change generalization curves during visuomotor rotation. 
Variability does affect learning, however, and understanding how variability 
affects generalization in other tasks should provide some insight into the 
neural representations of uncertainty and movement. 
 
2.5 Materials and Methods 
 
Ethics statement. The experimental protocol was approved by the 
Northwestern University Institutional Review Board and is in accordance 
with the Northwestern University Institutional Review Board's policy 
statement on the use of human subjects in experiments. Written informed 
consent was obtained from all participants. The Institutional Review Board 
of Northwestern University approved the study. 
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Experimental protocol. Sixteen right-handed healthy subjects (5 male, 11 
female; aged 27±3.2 years) participated in the experiment. All were naive to 
the purpose of the experiment, and were paid according to their 
performance. Subjects made center-out reaches in an approximately 150 x 
150mm central region of a 100cm x 70cm workspace. They controlled the 
position of a cursor with their right index finger, which was recorded using 
an Optotrak 3D Investigator Motion Capture System. A projector and mirror 
system was calibrated such that visual feedback was perceived as being in 
the movement plane (Figure 2.1A), and the subject's view of their hand was 
blocked by the mirror. 
The task was designed to measure how subjects generalize the 
mean of a noisy visuomotor rotation, that is, how a perturbation learned 
during movements in one direction affects subsequent movements in other, 
test directions. This experiment extends a previous paradigm that allows 
measurement of generalization about a fixed perturbation (Krakauer et al., 
2000) to include stochastic perturbations. 
Subjects were instructed to make center-out reaches into a certain 
direction (the learning direction) until they adapted to the 
perturbations/rotations. During this period subjects were given endpoint 
feedback - that is, the final position of the hidden cursor was displayed - and 
were eventually able to correct endpoint errors in the learning direction. 
Afterwards, they were instructed to make movements into other directions 
(the generalizing directions) in order to measure the generalization pattern 
of the learned mean of the perturbation. Generalization of the mean was 
assessed by analyzing their average reaching direction for each target. 
The learning direction was randomly sampled from one of the 4 
diagonal directions and generalization was measured in 7 directions: 180o, 
±90o, ±45o and ±25o from the learning direction (Figure 2.1C). Subjects 
controlled the position of a red circle, the cursor (~3mm radius), with their 
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right index finger. Except for the first familiarization trials the position of the 
cursor was hidden. Subjects were instructed to make radial reaches from a 
central blue circle, the starting circle (~6mm radius) to one of 8 yellow 
circles, the targets (~6mm radius). Targets were all displayed at a distance 
of 72mm from the central blue circle. 300ms after positioning the cursor over 
the blue circle, the cursor disappeared, one of the eight targets appeared 
and subjects had to reach it. On some of the trials the final position of the 
cursor was displayed for 500ms (endpoint feedback). The final position of 
the cursor was defined as the first position of the cursor when its center was 
at a distance greater than 72mm from the center of the starting circle. If the 
reach was successful, that is, if the center of the red cursor was inside the 
target then the target turned white and subjects were rewarded by having a 
point added to their score. If a successful reach happened in those trials 
where no information was provided about the success of the reach (no 
endpoint feedback) then a point was added to a hidden score. To initiate the 
next trial, subjects had to reposition the cursor in the starting blue circle. 
Except for the familiarization trials where the cursor was always visible, the 
cursor was visible only within a distance of 10mm from the center of the 
starting blue circle. Since some subjects have difficulty finding their way 
back to the starting blue circle, 4 seconds after the previous trial was over, 
the cursor flashed every second for 50ms to allow subjects to find the 
starting position. 
We measured generalization of the learned mean for a rotation of 
±30o under three variability levels. Each trial, noise was added to the 
visuomotor rotation drawn from a Gaussian with a standard deviation of 0o, 
4o or 12o. The standard deviation of 0o reproduces previous experiments 
that measured the generalization pattern of a deterministic visuomotor 
rotation (Krakauer et al., 2000). 
The experiment was divided into three blocks of 560 trials (Figure 
2.1B). Blocks differed in the level of variance and were pseudo-randomized. 
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Each block was composed of 4 sub-blocks: Familiarization, Baseline, 
Learning and Testing. No rotation was imposed during the familiarization 
and baseline blocks. In all cases, the maximum time to complete each trial 
was 4 seconds and the minimum time 40ms. If any of these times was 
violated the trial was restarted.  
Familiarization. During the first half (40 trials, 5 movements to each 
target) of the familiarization sub-block the cursor was always visible. During 
the second half (40 trials, 5 movements to each target) only endpoint 
position was displayed.  
Baseline. This sub-block was used to measure the baseline (80 
trials, 10 movements to each target). These reaches were made under the 
same conditions as the second half of the familiarization block – endpoint 
feedback was provided in all trials and no perturbation was applied to the 
cursor. 
Learning. Subjects completed 240 trials of movements towards a 
single learning target with only endpoint feedback. The cursor was rotated 
relative to hand position.  
Testing. The testing sub-block was composed of 160 trials. In order 
to prevent de-adaptation to the perturbation, the learning target was 
revisited at least twice every 4 trials; every sequence of 4 trials consisted of 
two reaches towards the learning target and two reaches towards any two of 
the 8 targets. Targets were chosen pseudo-randomly so that there were 10 
reaches total towards each of the generalizing directions. Endpoint feedback 
is provided only in the learning direction trials. During these trials towards 
the learning direction the perturbations applied to the cursor position were 
sampled from the same distribution used in the learning block. 
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Data analysis. Final hand position angle gives us a measure of the 
subject’s estimation of the perturbation. For each trial we computed the final 
hand position by averaging the last data point before the hand goes beyond 
a distance of 72mm – the target radial distance – from the center of the 
starting circle and the first data point after that. Notice that final hand 
position is well defined for every trial since trials were restarted whenever 
the subject did not go beyond a distance of 72mm. 
 Absolute final hand position and percent adaptation. Since the sign 
of the mean of the distribution of perturbation was randomly chosen for each 
block and each subject, we normalized the angle of final hand position 
according to the sign of mean of the perturbations so that the average final 
hand position angle in the learning direction was positive for every block; 
this was done by multiplying by -1 the angle of final hand position when the 
mean of the distribution of perturbations was positive (+30 degrees). We call 
this measure the absolute final hand position. We measured the baseline 
movement biases, )(θb , and the learned and generalized means, )(θg , by 
considering the average absolute angle of final hand position (Figure 2.2). 
Specifically, ,( )
b
t t h tb θ θ θ= − and ,( )
g
t t h tg θ θ θ= − , where tθ  is target 
direction, ,b t
hθ  and 
,g t
hθ  are average absolute angles of final hand position in 
trials towards target t during baseline and testing, respectively. Using this 
information we can compute the percent adaptation, that is, the difference 
between testing and baseline in the each direction relative to the learning 
direction lθ  (Figure 2.3C): 
( ) ( )
percent adaptation( ) 100
( ) ( )
t t
t
l l
g b
g b
θ θ
θ
θ θ
−
= ×
−
 
 
Notice that a positive absolute angle of final hand position or percent 
adaptation corresponds to a hand movement that counteracts the mean of 
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the distribution of perturbations. We use one of these two measures in every 
figure and analysis (with the exception of Figure 2.1A and 2.3E where the 
true sign of final hand angle is displayed). 
Time-scales of learning. To compute the time scales and amount of 
adaptation we considered only the first block of learning for each subject 
(n=8, n=4 and n=4 for 
pσ =0
o, 4o and 12o, respectively). We then fitted 
exponential learning curves that were constrained to start at zero. We used 
bootstrapping over trials to determine the p-value for the differences 
between the timescales of learning and between adaptation at end of the 
learning sub-blocks.  
Correcting for the sign of the mean of the perturbation.  For part of 
the analysis (Figure 2.3D) we wanted to take into account the fact that, for 
some of the blocks, the mean of the imposed perturbation had negative sign 
(-30o). This was done with the objective of searching for aspects of 
generalization that could depend on the sign of the imposed perturbation. 
We did the correction by reflecting the target directions relative to the 
learning target direction; if we set the learning target direction, lθ  to be 
zero, then the corrected generalization function ( )
c
g θ  is defined as: 
( ) ( )cg gθ θ= − . 
Width of generalization. To determine the generalization width we 
used raised von Mises-like (circular Gaussian) functions:  
2 3cos( )
0 1 2 3 0 1( | , , , ) expg b b
β θ βθ β β β β −= +  2.1 
 
where θ  is target direction. We fitted these functions to each individual 
percent adaptation generalization.  We used 21/ β  as the estimate of 
generalization width. We excluded two subjects from this analysis because 
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the estimated width of their generalization in at least one of the uncertainty 
conditions was more than 10 standard deviations away from the mean of the 
remaining subjects’ widths for that uncertainty condition. 
Peak of generalization. To determine if there is a consistent 
asymmetry in the generalization pattern, we determined, for each subject 
and each uncertainty condition, the angle of maximum generalization given 
by the parameter 3β  in Equation 2.1. The sign of the parameter was 
corrected for the sign of the mean of the perturbation, more specifically, we 
multiplied 3β  by the sign of the mean of the perturbation. 
Effect size. To compute the minimum effect size, η , that would 
have been required for detecting an significant effect with probability above 
0.95 using a two-sample one-sided paired t-test at a significance level of 
0.05, we used the standard minimum detectable effect formula (e.g. see 
Zar, 1999) 
2 2
1 2
0.05,26 0.05,26( )
14
s s
t tη
+
= +  
where 1s  and 2s  are the estimated variances of widths for each uncertainty 
condition and ,tα ν  represents the value of the inverse of the cumulative t-
student distribution with ν  degrees of freedom at  1 α− . 
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3.1 Summary 
Bayesian statistics defines how new information, given by a likelihood, 
should be combined with previously acquired information, given by a prior 
distribution. Many experiments have shown that humans make use of such 
priors in cognitive, perceptual, and motor tasks, but where do priors come 
from? As people never experience the same situation twice, they can only 
construct priors by generalizing from similar past experiences. Here we 
examine the generalization of priors over stochastic visuomotor 
perturbations in reaching experiments. In particular, we look into how the 
first two moments of the prior - the mean and variance (uncertainty) - 
generalize. We find that uncertainty appears to generalize differently from 
the mean of the prior, and an interesting asymmetry arises when the mean 
and the uncertainty are manipulated simultaneously. 
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3.2 Introduction 
People use priors during sensorimotor tasks, and such priors allow 
perception and movement to be more accurate in many situations (Alais and 
Burr, 2004; Jazayeri and Shadlen, 2009; Körding and Wolpert, 2004a; 
Tassinari et al., 2006). In Bayesian statistics the prior reflects information 
accumulated from previous experience, which is then combined with 
incoming sensory feedback (the likelihood). As we interact with the world, 
we learn about its statistics (e.g. means and variances) and incorporate this 
information into our priors. However, since we are never in the same 
situation twice, we must use past information from different but similar 
situations to derive the right prior beliefs for a specific task. Only by 
generalizing from past situations to our current one can we calculate what to 
expect. 
In asking how humans generalize priors it is essential to understand 
how we represent uncertainty. There are a number of models of how the 
nervous system might represent uncertainty (Fiser et al., 2010a; Hoyer and 
Hyvärinen, 2003; Ma et al., 2006). However, there is limited experimental 
evidence to constrain these models. Many electrophysiological experiments 
have probed how single neurons represent movement-related variables 
such as hand-direction, speed, or muscle activity (Georgopoulos et al., 
1992; Kakei et al., 1999; Moran and Schwartz, 1999; Sergio et al., 2005), 
but relatively little is known about the neural representation of uncertainty in 
sensorimotor tasks (Britten et al., 1992; Cisek and Kalaska, 2005; Rickert et 
al., 2009). Furthermore, to our knowledge, none of the theoretical models for 
neural representations of uncertainty makes any prediction for 
generalization of priors nor is there an established normative conjecture for 
how behaviors should generalize. 
One way of characterizing the generalization of priors comes from 
previous generalization experiments in motor control (Donchin et al., 2003; 
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Ghahramani et al., 1996a; Mattar and Ostry, 2007; Shadmehr, 2004; 
Thoroughman and Shadmehr, 2000). During center-out reaching, training 
with a rotational perturbation in one direction biases movements to nearby 
targets, and this bias decreases with increasing distance from the training 
direction (Krakauer et al., 2000). Previous studies have looked into whether 
uncertainty affects this generalization pattern (Fernandes et al., 2012). 
However how uncertainty itself might generalize is unknown.  
Here, we manipulated the mean and the variance (uncertainty) of a noisy 
visuomotor rotation (the prior) imposed during movements in one (training) 
direction. After training, we examined subjects' movements in test directions 
and measured subjects' uncertainty by probing their reliance on feedback 
(the likelihood) (Körding and Wolpert, 2004). In a first experiment we 
manipulated the variance without changing the mean. As with standard 
rotational generalization, we found a strong local effect where subjects' 
uncertainty peaks in the training direction and decreases with increasing 
distance. However, unlike standard rotational generalization, we found that 
changes in uncertainty had a global effect. In a second experiment we 
manipulated the variance while introducing a mean perturbation and 
observed interesting nonlinear interactions between mean and variance -- 
subjects had the highest uncertainty not in the training direction but in a 
direction away from the perturbation.  
 
 
3.3 Materials and Methods 
 
Ethics statement. The study and all experimental protocols were approved 
by the Northwestern University Institutional Review Board and are in 
accordance with the Northwestern University Institutional Review Board’s 
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policy statement on the use of human subjects in experiments. Written 
informed consent was obtained from all participants. 
 
Experimental protocol. General. Forty right-handed healthy subjects (15 
male, 25 female; aged 28.5±3.5 years) participated in the experiments; n=32 
in Experiment 1 and n=8 in Experiment 2. All were naive to the purpose of 
the experiments, and were paid according to their performance. Subjects 
made center-out reaches in a 150 x 150 mm workspace. They controlled the 
position of a cursor with their right index finger, which was recorded using 
an Optotrak 3D Investigator Motion Capture System. A projector and mirror 
system was calibrated such that visual feedback was perceived as being in 
the movement plane (Figure 3.1A and Fernandes et al., 2012), and the 
subject's view of their hand was blocked by the mirror. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Experimental setup and typical trajectory data. A, Subjects move a 
hidden cursor from a starting position to a target (yellow) by moving their occluded 
right index finger. We measure the generalization of the learned variance of a 
perturbation utilizing the response to a noisy midpoint cursor feedback (red dots). B, 
Experiment 1, with zero mean perturbation. Subject’s hand and cursor position 
during learning trials (red trials, black average). Average trajectories for generalizing 
directions are shown as black dashed lines (corresponding targets are black dots). 
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The position where midpoint feedback is triggered is denoted by the red line. C, 
Experiment 2, where the absolute mean perturbation is 30
o
. Same notation as (B). 
 
The task was designed to measure how subjects generalize a 
learned variance (and the learned mean) of a noisy visuomotor rotation, that 
is, how the uncertainty related to a perturbation learned during movements 
into one direction affects subsequent movements into other, test directions. 
The experiments combined two previously existing paradigms; one that 
allows measurement of generalization of the mean of perturbations 
(Fernandes et al., 2012; Krakauer et al., 2000) and another that allows 
measurement of how uncertain subjects are of a perturbation (Körding and 
Wolpert, 2004). 
Subjects were instructed to make reaches into a certain direction 
(the learning direction) until they adapted to the perturbations. During this 
period subjects were given endpoint feedback, and were eventually able to 
correct endpoint errors in the learning direction. Afterwards, they were 
instructed to make movements into other directions (the generalizing 
directions) in order to measure the generalization patterns of the learned 
mean and of the learned variance of the perturbation. Generalization 
patterns were assessed by using the fact that subjects combine their 
previous knowledge about the distribution of perturbations (the prior) and 
the feedback (the likelihood, see below) that they receive midway through 
the movement about the true position of the cursor weighted by their relative 
uncertainties (Körding and Wolpert, 2004). The ideal way to combine these 
two sources of information is to combine the means of the prior and 
likelihood, weighted by their relative precision (the inverse of the variance). 
Assuming that subjects combine this information optimally we can measure 
their relative uncertainty by computing the slope of a linear regression of the 
negative of final hand position (subjects’ estimated perturbation) as a 
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function of the perturbation (see Equations 3.1 and 3.2 and Figure 3.2A). 
Analogously we are able to simultaneously measure the mean of the prior 
(see Equation 3.3). 
In order to probe uncertainty, 5 red circles identical to the cursor are 
flashed midway through every trial reach: the midpoint feedback (likelihood). 
The position of these dots is sampled from an isotropic two-dimensional 
Normal distribution centered on the true position of the cursor with variance 
~5.1mm (chosen empirically to avoid complete reliance on either prior or 
likelihood, see below). Hence they give uncertain information about the true 
position of the cursor. The midpoint feedback is shown already during the 
familiarization block. This way subjects get a better idea of how the dots 
relate to the position of the cursor. We use the final hand position to 
measure the level of uncertainty that the subject has on the hidden cursor 
position. Describing it within the nomenclature of the Bayesian framework, 
the perturbation is sampled from a distribution with defined mean and 
variance and which is approximated by the prior, the midway flashing dots 
that give uncertain information about the true position of the red cursor 
correspond to the likelihood and the estimated perturbation corresponds to 
the mean of the posterior. By looking at the slope of the negative of the final 
hand position (mean of the posterior) as a linear function of the perturbation 
(Figure 3.2A) we can estimate the relative reliance on prior information -- 
relative to midpoint feedback information (Körding and Wolpert, 2004). 
Hence we can compute a relative measure of subjects’ learned and 
generalized uncertainty.  
The learning direction was randomly sampled from one of the 4 
diagonal directions and generalization was measured in 7 directions 
displayed at 180o, ±90o, ±45o and ±25o degrees from the learning direction. 
Subjects control the position of a red circle, the cursor (~3mm radius), with 
their right index finger. Except for the first familiarization trials the position of 
the cursor is hidden. Subjects were instructed to make radial reaches from a 
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central blue circle, the starting circle (~6mm radius) to one of 8 yellow 
circles, the targets (~6mm radius). Targets were all displayed at a distance 
of 72mm from the central blue circle. 300ms after positioning the cursor over 
the blue circle, the cursor disappeared, one of the eight targets appeared 
and subjects had to reach it. On some of the trials the final position of the 
cursor was displayed for 500ms (endpoint feedback). If the reach was 
successful, that is, if the center of the red cursor was inside the target then 
the target turned white and subjects were rewarded by having a point added 
to their score. If a successful reach happened in those trials where no 
information was provided about the success of the reach (no endpoint 
feedback) then a point was added to a hidden score. To begin the next trial, 
subjects had to reposition the cursor in the starting blue circle. Except for 
the familiarization trials where the cursor was always visible, the cursor was 
visible only within a distance of 10mm from the center of the starting blue 
circle. Since some subjects have difficulty finding their way back to the 
starting blue circle, 4 seconds after the previous trial was over, the cursor 
flashed every second for 50ms to allow subjects to find the starting position. 
The study comprised two experiments; Experiments 1 and 2. The 
experiments differ in that the mean of the imposed perturbations is zero in 
Experiment 1 and nonzero in Experiment 2. 
 
Experiment 1: Generalization of uncertainty under zero mean rotation. 
The goal of Experiment 1 is to measure the generalization pattern of 
uncertainty. The experiment begins with an initial Familiarization block (40 
trials, 5 movements to each target) where the cursor is always visible. No 
rotation was imposed during the familiarization block. After that, the 
experiment is divided into two blocks of 720 trials, one for each level of 
variability (std: 4o or 12o). The two blocks differ only in level of variance and 
their order is pseudo-randomized across subjects. 
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Each block of 720 trials is composed by a Learning and a Testing 
sub-blocks. The learning direction is the same for both blocks, but selected 
randomly for each subject from 4 possible directions; ±45o and ±135o. The 
maximum time to complete each trial is 4 seconds and there is a minimum 
time of 400ms to complete the second half of the reach. If any of these 
times is violated the trial is restarted. The minimum time threshold is to 
guarantee that subjects have enough time to integrate the midpoint 
feedback information. 
Learning. Subjects complete 240 trials of movements towards a 
single learning target with midpoint (the cloud of circles flashed midway 
through the movement) and endpoint feedback. The cursor is hidden and 
rotated relative to hand position. The rotations applied within each block are 
sampled from the same normal distribution with mean 0o and standard 
deviation pseudo-randomly chosen to be either 4o or 12o. 
Testing Uncertainty. The testing uncertainty sub-block (480 trials) is 
composed by sequences of 4 trials. In order to prevent forgetting of the 
perturbation the first 2 trials of these sequences are towards the learning 
direction and the other 2 towards any 2 of the 8 possible directions. Targets 
are chosen pseudo-randomly so that exactly 20 reaches are made towards 
each generalization target.  Endpoint feedback is provided only in trials 
towards the learning direction and midpoint feedback is provided in all 
directions. 
 
Experiment 2: Generalization of uncertainty under nonzero mean 
rotation. Experiment 2 is aimed at measuring the generalization pattern of 
mean and variance when both are perturbed simultaneously. The purpose 
of Experiment 2 is to distinguish between the abstract Bayesian models that 
explain the data of Experiment 1 and to see how changing the mean of a 
perturbation influences the generalization of uncertainty. Hence, the 
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difference between Experiments 1 and 2 is essentially that in Experiment 2 
the perturbations have a nonzero mean. The experiment starts with a 
Familiarization block (40 trials) just like the one in Experiment 1, and it is 
then divided into two blocks of 880 trials. The reason for the larger number 
of trials is that there is an extra sub-block between the Learning (240 trials) 
and the Testing Uncertainty (480 trials) sub-blocks; the Testing Mean sub-
block (160 trials).  
Testing Mean. Sub-block for measuring the generalization of the 
mean (160 trials). This sub-block allows us to measure directly how each 
subject generalized the mean of the perturbation (see Figure 3.5A, B). 
Subjects make reaches towards all targets. Endpoint feedback and midpoint 
feedback are provided only in the learning direction trials. In order to prevent 
de-adaptation to the perturbation, the learning target is revisited at least 
twice every 4 trials; every sequence of 4 trials is composed by two reaches 
towards the learning target and two reaches towards any two of the 8 
targets. Targets are chosen pseudo-randomly so that there are in total 10 
reaches towards each of the generalizing directions. Even though midpoint 
feedback is not displayed in movements towards generalizing direction, 
there is still a minimum amount of time to complete the second part of the 
movement in every trial. Hence, subjects still slow down halfway through the 
movement as in the trials where midpoint feedback is displayed.  
We can then use these measurements of the generalization of the 
mean during the Testing Uncertainty sub-block; in each target direction, the 
perturbation will have a mean equal to how much the subject generalized 
the learned mean to that direction (as measured in the Testing Mean sub-
block, see Figure 3.5A, B). Notice that, even though there is no endpoint 
feedback during Testing Uncertainty, if the mean perturbation doesn’t match 
the subject’s generalized mean then the midpoint feedback could perturb 
subjects learned mean and uncertainty, and, consequently the 
measurement of generalization of uncertainty. Hence, by matching the 
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mean of the probing perturbation in each of the generalizing directions with 
the learned mean, we minimize the possibility of subjects learning from the 
midpoint feedback information (see description of the experimental design 
below for further details regarding this issue).  
 
Experimental protocol. Details. There are two important details to be 
noticed regarding the experimental design of both experiments.  
It is not possible to measure a baseline for uncertainty using this protocol. It 
is not possible to measure a baseline for relative reliance on midpoint 
feedback due to the fact that we need to introduce a perturbation to 
measure the slope (Equation 3.1 and 3.2 and Figure 3.2A). For that reason 
we measured the generalization of two different levels of variability – 
standard deviation of 4o and 12o. These standard deviation values were 
chosen empirically based on several constrains that the task imposes: at the 
same time that both values need to be sufficiently different, the smaller 
variance cannot be too small otherwise the range of the perturbations is not 
large enough to measure the relative reliance on midpoint feedback (the 
slope of a linear regression) with a reasonable confidence interval. The 
higher variance condition cannot be too large otherwise it could introduce 
nonlinearities (Körding et al., 2007; Wei and Kording, 2009) and because of 
the constrains inherent of working in a circular support. The standard 
deviation of the likelihood was chosen empirically so that the slopes would 
be close to 0.5. This is the range where behavior is influenced equally by 
prior and likelihood, and thus where fluctuations in uncertainty will have the 
most effect. Several values were tested while designing the experiment, 
starting with the theoretical value that would produce the desired slope and 
changing it until values obtained for the slope were around 0.5. 
In the generalizing directions, the standard deviation of the perturbation 
used to probe uncertainty is the same regardless of the standard deviation 
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of the imposed perturbation in the learning direction. Since midpoint 
feedback is necessary to measure subject's relative uncertainty, special 
care is needed to ensure that this feedback does not bias measurements of 
generalization. Differences in learning and sensorimotor integration could 
both lead to spurious differences in the patterns of relative uncertainty. In 
both experiments we do not provide endpoint feedback in the generalizing 
directions. In Experiment 1 this is enough to ensure that differences in 
generalization patterns cannot be due to learning during the testing phase. 
However, during both experiments, perturbed midpoint feedback is the only 
method to measure each subject's relative uncertainty. The spread and 
timing of the midpoint feedback was the same across the two variance 
conditions. Additionally, we set the variance of the perturbation in the 
generalization directions to the geometric mean of the two standard 
deviations used in the learning directions, namely 124 × o. This 
guarantees that the only difference in the distribution of perturbations 
between the blocks of trials during movements in the learning direction. The 
important consequence is that, even if the midpoint feedback allowed 
subjects to learn during generalization trials, learning would only act to bring 
the two generalizations curves closer together. The methods used here, 
thus, set a lower bound on the distance between the generalization patterns 
for the two variance conditions. 
 
Data analysis. General. 
Final hand position and estimated perturbation. In this paradigm, the final 
hand position angle, fhθ  angle gives us a measure of subjects estimated 
perturbation θ̂ , specifically; fhθ̂ θ= − . We compute the final hand position 
for each trial by averaging the last data point before the hand goes beyond a 
distance of 72mm – the target distance – from the center of the starting 
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circle and the first data point after that. Every trial was restarted if subjects 
didn’t go beyond the target distance, thus fhθ  and θ̂  are defined for every 
trial. 
 
Measuring generalization of uncertainty; relative reliance on midpoint 
feedback (slope). We assume that the estimated perturbation corresponds 
to the mean of the posterior (Körding and Wolpert, 2004). Assuming 
Gaussian distributions, an ideal observer/actor would combine information 
from their prior over cursor perturbations (
pθ ) and the perturbation angle 
sensed from the midpoint feedback information (
fθ ) weighting their values 
by their relative precisions, according to   
2 2
2 2 2 2
ˆ f p
p f
p f p f
σ σ
θ θ θ
σ σ σ σ
= +
+ +
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Where 2
pσ  and 
2
fσ  denote subjects’ uncertainty in prior and midpoint 
feedback respectively. Subjects estimated angle of the perturbation (θ̂ ) is 
reflected in the angle of their final hand position. As a proxy for the sensed 
perturbation angle (
fθ ) we use the real perturbation angle corrected (see 
below) for the bias in the centroid of the sampled flashing dots of the 
likelihood. That is, instead of considering the real perturbation angle we 
considered the angle that a vector from the center of the central blue circle 
to the centroid of the flashing dots would do with the target direction if the 
subject had moved straight to the target. Importantly, this equation allows us 
to estimate the relative learned variance of the prior for each generalizing 
direction, and to compute a relative generalization function for uncertainty. 
We estimate the value of the slope (
ps ) 
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for each variance condition and direction using linear regression (Figure 
3.2A) – we use the median of bootstrap samples to reduce the influence of 
outliers when computing the slopes. This slope, the relative uncertainty, 
serves as the basis for most of our analysis. The centroid adjustment and 
bootstrapped slope estimates provide more robust measures of behavior, 
but using unadjusted perturbations and maximum likelihood estimated slope 
produce qualitatively very similar results. 
 
Measuring generalization of the mean.  
Inferred mean. We are able to infer the mean of the prior in both 
experiments using the data from the testing uncertainty block. We do this by 
computing the intercept of a linear regression; we can rearrange Equation 
3.1 to obtain   
2 2
2
ˆ( )
f p
f p f
f
σ σ
θ θ θ θ
σ
+
= + −   3.3 
We can hence, for each target direction, use as estimate of the subjects’ 
mean of the prior,
pθ , the intercept of linear regression of fθ  as a function of 
ˆ
fθ θ− . 
Direct measurement of the prior’s mean. In Experiment 2, during the testing 
mean block, we were able to directly measure generalization of the mean in 
each of the generalizing direction; during the trials in the generalizing 
directions of the testing mean sub-block, subjects were not shown midpoint 
feedback (the likelihood) and hence their estimate - as inferred by final hand 
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position - is assumed to be the mean of the prior distribution. Using this 
information we were able to compute, during the experiment, the means of 
the perturbations used to probe uncertainty in the generalizing directions 
during the testing uncertainty sub-block (see Experimental protocol above 
for details). During trials in the learning direction subjects were still shown 
midpoint feedback. Thus, their average final hand position during trials 
towards the learning direction is an estimate of the mean of the posterior 
and not of the prior. The generalization patterns obtained during the test of 
the mean block match very well the ones inferred using the data from the 
testing of uncertainty blocks (F1,7=3.27, p=0.11, two-way (testing block, 
direction) repeated measures (subject) ANOVA, see Figure 3.5B; see also 
Figure 3.5A first and second rows for individual subject data). The higher 
complexity of this task, relative to previous studies that measured 
generalization of means (Fernandes et al., 2012), lead to smaller variability 
(possibly due to smaller variability in cognitive strategies) across subjects. 
Absolute mean and percent adaptation. In Experiment 2, since for half of the 
subjects the mean of the perturbation was -30o, we normalized the 
estimated perturbation (as measured by the negative of the angle of final 
hand position) according to the sign of the mean of the perturbation; we 
multiplied by -1 the angle of the estimated perturbation if the mean of the 
perturbation was negative (-30o). Hence, a positive absolute mean 
corresponds to a movement that counteracts the perturbation. We call the 
measurements of the mean using this normalization the inferred absolute 
mean and the measured absolute mean. Using the absolute inferred mean 
we compute the percent adaptation, the amount of learned/generalized 
mean relative to the learned mean in the learning direction (Figure 3.4E). 
The percent adaptation in the learning direction is hence, by definition, 
100%.    
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Models for generalization.  
The models we consider are online learning models. They use gradient 
descent to learn the mean and standard deviation of the imposed prior; for 
each trial they use gradient descent to minimize the expected squared error 
between the target angle and the final cursor position angle. 
Consider the subjects’ original prior: 
0 0 0 0( , ) (0 , )p θ σ σ
°= =N N
   
.  
We assume that the original prior is the same for all directions. Throughout 
this section we generally use θ  to denote perturbation related angles and φ  
to denote target angles. Note that the perturbation angles θ  are always 
given relative to a target direction. 
We define a context function, ( )
l g
Wφ φ , for a target direction gφ  relative to 
the learning target direction lφ , as a scaled von Mises function: 
( ) ( )( )( )0 1exp cos /l g g lW b bφ φ φ φ α= + −    
 
where 0b  is a baseline for context, 1b  defines the width of the context and 
0 1exp( )b bα = +  is a normalization factor so that context is 1 in the learning 
direction, that is, ( ) 1
l l
Wφ φ = . This is the same as saying that generalization 
is complete in the learning direction. The context function can be interpreted 
as defining how similar the movement directions.  
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The Model’s parameters are: three context function parameters allowing for 
different context baselines for mean and variance, 0
pb
θ
, 0
pb
σ
, 1b ; the initial 
prior uncertainty 0σ  and likelihood uncertainty fσ  and the learning rates of 
mean and variance, 
pθ
η  and 
pσ
η . These 7 parameters were enough to 
produce good fits to the data from the first block. However, we observed 
that, none of the models managed to capture decreases in the variance of 
the prior during the second block. For this reason and to account for 
possible differences between the learning and the testing blocks, we added 
an extra parameter that scales the model’s output of prior uncertainty at the 
end of learning before fitting it to the testing data. Hence both Models 1 and 
2 have a total of 8 parameters. While Model 1 is the target centered, Model 
2 tests the hypothesis that generalization of variance has a non-target 
centered reference frame; the visual feedback information. 
 
Model 1. Gradient descent with target centered reference frame. On each i-
th trial of the learning block, the subject is trying to minimize the squared 
error between the target angle and the final cursor position angle, that is, 
trying to learn the mean ˆpθ  and variance 
2ˆ
pσ  of the prior imposed in the 
learning direction  such that 
( )
,
ˆ ˆ( , ) arg min , ,l l
p p
i
p p p p
e
φ φ
θ σ
θ σ θ θ σ=
   
 
where iθ  is the perturbation imposed during the i-th trial and 
( ) ( )( )
2
ˆ, , ,i ip p p pe θ θ σ θ θ θ σ= − where ( )ˆ ,p pθ θ σ   is defined in Equation 
3.1. The model takes as input the learning trials and assumes that the 
standard deviation and mean of the subject's prior evolve according to  
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Model 2. Gradient descent with difference frames of reference; visual 
feedback centered context for generalization for variance. The only 
difference between the models is that the context function for uncertainty in 
the prior (standard deviation, 
pσ ) is centered on the angle of the centroid of 
the displayed cloud of dots, cφ , while the context function for the mean 
remains centered on the learning target direction, lφ : 
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In order to avoid using behavioral data obtained during the learning block, 
the model uses the predicted position of the cloud of dots as a proxy for cφ . 
This predicted position is obtained by computing, give the trial perturbation, 
where the cloud of dots would appear if the subject performed a straight 
center-out movement corrected by the current mean of the prior. Equivalent 
results were obtained when data from the learning block, the actual angle of 
centroid of the cloud of dots, was used. However, using only testing data 
allows for a fair comparison of all models, and allows us to simulate the 
models even in the absence of behavioral data.  
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Computing the gradient 
To compute the partial derivative of the error function, ( ), ,i p pe θ θ σ , we 
observe that 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 2
ˆ, , , (1 )i i ip p p p p f p pe s sθ θ σ θ θ θ σ θ θ θ= − = − − −  
where  ( )2 2 2/p p p fs σ σ σ= +  and θ̂  is defined in Equation 3.1. 
 
Applying the chain rule we obtain the partial derivatives: 
( ) ( )
( )
2 2
22 2
2 2
2 2
p fi
p p f p f p
p p f
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θ θ θ θ θ θ σ
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( )( )( )2 1 1p p p p f p
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Model fitting.  
We fitted the models to the slope and mean data of each subject by 
minimizing the squared distance to the subjects slope and mean in each 
direction weighted by the precision (inverse variance, obtained using 
bootstrapping) of each data point. To account for discrepancies between the 
learning and testing blocks, both models have an additional scaling 
parameter that allows us to fit the output of the learning model to subject’s 
prior uncertainty during testing. To compare models (Figure 3.7) we 
bootstrap over the average difference between the weighted RMSE across 
subjects. 
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3.4 Results 
Here we ask how a noisy perturbation in one, training direction affects 
reaches into other directions. In particular, we aim to extend movement 
generalization studies by understanding how both the mean and the 
variance of a training perturbation affect other movements. Subjects 
controlled the position of a hidden cursor with their right index finger while 
their true hand position was occluded by a projector mirror system (Figure 
3.1). They made reaches from the workspace center to one of eight 
concentric targets with a visuomotor rotation applied to the hidden cursor 
position. The visuomotor rotation was drawn randomly each trial from a 
Gaussian distribution with fixed mean and variance. During learning 
subjects were incentivized (see Materials and Methods) to make reaches 
to one of the targets (training) and received endpoint feedback that allowed 
them to adapt to the perturbations. During testing subjects also made 
reaches to the other targets, without endpoint error feedback, allowing us to 
probe generalization. All subjects went through 2 blocks of training, each 
with a different variance (
pσ : 4
o or 12o). We measured how the learned 
variance generalizes, first without perturbing the mean (Experiment 1) and 
then while also perturbing the mean (Experiment 2). 
As subjects adapt to the noisy visuomotor rotations they update their 
knowledge of both the mean and variance of the perturbations. We can 
probe subjects' prior uncertainty by providing noisy feedback about the 
cursor position midway through the movement in the form of a cloud of dots 
(Körding and Wolpert, 2004). Subjects (n=32 in Experiment 1 and n=8 in 
Experiment 2) use this midpoint feedback information to correct their 
movements during each reach (Figure 3.1) and they rely more on feedback 
the more uncertain they are about the cursor position. Computing the slope 
of the negative of final hand position angle (proxy for estimated perturbation) 
as a function of the perturbation angle (proxy for perturbation sensed via 
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midpoint feedback) provides a measure of the uncertainty that subjects have 
about the expected perturbations (prior uncertainty) relative to uncertainty 
about the midpoint feedback (likelihood uncertainty) (Körding and Wolpert, 
2004). Intuitively we can see that, if subjects are very certain about the 
perturbation (low prior uncertainty) then they will tend to ignore the noisy 
midpoint feedback information and the slope will have a value closer to zero. 
If on the other hand they have a high prior uncertainty relative to the 
uncertainty in the midpoint feedback, they will tend to rely only on midpoint 
feedback and hence the slope will have a value of one. For standard 
Bayesian integration using Gaussian distributions (Körding and Wolpert, 
2004), the slope 
ps  is given by 
2
2 2
p
p
p f
s
σ
σ σ
=
+
 
where  2
pσ  and 
2
fσ   are the variances of the prior and likelihood 
distributions, respectively (see Materials and Methods for details). Hence, 
larger slopes indicate a higher reliance on sensory feedback and higher 
uncertainty about the perturbations (see Figure 3.2A). Whether subjects are 
Bayesian or not, their slope is a measure of how uncertain they are about 
the hidden perturbation. 
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Figure 3.2. Experiment 1: Relative reliance on midpoint feedback (slope) across 
directions. A, Probing uncertainty in the prior by computing the relative reliance on 
midpoint feedback. Estimated perturbation as a function of the perturbation angle, 
for a typical subject, in the learning direction and in one generalizing direction (+90
o
) 
during the testing phase. Solid lines denote linear fits to the data. Insets: Slope or 
relative reliance on midpoint feedback (±SE) during movements in that direction for 
this subject. B, Learning for two groups of subjects: subjects that started with the 
low variance condition and subjects that started with high variance condition. 
Colored lines are average slopes (±SEM) across subjects considering bins of 20 
trials. Black curves are exponential fits. C, Relative reliance on feedback for the two 
levels of prior uncertainty as a function of target direction relative to learning 
direction. Mean (±SEM) of slopes across all subjects. D, Inferred mean of prior for 
the two levels of uncertainty as a function target direction relative to learning 
direction. Mean (±SEM) of slopes across all subjects. 
 
 
Experiment 1  
We first wanted to know how uncertainty generalizes with a zero mean 
perturbation. We find that subjects learn about the variance and exhibit 
smaller slopes for the small variance condition than for the high variance 
condition (Figure 3.2B). This is what we should expect since a smaller slope 
implies that the subject relies less on the midpoint feedback and, hence, that 
the subject is more certain a priori about the hidden cursor position. 
Furthermore, learning curves under the same variance condition converge 
to the same value during the learning phase, no matter which condition 
subjects started in and appear to saturate before we assess generalization. 
We do not find a significant difference between the slopes in the two groups 
of subjects after training (F(1,472)=0.95, p=0.33, four-way nested ANOVA over 
subject, variance, group, target direction where subject is nested in group). 
By the end of each learning block subjects have adapted to the new 
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variance condition. In the following analysis we thus combine data across 
groups to ask how subjects generalize this learned variance. 
 
 
Figure 3.3.  Individual subject slope data for Experiment 1. Error bars are ±SEM 
(bootstrap). Lines are Model 2 (see Models) fits to individual subjects. Black and 
orange bar (inset) indicates the order in which the different uncertainty blocks were 
presented to each subject. 
 
To examine generalization of uncertainty we quantify subjects' reliance on 
midpoint feedback (as measured with the slope) as a function of the 
direction of movement. We find that the reliance on midpoint feedback 
(Figure 3.2C; see Figure 3.3 for individual subject data) is significantly 
different between the two variance conditions (F(1,31)=65.13, p<10E-8, two-
way repeated measures ANOVA) and slopes for the high variance condition 
are higher than those for the low variance condition for movements into all 
directions (p≤0.006, for every direction, paired t-tests, n=32). Uncertainty in 
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the prior (as measured by the relative reliance on midpoint feedback) 
increases in all directions and decays with increasing distance from the 
learning direction. Unlike the mean (Experiment 2 below and Fernandes et 
al., 2012, but see Taylor and Ivry), uncertainty appears to have a strong 
global component. 
Even though the perturbation had zero mean, we can infer the mean of the 
subject’s prior by analyzing the intercept of a linear regression using data 
from the testing block (see Materials and Methods for details). As with the 
slopes, we do not find a significant difference between the inferred means in 
the two groups of subjects (F(1,472)~0, p~0.97, four-way nested ANOVA) 
which allows us to pool the data of both groups. We find an interesting 
asymmetry consistent with use-dependent learning/adaptation theory 
(Diedrichsen et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2011; Verstynen and Sabes, 2011); 
in the reaches towards targets that neighbor the learning target, hand 
movements are biased towards the learning target and this bias decays with 
distance from the learning target (Figure 3.2). Furthermore the bias is 
stronger in the low variance condition (p<0.001 for both 22.5o target 
directions, paired t-tests) when movements tend to be less variable and 
hand position covers a narrower region. We observed signs of a similar 
effect in a previous study exploring generalization of the mean (Fernandes 
et al., 2012). We can see it clearly here in the absence of mean adaptation, 
and where possibly the large number of subjects and the increased 
complexity of the task (reduced cognitive strategies and across subject 
variability) makes the effect more observable. These results suggest a weak 
use-dependent learning effect in this experiment. 
Experiment 1 is the analogous for uncertainty of previous generalization 
studies that measured the generalization of fixed visuomotor perturbations 
(Krakauer et al., 2000), i.e., the generalization of the mean of the prior with 
zero imposed variance/uncertainty. In a previous study we showed that the 
generalization of the mean seems to be unaffected by changes in prior 
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uncertainty (Fernandes et al., 2012).  Fully understanding the generalization 
of uncertainty requires some understanding of how simultaneously 
perturbing the mean affects the generalization of uncertainty. Experiment 2 
aims to characterize these interactions and differences between 
generalization of the mean and variance. 
 
Experiment 2  
In Experiment 2 our aim is to characterize how the mean of a perturbation 
affects the generalization of uncertainty. As in Experiment 1, it is important 
to quantify the effects of the different perturbation variances and to 
determine whether training order (i.e., high-to-low vs low-to-high variance) 
matters. Subjects (n=8) readily learned the perturbation variance (Figure 
3.4A), even with the addition of a non-zero mean perturbation, and we found 
that, in block 1, the reliance on midpoint feedback (slope) (Figure 3.4B) is 
significantly different between the two variance conditions (F(1,8)=19.72, 
p=0.02, two-way repeated measures ANOVA). However, in Experiment 2 
we found a significant difference in reliance on midpoint feedback between 
the two groups of subjects after training (F(1,112)=8.7, p=0.004, four-way 
nested ANOVA -- subject, variance, group, direction where subject is nested 
in group). In particular, there are signs of interference in Block 2 (Figure 
3.4B, C). As savings and interference are a hallmark feature of motor 
learning (Brashers-Krug et al., 1996; Krakauer et al., 1999) it is not 
surprising that we should also see them here. Because the order of training 
now matters we will present and analyze the data from the two blocks 
separately. 
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Figure 3.4. Experiment 2. A, Learning of uncertainty for the two groups of subjects: 
subjects that started with the low variance condition and subjects that started with 
high variance condition. Colored lines are average slopes (±SEM) across subjects 
considering bins of 20 trials. B–C, Relative reliance on midpoint feedback for the 
two levels of prior uncertainty as a function of target direction relative to mean of 
perturbation (±30
o
) following the first (B) and second (C) learning blocks. Mean 
(±SEM) of slopes across all subjects (n=8) in Experiment 2 (opaque solid lines). The 
transparent lines are the results of Experiment 1 (same data as in Figure 3.2C). D, 
Inferred mean of prior (±SEM) in the generalizing directions relative to the learning 
direction (baseline was not measured in this experiment and hence not taken into 
consideration in this quantification). E, Inferred percent adaptation (±SEM) for the 
mean in the generalizing directions relative to the learning direction. 
 
In contrast to Experiment 1, here we find a strong asymmetry in the 
generalization of uncertainty (Figure 3.4B, C; see Figure 3.5A for individual 
subject data). The generalized uncertainty as measured by the relative 
reliance on midpoint feedback is higher than expected for the neighboring 
targets on one of the sides of the training direction, even higher than the 
learned uncertainty in the training direction. These directions of higher 
uncertainty correspond to the opposite direction to where the hand has to 
move to correct for the perturbation -- that is, the direction of the mean of 
the perturbation. These are the directions where the midpoint visual 
feedback is more often displayed during early learning. Furthermore this 
asymmetry is observed consistently across subjects (Figure 3.5A, C) and 
seems to be robust to any subject-specific cognitive strategies (Taylor and 
Ivry). We find that when changed simultaneously, the mean and variance of 
perturbations have asymmetric effects in the generalization of the variance 
of the prior over those perturbations. 
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Figure 3.5. Individual subject data for Experiment 2, and further data analysis. A, 
Error bars are ±SEM (bootstrap). Black and orange bar (first row, inset) indicates 
the order in which the different uncertainty blocks were presented to each subject. 
Lines in second and thirst row are Model 2 (see Models) fits to individual subjects. 
B, Generalization of mean measured during testing mean sub-block (opaque), 
compared with the inferred generalization of the mean (transparent, same as Figure 
3.4D during testing uncertainty sub-block. C, Generalization of mean and of relative 
reliance on midpoint feedback (slope) separated by sign of the mean of the 
perturbation. The asymmetry in generalization of uncertainty (slope) was stronger 
for the right handed subjects (lower panels). 
 
Since we find a surprising asymmetry in the generalization of variance in 
Experiment 2, it is reasonable to ask whether manipulating mean and 
variance simultaneously has a similar effect in the generalization of the 
mean. We find that the generalization of the mean angular perturbation is 
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local, with a width of about 30o, similar to what has been reported in 
previous studies (Fernandes et al., 2012; Krakauer et al., 2000) (Figure 
3.4D, E and Figure 3.5B). As in previous studies, with similar center-out 
reaching designs (Fernandes et al., 2012), generalization to targets at a 
±90o angular distance from the learning target is not significantly different 
from zero (p>0.13 for the ±90o targets in both uncertainty conditions, t-tests). 
Furthermore, in agreement with Experiment 1, in the directions that neighbor 
the learning target we observe an asymmetry consistent with use-dependent 
learning. Note that the use-dependent asymmetry, although reflected as an 
asymmetric generalization pattern in the mean, can be interpreted as 
movements close to the training direction being attracted by the direction 
where training occurred. 
 
Models 
If the amount of generalization depends only on similarity between contexts 
and context is symmetric around target then we would not expect to see an 
asymmetric pattern in the generalization of variance. In practice, however, 
the coordinate systems in which subjects try to solve the problem can have 
an influence on the generalization patterns. To allow for this possibility we 
hypothesized that the asymmetry could have arisen from a context that is 
not target centered. Do subjects learn about visual feedback position (Taylor 
et al., 2012) when generalizing uncertainty? 
To see if the data is consistent with this hypothesis and to implement 
models where feedback position is relevant, we need to consider the 
distribution of learning data. One natural way of implementing such a model 
is in terms of online gradient descent. Every trial, one goal of the movement 
system may be to update certain parameters so that future movements will 
be better -- we want to go down the gradient of errors (Taylor et al., 2012; 
Thoroughman and Shadmehr, 2000). We thus implemented two online 
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learning models that take the perturbations imposed during the learning 
trials. These models implement gradient descent on the value of, assumed 
(direction dependent) mean and variance in order to minimize the squared 
error between target angle and final cursor position angle of each trial (see 
Materials and Methods for details). Model 2 uses a coordinate system for 
generalization of variance related to the position of visual feedback while 
Model 1 uses only target-centered coordinates. This way of phrasing the 
problem allows us to consider the effect of the candidate coordinate 
systems on learning and generalization.  
 
 
Figure 3.6 Online learning models for different reference frames. A, Models fit 
(shaded area is ±SEM for M2 fits) for the slope data of Experiment 2 (same as 
Figure 3.4B, C, opaque). Error bars are ±SEM. B, Models fit for the mean data of 
Experiment 2. C, Models fit for mean and slope data (same as Figure 3.4B, C, 
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transparent) of Experiment 1. Error bars are ±1SEM. Lines are average across 
subjects of individual fits. Error bars are ±1SEM. 
 
We find that Model 2 captures the generalization patterns of both 
experiments (Figure 3.6; see Figure 3.3 and 3.5A second and third rows for 
individual subject fits). Importantly, Model 2 was able to capture the 
asymmetric generalization of uncertainty of Experiment 2 (Figure 3.6A) and, 
simultaneously, explain the data in Experiment 1 (Figure 3.6C) – except for 
the use-dependent effect. We find that, while none of the models is 
significantly better for Experiment 1 (p>0.14 for uncertainty and for mean; 
bootstrap of RMSE of individual fittings across subjects, see Figure 3.7A, 
C), Model 2 is better than Model 1 for Experiment 2 (p<10-4 for uncertainty; 
bootstrap individual fittings across subjects, see Figure 3.7B, D). Although 
lacking a normative interpretation/justification, using different reference 
frames for mean and variance and using gradient descent learning 
accurately captures the generalization patterns across experiments. 
 
 
3.5 Discussion 
Here we examined how priors over a stochastic visuomotor perturbation 
generalize. We examined in particular, how prior uncertainty, that is, 
knowledge of the trial-by-trial variability, generalizes.  We first tested 
generalization when we changed only the variance of the distribution of 
rotation perturbations and not the mean. We found that, similarly to standard 
generalization of visuomotor rotations, generalization of uncertainty has a 
local component. However, unlike the mean, it affects movements into all 
directions. We then tested how uncertainty generalizes when we introduce a 
stochastic perturbation with non-zero mean. We observed asymmetric 
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generalization that is qualitatively consistent with a descriptive, online 
learning model that assumes that mean and variance generalize according 
to different reference frames. 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Model comparison. A–D, Model comparison for Models 1 and 2 for 
Uncertainty (A and B) and for Mean (C and D). (Left) Weighted root mean square 
error (RMSE) across subjects (95% confidence intervals, bootstrap) of each model 
and of the difference between models for each subject. (Right) scatterplot of the 
RMSE for each subject for Models 1 and 2. 
 
 
In movement research, generalization experiments are usually interpreted 
as being directly related to neuronal tuning properties (Krakauer et al., 
2000a; Thoroughman and Shadmehr, 2000) (but see Pearson et al., 2010; 
Taylor and Ivry). Under this interpretation they constrain our 
conceptualization of neural computation and reveal a great deal about the 
neural basis of sensorimotor integration. We had seen evidence for some 
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independence in representation of mean and variance of priors in previous 
studies when we showed that uncertainty does not affect the width of 
generalization of the mean (Fernandes et al., 2012). The results of this 
study indicate that knowledge of the variance of external perturbations might 
be represented in a way that is distinct from the knowledge about the mean 
– both the extent of generalization and reference frames appear to differ. 
The degree to which the brain is “Bayesian” has been extensively debated 
over the last decade (Doya, 2007). Many studies have shown that the brain 
achieves Bayes-like behavior for familiar tasks (such as reaching) and that 
this behavior stems from ongoing learning (Berniker et al., 2010). Such 
general-purpose Bayesian behavior may result from a variety of non-
Bayesian/heuristic neural representations. Alternatively, Bayesian ideas 
may be far more fundamental to the organization of the brain in the sense 
that there is something Bayesian about the neural code itself. For example, 
spikes in populations of neurons might directly represent probability 
distributions, including their means and variances (Deneve, 2008; Fiser et 
al., 2010a; Hinton and Sejnowski, 1983a; Hoyer and Hyvärinen, 2003; Ma et 
al., 2006; Ma, 2010; Sahani and Dayan, 2003; Soltani and Wang, 2009; Wu 
et al., 2003; Zemel et al., 1998). None of these “Bayesian Brain” theories 
explicitly predicts generalization of uncertainty and, generalization is 
probably related to underlying neural representations in a more complex 
way than generally assumed in motor control research. However, 
dissociation between generalization of mean and variance emerges 
immediately from our results and produces an important challenge to 
extensions of “Bayesian brain” theories to generalization. 
The lack of computational predictions for generalization of priors, and of 
uncertainty in particular, is mirrored in experimental work where the focus 
both in behavioral as well as in electrophysiological studies in motor control 
has been on the generalization and representation of fixed perturbations 
without any trial-by-trial variability (but see Fernandes et al., 2012 and 
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Verstynen and Sabes, 2011). Previous work had not indicated that means 
and variances could generalize differently. 
Previous studies have shown that the reference frames for generalization 
depend on context, and that we expect different generalization patterns if 
different contexts are imposed (Berniker and Kording, 2008; Brayanov et al., 
2012; Taylor and Ivry). Studies that focus on the adaptation of the mean 
suggested that feedback plays an important role in adaptation (Huang et al., 
2011) and generalization (Taylor et al., 2012). Differences in visual error 
information lead to changes in generalization that can be explained by a 
neural network that assumes error feedback processing on a set of 
homogeneous and invariant tuning functions (Taylor et al., 2012). The use 
of the reference frame of visual feedback for the learning of the mean has 
thus been shown previously. This study suggests the use of a visual 
reference frame for the generalization of uncertainty. 
The model presented here makes several predictions for future experiments 
as well. Some studies look at what happens when perturbations are 
introduced gradually (Berniker and Kording, 2011; Kagerer et al., 1997; 
Turnham et al., 2012). If Model 2 is correct then we expect gradually 
introduced perturbation to produce a less asymmetric generalization curve 
for uncertainty, since the feedback would generally not appear so far away 
from target direction. Another interesting follow-up experiment would be to 
do the same set of experiments for visuomotor gain instead of visuomotor 
rotation - whose mean has been shown to generalize globally in minimal 
uncertainty conditions (Krakauer et al., 2000). 
The fact that the task was more complex than previous studies (Fernandes 
et al., 2012) allowed us to infer the mean of the prior with smaller variability 
across subjects. We find clear signs that movements are biased towards 
typical directions of previous hand movements, which is consistent with the 
use-dependent learning/adaptation hypothesis (Diedrichsen et al., 2010; 
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Huang et al., 2011; Verstynen and Sabes, 2011). We find this in both 
experiments and it is particularly evident in Experiment 1 where the mean of 
the distribution of stochastic perturbations was zero; this use-dependent 
asymmetry scales with the uncertainty level and exists even when there is 
zero mean perturbation. Although our model captures features of 
generalization patterns for both mean and uncertainty, it does not capture 
this use-dependent aspect of the generalization. Future work could account 
for these effects by incorporating a hand centered reference frame or other 
“model-free” learning processes (Huang et al., 2011). 
In fact, even though Model 2 is consistent with observed symmetry we 
cannot exclude that it might be caused by other mechanisms. It is not an 
unreasonable hypothesis that the same mechanism responsible for the use-
dependent asymmetry in the generalization of the mean is responsible for 
the asymmetry in the generalization of uncertainty. If this is true it happens 
in a way that is not obvious to us and future research could try to address it. 
Where priors come from and how they are represented are fundamental 
questions in learning and behavior. As we never experience the same 
situation twice, constructing priors depends crucially on our ability to 
generalize. However, generalization in both perception and action is a result 
of how the brain represents the external world. In perception research, 
studies that hypothesize priors based on the statistics of natural scenes 
(Burge et al., 2010; DiMattina et al., 2012; Geisler et al., 2001; Roth and 
Black, 2005) generally assume certain invariances where global 
generalization occurs along many dimensions of the stimulus. When 
calculating orientation priors, for instance, color and contrast are assumed 
to be irrelevant and only the statistics over orientation are considered 
important (Girshick et al., 2011). In movement research, it is generally 
assumed that the system is invariant to the content of the visual scene and 
that generalization only depends on (angular) distance (Krakauer et al., 
2000), velocity (Goodbody and Wolpert, 1998) or the way an object is held 
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(Ingram et al., 2010) (but see Taylor et al., 2012). For both perception and 
action, the nature of the underlying representations determines the shape of 
generalization. Quantifying the generalization of priors, taking uncertainty 
into account, allows new ways of understanding these representations. 
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4.1 Summary 
The two-alternative-forced-choice (2AFC) paradigm and the resulting just-
noticeable difference (JND), are generally assumed to quantify sensory 
uncertainty independent of a subject’s beliefs (i.e. their prior). This 
interpretation is consistent with the maximum a posteriori (MAP) decision 
theory, according to which subjects choose the option most probable (using 
a posterior distribution to represent subjective belief). However, a host of 
alternative decision-making theories, including sampling and matching, 
predict choices should be influenced by prior beliefs. Here we 
mathematically examine the predictions of these different theories and, 
using the results from an interleaved estimation and 2AFC task, find no 
influence of the subjects’ prior beliefs on their measured JNDs. These 
results are consistent with the MAP hypothesis, arguing against sampling 
theories of decision making. We propose that the 2AFC task is not a 
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straightforward tool for measuring subjects’ sensory precision, but rather a 
probe for theories of the neural representation of uncertainty. 
 
4.2 Introduction 
Every decision we make is a choice, constrained by our options and based 
on limited and uncertain information. For example, which lane on the 
highway should you drive in? which line at the grocery store should you wait 
in? Sometimes our options have clear differences, while other times the 
options and their outcomes are nearly identical and hard to distinguish. 
Though these decisions are commonplace and indicative of how we make 
choices in general, how people choose between multiple uncertain options 
remains largely unknown. 
There are multiple prominent theories describing how people make 
decisions under uncertainty. Normative theories assume that sensory 
information (generating a likelihood function) is optimally combined with our 
expectations (a prior distribution) into a belief (posterior distribution) over the 
outcome of our choices (e.g. the probability getting home early for each lane 
we drive in). Various theories on decision-making differ only in how a choice 
is made from this posterior probability. One alternative is that people choose 
the most probable alternative (the maximum a posteriori probability---MAP 
hypothesis). Alternatively, people may not be able to compute the most 
probable outcome, and must approximate it instead. Under this hypothesis, 
subjects draw one or more sample choices from their posterior, and 
compute the best sample statistic, the so-called “sampling hypothesis” (Vul 
et al., 2009). If subjects use only one sample, they are said to be “matching” 
(Vulkan, 2000; Wozny et al., 2010). Though both MAP and the sampling 
hypotheses offer very different predictions, they can both be viewed as 
optimal under the right assumptions (e.g., for MAP (Duda et al., 2012); for 
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sampling (Sakai and Fukai, 2008; Vul et al., 2009; Wozny et al., 2010)) and 
thus equally normative in their description of decision-making. 
The two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) task has been the workhorse of 
psychophysics and decision-making experiments for the last 150 years 
(Green and Swets, 1966). In this task, subjects are presented with two 
alternatives and forced to choose between them based on some 
experimentally defined attribute. For example, subjects may be asked to 
decide which of two flashes of light displayed on a screen is further to the 
left. By controlling the discrepancy between these cues (location of light 
flashes), experimenters can obtain a psychometric curve: the probability of a 
subject's response given the discrepancy between cues. This curve can 
then be used to quantify the just-noticeable-difference (JND), which is 
related to how different must the two cues be before subjects can reliably 
tell them apart (Green and Swets, 1966). Due to its simplicity and 
experimental benefits, the 2AFC task is used in a broad variety of sensory 
and cognitive domains to measure the JND. 
In the majority of circumstances, the 2AFC task and psychometric curve are 
assumed to characterize sensory precision (Ernst and Banks, 2002; Fetsch 
et al., 2011; Girshick et al., 2011; Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006; Tassinari et 
al., 2006). Importantly though, the resulting JND is thought to be 
independent of an individual's prior beliefs. This is beneficial for several 
reasons, not least of which because it precludes the possibility that the 
measured JND can be influenced by subject biases or experimental 
circumstances. However, how people perform the 2AFC task, and what the 
JND measures, relies crucially on how people make decisions under 
uncertainty; depending on the subjects' strategy, the JND may or may not 
be influenced by a subject's prior, confounding its interpretation as a 
measure of sensory precision. This confound raises concerns for the great 
number of studies that rely on psychometric curves and measured JNDs 
obtained in the 2AFC task. 
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Here we mathematically examine the MAP and sampling theories of 
decision-making and their influence on the 2AFC task and resulting JND. 
We demonstrate how if, after combining sensory and prior information, 
subjects choose the option that maximizes their posterior (i.e. the MAP 
answer) then the JND correctly measures a subject's sensory precision. 
However, if subjects choose according to the sampling hypothesis, the 
psychometric curve and JND measure something altogether different that 
depends on their prior. We then exploit this result to design an experimental 
paradigm to test how people make uncertain decisions. Using an interleaved 
estimation and 2AFC task, we measure subjects’ prior beliefs and their 
JNDs. In our task we found that changes in a subject's prior had no 
measurable influence on their JND, consistent with MAP decision-making. 
Our results thus support the traditional interpretation of the psychometric 
curve as measuring sensory precision, independently of prior knowledge. 
However, we propose that in general, the 2AFC task is not a straightforward 
tool for measuring a subject's sensory precision. Instead, the 2AFC task can 
be used to probe and falsify theories of decision-making under uncertainty 
(Gold and Ding, 2013; Liston and Stone, 2008; Palmer et al., 2000). 
 
4.3 Results 
Our aim was twofold. First, we sought to examine several prominent 
theories for decision-making under uncertainty, and in particular how they 
would influence a psychometric curve. Second, we sought to design an 
experiment capable of testing these predictions. These analyses would 
clarify the implicit assumptions behind the common use of the 2AFC task, 
and the experiment would test whether the JND is in fact a measure of 
sensory precision, or merely a phenomenon of dubious distinction. Below 
we briefly introduce the relevant decision variables, the conventional 2AFC 
interpretation and determination of the JND. This will provide the 
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groundwork for the subsequent mathematical analysis of the 2AFC task 
under the sampling and maximizing theories. We then describe the 
experiment and present the experimental results and their analyses. 
 
Decision-making Theory and the 2AFC 
In the 2AFC task, people are asked to make a binary choice based on two 
experimentally imposed cues, which we refer to as 1c  and 2c . They could be 
two differentially illuminated flashes of light or two sounds of different 
pitches. For instance, suppose that the task is to decide whether the second 
cue is greater in value than the first cue (i.e. is 2 1c c>  true of false?) Since 
the answer to this or any 2AFC question is binary, we can describe the 
answer with the random Bernoulli variable, {0,1}z ∈ . By asking subjects to 
perform many trials of this task, while systematically manipulating the 
difference between 2c  and 1c , we obtain a psychometric curve. This curve 
characterizes the probability that a subject chooses one cue over the other 
as a function of the difference between them, δ . One way of describing this 
relationship is with the cumulative normal distribution,  
JND
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 where erf  denotes the error function. The standard deviation, JNDσ , often 
referred to as the just-noticeable difference (JND), describes the behavioral 
precision in discriminating two cues. The experimental and behavioral 
aspects of the 2AFC task are well-studied and analyzed and can be found 
elsewhere (Green and Swets, 1966). 
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The psychometric curve and JND presented above quantify subject 
behavior, but do not describe how choices are made. This decision process 
is formalized in essentially the same manner by many normative theories. 
Due to the noise imposed by the experimental settings as well as to the 
inherent noise in the human sensory apparatus, the two cues give rise to 
uncertain sensations, which we shall label as 1s  and 2s . Formally, our 
sensory information induces the likelihood of every possible value of the cue 
for each sensation: 1 1( | )P s c  and 2 2( | )P s c . Our percepts can be thought of 
as another probability distribution, ( | )P c s , which is our posterior belief of 
each cue probability given our sensation of them. Applying Bayes’ formula, 
we find, 
( | ) ( | ) ( )P c s P s c P c∝  
where the prior, ( )P c , is our subjective expectation based on a lifetime of 
experiences. Hence, our perception of the cue is a function of both our 
senses, and our prior belief in what we expect the cue to be. Now we can 
formally interpret the 2AFC task as a decision, z , based on two probability 
distributions, 1 1( | )P c s  and 2 2( | )P c s . This allows us to predict different 
distributions, ( | )P z δ , for different candidate decision-making theories and 
determine when, if ever, the JND is influenced by prior beliefs. Additionally, 
by comparing these predictions against subject behavior, we can use the 
2AFC task as a tool to corroborate or falsify decision-making theories. 
 
Maximum a posteriori (MAP) decision-making 
Under the MAP hypothesis, subjects make their decision based on the most 
probable choice; that is, in choosing which cue is larger, one simply 
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compares the most probable value of 2c , with the most probable value of 1c . 
Mathematically, the choice is defined as follows:  
2 12 2 1 1
1 if arg max [ ( | )] arg max [ ( | )]
0 otherwise
c cP c s P c s
z
≥
= 

 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Predictions of the different decision making theories. (A) Psychometric 
curves predicted for the sampling models and the MAP model under different prior 
conditions. Note that the MAP/narrow prior and the MAP/wide prior lines overlap.  
(B) JND of the psychometric curves as a function of relative reliance on likelihood 
(proxy for prior uncertainty). The predictions for the sampling models (with different 
number of samples, k) and the MAP model are shown. 
 
By assuming functional forms for the likelihood ( | )P s c  and prior ( )P c , we 
can then obtain ( | )P z δ , by integrating over our senses, s . In particular, if 
we assume normal distributions (see Supplemental Information) we get, 
1
( 1 | ) 1 erf ( )
2 2
P z
δ
δ
σ
 
= = +  
, 
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 where σ  is the standard deviation of the likelihood. To be clear, if subjects 
choose according to the MAP hypothesis, the function above accurately 
models their behavior, whereas Equation 4.1 is used to fit their behavior. 
Note that the resulting psychometric curve (and JND) are independent of the 
subject's prior (see also Figure 4.1A). Furthermore, by comparing terms 
with Equation 4.1 we can define the experimentally derived JND in terms of 
the precision of a subject's likelihood:  
MAP
JND 2σ σ=  
The assumptions we made to derive these results are the implicit 
assumptions that most studies make when the experimental JND is 
interpreted as a measure of the subject's sensory accuracy. However, as we 
demonstrate below, alternative decision-making theories predict distinct 
results.  
Decision-making theory JND 
(1) MAP MAP
JND 2σ σ=  
(2) sampling sampling 2 2
JND 2 ( 1) /c ck kσ σ σ σ σ
 = + +
 
 
(2) matching (k=1) 
  
matching 2 2
JND 2 2 / cσ σ σ σ= +  
(3) sampling with cσ → +∞  
JND
1
2
c
c
k
kσ
σ σ
→+∞
+
→  
Table 1. Different predictions for the measured JND, according to MAP and 
sampling/matching decision-making theories. 
    
Sampling-based decision-making 
In contrast with the above result, the sampling-based decision-making 
hypothesis proposes that choices are based on an approximation to the 
most probable outcome. This approximation is computed by “sampling” from 
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the two posterior distributions, and comparing the averages. Mathematically, 
we can express the choice as follows:  
2 11 if
0 otherwise
k k
c c
z
 ≥
= 

,   4.2 
 where 1
k
c  and 2
k
c  are the sample means computed by drawing k  samples 
from the posterior distributions, 1 1( | )P c s  and 2 2( | )P c s . Again, by assuming 
distributions for the likelihood and prior we can then obtain ( | )P z δ . If we 
assume normal distributions for the likelihood and the prior, 
2
1 2( ) ( ) ( , )cP c P c N µ σ= = , we find, 
( )2 2
1
( 1 ) 1 erf
2 2 ( 1)
c
c
k
P z
k
σ δ
δ
σ σ σ
  
  = = +
   + +   
∣  
 We note several features of this result, first of which is the appearance of 
terms from the prior (see Figure 4.1A). Again by matching terms with 
Equation 4.1, under this hypothesis the experimentally derived JND is not 
merely a subject's sensory accuracy, but rather a combination of both 
sensory and prior uncertainties: 
2 2
sampling
JND
2 ( 1) c
c
k
k
σ σ σ
σ
σ
+ +
=  4.3 
This result is in stark contrast with the traditional interpretation of the 2AFC 
task. We see that when a subject's prior is certain (relatively small cσ ), the 
JND increases (see Figure 4.1B). Intuitively, we interpret this as follows: as 
the prior becomes more and more certain, sensory information becomes 
less relevant and the posterior belief is more closely aligned with the prior. 
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Therefore, distinguishing a difference between the two cues requires 
increasingly large differences. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Experimental protocol. Subjects were shown two sets of “splashes” (5 
dots) and then randomly presented with one of two tasks; either (A) the 
estimation/coin-catching task or (B) the 2AFC task. (A) On the estimation trials 
subjects were prompted to place a net (vertical blue bar) where they estimated the 
hidden coin position to be. (B) On the 2AFC trials subjects had to estimate which of 
the two hidden coins landed more to the right. 
 
In the limit of an infinite number of samples, the JND under the sampling 
hypothesis is equivalent to the MAP prediction. In the limit of an infinite 
variance prior, the JND tends to  
JND
1
2
c
c
k
kσ
σ σ
→+∞
+
→  
79 
 
which is different from the MAP prediction (if k  is finite). We also note the 
special case where 1k =  is the so-called matching hypothesis (Vulkan, 
2000; Wozny et al., 2010). This scenario is equivalent to the hypothesis that 
subjects choose between their choices with a rate that is proportional to the 
probability of being correct; that is, 1z =  with probability 2 1 2 1( | , )P c c s s> . By 
observation the JND is now: 
matching 2 2
JND 2 2 / cσ σ σ σ= + . 
 
These systematic differences between the MAP and sampling predictions 
(Table 1) suggest a way of using subjects’ performance during the 2AFC 
task to investigate how they make decisions under uncertainty. Below we 
present the details and results of an experiment design that aims at doing 
so. 
 
Measuring subjective beliefs 
Based on the derivations above, we designed an experiment to manipulate 
subjects' uncertainty in the prior while simultaneously quantifying changes in 
their JND. Each of the seven subjects performed the experiment on five 
separate days. On each day, they performed 2,000 trials, randomly 
switching between estimation trials (1000/day), where they had to estimate 
the location of a hidden coin, and 2AFC trials (1000/day), where they had to 
decide which of two coins was further to the right (see below, and Materials 
and Methods). Halfway through each day's experiment, the variance of the 
prior distribution would switch, from large to small or from small to large. 
These conditions allowed us to test whether subjects' JND changed when 
the variance of the prior changed. 
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During estimation trials, subjects' guesses for the location of the hidden 
coins were used to measure their subjective beliefs, commonly referred to 
as their prior. By recording how their guesses varied as the location of the 
evidence (splashes/likelihood) varied, we measure two features: the mean 
of their prior (see Figure 3A and Materials and Methods) and their reliance 
on the likelihood relative to the prior (“reliance on likelihood”, for short; see 
Figure 3B, C and Materials and Methods). The reliance on likelihood is an 
indirect measurement of the variance of a subject's prior (Berniker et al., 
2010a; Körding and Wolpert, 2004b; Vilares et al., 2012). With these 
measurements we could determine if subjects learned the experimentally 
manipulated distribution of coins. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Measuring subject's priors. A) Estimated mean of the prior for a 
typical subject on both blocks of the first day. Error bars are 95% CI 
(bootstrap). B) Data from the estimation trials for a typical subject on their 
first day. The slope of a linear regression determines the reliance of the 
likelihood, a proxy for subject’s prior uncertainty. C) The reliance on the 
likelihood is binned to visualize learning. As subjects learn the prior (dashed 
lines are theoretical values that correspond to the experimental variances of 
prior and likelihood). Error bars are 95% CI (bootstrap). 
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First we wanted to know if subjects learn a prior and whether they take prior 
and likelihood variances/uncertainties into account when deciding where to 
place the net. That is, (a) whether subjects learn a different prior in the low 
prior uncertainty block relatively to the high prior uncertainty block and (b) 
whether they also take the different uncertainty levels in the likelihood into 
account. As this estimation paradigm has been used with successful results 
in previous research (Berniker et al., 2010a; Vilares et al., 2012) we expect 
this to happen. Indeed, the fitted slope to the data of the estimation trials 
during the first 250 trials of the first day were significantly different across 
priors (F(1,19)=44.2, p<0.01, ANOVA), and likelihood (F(1,19)=12.8, 
p<0.01,  ANOVA), but not subjects, (F(1,19)=1.5, p=0.22, ANOVA), 
suggesting that the experimentally manipulated priors and likelihoods had 
an effect in subjects behavior. The same result holds for the estimation trials 
within the last 250 trials of the first day. Subjects typically learned the task 
already in the first day as is evident from the different behavior for the 
different conditions. The additional four days were necessary to more 
precisely quantify their psychometric curves. 
Next we wanted to know if subjects learned similar priors across days. This 
is important if we could combine the data across days. The fitted slopes 
during the estimation trials during the last 250 trials of each day was 
significantly different across priors, F(1,127)=325.9, p<0.01, likelihoods, 
F(1,127)=90.67, p<0.01, subjects F(6,127)=6.44, p<0.01, but not 
significantly different across days, F(4,127)=1.26, p=0.28, suggesting that 
subjects learned similar priors across days. The slopes for the different prior 
and likelihood conditions did not change significantly across days for each 
subject. 
The average reliance on the likelihood across subjects and days was 0.72 
(SE 0.01) for narrow prior and narrow likelihood, 0.43 (SE 0.01) for narrow 
prior and wide likelihood, 0.95 (SE 0.007) for wide prior and narrow 
likelihood, and 0.91 (SE 0.006) for wide prior and wide likelihood. These 
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numbers are significantly different from the optimal values but show a trend 
qualitatively consistent with the optimal values: 0.91 for narrow prior and 
narrow likelihood, 0.39 for narrow prior and wide likelihood, 0.99 for wide 
prior and narrow likelihood, and 0.94 for the wide prior and wide likelihood 
conditions. The fact that subjects don’t learn the exact experimentally 
imposed prior is not a problem given that what we need is for subjects to 
learn a sufficiently different prior across condition that allows distinguishing 
between decision-making theories. 
Based on the above findings we conclude that subjects take into 
consideration the prior and the likelihood uncertainty when making a 
decision in the estimation task. Importantly they learn a different prior for 
each imposed prior condition and we are able to obtain a relative measure 
of each subject’s subjective prior. This allows us to examine if changes in 
their priors influenced their JND's. The results of this examination would 
provide evidence for either a MAP or sampling decision-making process.  
 
Measuring psychometric functions 
As described above, on each day subjects performed 1000 2AFC trials. The 
data from these trials were used to fit psychometric functions. These 
subject-specific curves quantify how large the discrepancy between two coin 
splashes needs to be before subjects can reliably perceive them as distinct. 
In roughly half of the trials, the two coin splashes had approximately the 
same size. We denote these trials as same-likelihood 2AFC trials. Using this 
data we could fit a psychometric curve to each subject's responses, and 
measure their JNDs and PSEs (see Methods). The psychometric curves 
(using the same-likelihood 2AFC trials) would give us valuable estimates of 
subject-specific JNDs. These estimates are necessary to test the decision-
making theories. 
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In the remaining 2AFC trials, the two coin splashes had different sizes; 
different-likelihood 2AFC trials. When two different likelihoods are used to 
make a choice, the probability of a response is a function of both cue 
locations (not merely the difference between them as it happens in the 
same-likelihood condition, see Figure 4A); the psychometric function is now 
a surface (see Figure 4.4B and Supp. Information). We used these surfaces 
to measure how the PSE's changed with cue locations. These surfaces, 
computed using the different-likelihood 2AFC trials, were used as a valuable 
control; since the use of a prior makes predictable changes in the way the 
cues’ position affect the shape of the surface (see below and Supp. 
Information) we can use this data to test whether the prior learned in the 
estimation trials is used in the 2AFC trails. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Subject-specific psychometric curves. A) Data from the 2AFC trials is 
used to fit a psychometric curve. Red and blue dots are subject responses during 
the narrow and wide conditions, respectively. B) When the standard deviations of 
the two cues are different, the probability of a response being true is a function of 
the location of the both reference cues and the fit is now a surface. 
 
Subjects use the learned prior during the 2AFC task 
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A basic assumption of the 2AFC analysis is that subjects use their prior 
when making choices. However, it could be the case that subjects only use 
one prior in the estimation trials, and use a different strategy for the 2AFC 
trials. For example, subjects might simply use the respective centroids to 
choose between splashes (i.e. a maximum-likelihood estimate), or a 
different prior and neglect the prior learned during the estimation times all 
together. To exclude this possibility, we examined the psychometric 
surfaces obtained in the different-likelihood 2AFC trials. If subjects were 
using the prior learned during the estimation trials, these surfaces would 
change in a predictable way. 
In the different-likelihoods 2AFC trials, the PSE for both MAP and sampling 
hypotheses is a function of the cue positions (see Materials and Methods 
and Supp. Information). In particular, the PSE should change linearly with 
the cue positions, We can express this in terms of either cue’s position, for 
instance, 1c ,  and their respective variances: 
2 2
2 1
1 12 2
1
PSE( )
c
c c
σ σ
σ σ
 −
=  
+ 
 
 where 1σ , 2σ  are the likelihood variances and cσ  is the prior variance. We 
denote the term 2 2 2 22 1 1( ) / ( )cσ σ σ σ− +  by slope of PSE. Importantly, the 
prediction is that the slope's magnitude (absolute value) will decrease as the 
prior's variance increases, allowing us to predict how it should change 
across the small and large experimental prior variance conditions. We chose 
1c  to be the splash with large variance and hence the slope of PSE is 
predicted to be negative.  
In agreement with the predictions, we found that the PSE slope for the small 
prior was significantly smaller (than for the large priors (p<0.05, paired t-test; 
see Figure 4.5A). This result supports the assumption that subjects used 
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their subjective prior learned during the estimation trials when making their 
choices during the 2AFC task. We can now finally check if changes in prior 
affects the JND measured using data from the same-likelihood 2AFC trials.  
 
 
Figure 4.5. Comparing subject data and candidate decision-making theories. A) 
Across-days average slope of the PSE (during the two-likelihood 2AFC trials) 
across conditions for each subject. With one exception, each subject's data followed 
the same trend indicating the prior had a significant effect on their choices during 
the 2AFC task. B) Each subjects JND plotted versus their reliance on the likelihood 
(95% CI) Solid lines correspond to the theoretical predictions for the MAP (black 
line) and sampling (various number of samples, k) hypotheses. 
 
Subjects' JND's did not change with their prior 
To summarize, our results so far suggest that subjects learned two distinct 
priors during the estimation trials, and that they used these priors during the 
2AFC trials. We are now in conditions of testing whether the prior 
uncertainty affects the JND obtained using the standard (same-likelihood) 
2AFC task and look for evidence of either decision-making theory.  
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The MAP hypothesis predicts that changes in the prior should not influence 
the JND, whereas the sampling hypothesis predicts that changes in the prior 
do influence the JND – concretely, that a decrease in prior uncertainty 
should lead to an increase in the JND. We found that subject's JND's did not 
increase as prior uncertainty (reliance on likelihood) decreases (p=0.91, 
paired t-test, see Figure 4.5B), and hence, it does not follow the general 
trend predicted by sampling. This evidence suggests people do not sample.  
Notice that, even though we found no evidence for sampling, in theory 
subjects could be sampling; recall that in the limit of an infinite number of 
samples, the predictions for the JND are identical for both strategies. 
However, given that each splash (likelihood) is displayed for only 25ms and 
masked immediately after, it is reasonable to expect that the number of 
samples subjects would be able to sample (if they were using a sampling 
strategy) would be limited. Related to this, notice that for virtually all subjects 
the JND (and the 95% CI) in the narrow prior (low reliance on likelihood, 
leftward points in Figure 5B) is well below the sampling predictions for a few 
samples. 
The paradigm presented here offers a straightforward procedure for using 
behavioral data to examine theories of decision making under uncertainty. 
Our findings support the hypothesis that, when making decisions under 
uncertainty, subjects use a MAP process; after combining a subjective prior 
and their sensory input they choose the option that is most probable. This 
finding is important for several reasons. Evidence for a MAP process 
supports the conventional interpretation of the JND and what it measures, 
i.e. sensory precision. These findings also argue against a popular proposal 
for the basis of neural computations based on sampling.  
 
 
87 
 
4.4 Discussion 
The JND obtained from the 2AFC paradigm is often used to measure 
sensory uncertainty and hence assumed to be immune to changes in the 
prior uncertainty. Here we showed how the interpretation of the JND is 
sensitive to the underlying assumptions about which algorithm the brain 
uses when deciding between two choices. We did this by explicitly 
computing the predictions from two prominent decision-making hypotheses; 
the MAP and the sampling/matching hypothesis. The results of an 
experiment designed to test these predictions are consistent with the MAP 
theory and hence argue against the sampling/matching theories. 
Previous studies have used the 2AFC paradigm to test assumptions about 
the underlying computational processes implemented in the brain (Gold and 
Ding, 2013; Liston and Stone, 2008). In fact, the 2AFC paradigm has been 
used to study how the prior affects perceptual choices (Liston and Stone, 
2008). However, and at the same time, the paradigm is more often used to 
measure sensory uncertainty without explicitly stating or testing the 
underlying assumptions about the neural computational processes (Ernst 
and Banks, 2002; Fetsch et al., 2011; Girshick et al., 2011; Stocker and 
Simoncelli, 2006; Tassinari et al., 2006); e.g. it has been used to measure 
the prior uncertainty by factoring out the likelihood uncertainty measured 
using the JND (Girshick et al., 2011). Many applications for 2AFC assume 
that the JND measures likelihood uncertainty, our study provides a 
framework for testing this assumption. 
The results from our experiment were not trivially expected. Even though 
one could argue that MAP is the optimal strategy in a 2AFC task, this does 
not imply that the brain implements it a MAP algorithm. In fact, several 
studies support the sampling hypothesis; theoretical work shows that a 
sampling strategy can be optimal under certain assumptions (Sakai and 
Fukai, 2008; Vul et al., 2009) and experimental work has also argued for 
88 
 
sampling or matching both in cognitive tasks (Gaissmaier and Schooler, 
2008) as well as in perceptual tasks (Battaglia et al., 2011; Wozny et al., 
2010), or based on spontaneous neural activity (Berkes et al., 2011).  
While our results do not support the matching/sampling hypothesis, we 
cannot rule out matching/sampling or some other decision-making algorithm 
in other circumstances. Our paradigm should be extended to tasks that have 
been suggested to show evidence for sampling and also to tasks often used 
in studies that use JND as a measure of sensory uncertainty. Another 
possible caveat is that our task is artificial; we chose it because it is an 
established paradigm for studying learning and representation of prior 
uncertainty (Berniker et al., 2010a; Vilares et al., 2012) and because 
natural/evolutionary/innate priors are harder to change (but see Hosoya et 
al., 2005). It could be possible, however, that the brain uses a different 
strategy with natural priors. Future work should adapt this paradigm to a 
more natural prior/task and see if the results stand. 
We used masking to limit the number of samples subjects could take if they 
were using a sampling strategy. Since in the limit of an infinite number of 
samples the two theories are undistinguishable (at least using our 
paradigm), limiting the number of samples would help us distinguishing 
between the two theories. It has been shown for instance that if samples are 
costly then decisions based on few samples are optimal (Vul et al., 2009). 
While we cannot put an exact upper bound on the number of samples 
subjects can take during the 25ms the image is presented, it is reasonable 
to expect that masking limits the number of samples humans can take if 
humans use a sampling decision-making algorithm. 
We observed that there is a lower bound on the number of samples subjects 
could be sampling if they were using a sampling decision-making strategy. 
We have used this, together with the fact that we are masking to argue 
against sampling. However, we also observe that the JND measurements 
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are above the theoretical prediction for MAP. This is explained by the fact 
that we used the experimentally defined variance of the likelihood. As the 
true variance of the likelihood is expected to be higher than the 
experimentally imposed one -- due for instance to sub-optimality in 
estimating the centroid of the cloud of dots (Tassinari et al., 2006) -- the true 
JND for a MAP strategy should also be above the theoretical prediction and 
hence be consistent with our results.  
 
 
4.5 Materials and Methods 
 
Experimental Protocol 
We designed an experiment to examine whether or not subjects' behavior 
during a 2AFC task is influenced by their prior. If a change in their prior 
produces systematic changes in their JND, then this would be evidence that 
decisions are made by sampling. If, on the other hand, the JND is invariant 
with respect to their prior, then this would offer evidence that subjects use 
MAP. Additionally, this would provide evidence that the 2AFC task 
measures sensory precision. To test this, we had subjects participate in a 
previously published “coin-catching” paradigm (Berniker et al., 2010a; Sato 
and Aihara, 2011; Vilares et al., 2012) which consists of an estimation task. 
Here we adapted the paradigm to include 2AFC trials as well as estimation 
trials. 
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Estimation and 2AFC trials 
A virtual coin-catching paradigm was used to test subjects in both estimation 
and 2AFC tasks. All trials/tasks began the same. The locations of two virtual 
coins were drawn from a normal distribution (the prior). The location of the 
first coin was depicted by quickly presenting a “splash” (the likelihood) as 
five small red dots drawn from a normal distribution centered on the coin's 
position (see Figure 4.2). After 25 milliseconds a mask (see below) was 
displayed for 500 milliseconds. Then a second splash was used to depict 
the location of the second coin (again centered on the coin's location and 
displayed for 25 milliseconds and followed by a mask. After this subjects 
were randomly asked to either estimate the second coin's location (the 
estimation task), or which of the two coins landed further to the right (the 
2AFC task) (see Figure 4.2). 
 
Estimation task.  
In the estimation trials, subjects were presented with a virtual net, depicted 
with a vertical bar (10% of the screen width). Their task was to place the net 
where they believed the coin landed. Since the net covered the entire height 
of the screen, the task was a one-dimensional estimation problem. Once 
they placed the net in the desired location and depressed the mouse key, 
the true coin location was displayed to them and the trial ended. If a coin 
landed within the net it was considered caught. A running tally of the number 
of coins caught as well as their average distance between the net and the 
coin was displayed. The estimation trials were used to change the subject's 
prior belief in coin locations, and its data was used to estimate if that change 
happened. 
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2AFC task. 
In the 2AFC trials, subjects were instructed to guess which tossed coin, 
unseen to them, landed further to the right by depressing a key (either 1 for 
the first coin, or 2 for the second coin). The data collected during the 2AFC 
trials was used to construct psychometric curves. The data allowed us to 
both measure the subjects’ JND and also to verify that subjects used a prior 
for the coin's location in both the estimation and 2AFC trials (see below).  
By manipulating the variance/uncertainty of the coin's prior – the variance of 
the distribution from witch the hidden coin’s position is sampled -, as well as 
of the likelihood, we were able to change the subjects' prior, infer if the prior 
was effectively changed (using the estimation trials) and confirm that 
subjects used the learned prior in the 2AFC task (using the different-
likelihood 2AFC trials). Importantly, since we simultaneously measured 
subjects’ JNDs (using the same-likelihood 2AFC trials, see below) we were 
able to examine the specific predictions of different decision-making 
theories; concretely, whether and how subjects’ JND changes with changes 
in variance/uncertainty of their prior.  
 
Experimental details  
Seven subjects participated in this study (one female) with an average age 
of 30.1 7.2±  years. Four of the participants were naive to the goals of the 
experiment, signed consent forms and were paid based on their 
performance. The remaining three participants are authors of this 
manuscript (DA, MB and HLF). All experimental protocols were approved by 
the Northwestern University Institutional Review Board and were in 
accordance with Northwestern University's policy statement on the use of 
humans in experiments. 
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Subjects performed the experiment over five days, participating 
approximately two hours per day. On each day they were seated in front of 
a computer monitor (approximately 24 inches (52cm wide, 32.5cm high) in a 
quiet room. Each subject performed two 1000-trial blocks per day (for a total 
of 10,000 trials across 5 days). The prior over coin locations switched from 
block to block, from wide to narrow variance on one day, and narrow to wide 
variance, on the subsequent day, etc. Both priors were normal distributions 
with zero mean. The narrow prior had a standard deviation of 4% of screen 
width while the wide prior had a standard deviation of 20% of screen width. 
To create the splashes, we used two standard deviations; one was 2.24% of 
the screen width, the other 8%. Occasionally target coins close to the left 
and right side of the monitor would have splashes that fell outside the 
screen limits. In these trials the splash was resampled until all dots were 
within the screen limits. In half of the trials, the same likelihood was used for 
both coins (standard deviation of 8% of screen width). In the remaining, 
randomly drawn trials, one of the coins' splashes used the 2.24% standard 
deviation, while the other used the 8% standard deviation. 
2AFC trials wherein the two coins had the same likelihood standard 
deviation – denoted same-likelihood 2AFC trials – were used to measure 
subjects' JND. 2AFC trials wherein the two coins had different likelihood 
standard deviations – denoted different-likelihood 2AFC trials – allowed us 
to verify that subjects used the prior learned during the estimation trials to 
judge coin locations during the 2AFC trials. Alternatively it could be that 
subjects were just using the splash's centroid or a different prior (see 
below); this is an important control because, even though the MAP 
hypothesis predicts that subjects’ behavior is independent of their prior (see 
Figure 4.2), this would also be the predicted behavior under the sampling 
hypothesis if subjects, while performing the 2AFC task, merely neglected 
the prior learned during the estimation trials, and instead relied on a different 
and unchanged prior.  
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All trials began as described above, and were randomly assigned to be 
estimation or 2AFC trials. Each block consisted of 500 estimation trials and 
500 2AFC trials, in a random order. To assist subjects in learning the coin's 
prior quickly, the first half of each block was mostly estimation trials (375 
estimation trial and 125 2AFC trials) while the second half were mostly 
2AFC trials (125 estimation trials and 375 2AFC trials). After the end of the 
first block, subjects took a brief (3-5 minute) rest before beginning the 
second block, with a different prior. 
At the start of each day, subjects were instructed on how to complete the 
estimation and 2AFC tasks, from a prepared manuscript. Subjects were told 
that someone behind them (the exact location not being important) was 
tossing coins, one at a time, into the pond/screen. In the estimation trials, 
their task was to try and “catch” the coin by placing a net (the vertical bar) 
where they believed the unseen coin landed. They were asked to make the 
average distance between the net and coin as small as possible, while 
collecting the maximum number of coins. They were also informed that they 
would be paid based in part on how small this distance was. Though clear to 
most subjects, it was explained to them that the vertical component of their 
guess did not matter, as the net spanned the whole height of the screen. For 
the 2AFC trials they would have to guess which of the unseen coins landed 
further to the right. Instructions were provided on how to indicate their 
choice with a key depress. To reduce the influence of uncontrolled cognitive 
strategies, subjects were also told that that the person throwing coins was 
not trying to help or hinder their progress, nor reacting to the choices they 
made. 
At the end of each day, their average distance from the hidden coins during 
the estimation trials was tallied and they were paid a base rate plus an 
additional bonus for increasingly small errors.  
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Data Analysis 
Our goal was to find a correspondence in the data with the hypotheses we 
described before. We use simple linear regressions to infer subjects’ prior 
mean and a relative measure of prior variance/uncertainty – denoted relative 
reliance of likelihood, a proxy for subjects’ prior uncertainty (see below). We 
use a cumulative Gaussian psychometric curve to measure JND and PSE. 
With these inferred pieces of information, we can investigate whether 
subjects' JND changes when their prior uncertainty changes. 
 
Estimation task 
Measuring subject’s prior variance/uncertainty. The estimation task is used 
both to change subjects’ prior uncertainty and to measure it. We assume 
Gaussian distributions and a reasonable cost-function (e.g. minimizing the 
squared error). Under these assumptions the best way (Bayes’ optimal) of 
combining the two pieces of information (prior and likelihood) is by weighting 
their means by their relative precision, i.e., their normalized reciprocal 
variance (see Körding and Wolpert, 2004b; Trommershäuser et al., 2011). 
This corresponds to the MAP solution: 
22
2 2 2 2
ˆ sc
c c
c c
σσ
µ
σ σ σ σ
= +
+ +
 
where σ  and cσ  denote the likelihood and prior variance respectively, and 
µ  and sc  their respective means. Consider the following model:  
bias reliance estimation
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ; r , )s sp c c c r cφ σ= +∣  
where ( ; , )xφ µ σ  is a normal density function with mean µ  and standard 
deviation σ . By fitting this model to the data and estimating reliancer , i.e., by 
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computing the slope of the linear regression between the centroid of the 
splash of dots (proxy for mean of likelihood/sensed cue (Berniker et al., 
2010a; Sato and Aihara, 2011; Vilares et al., 2012) and estimated position 
(using the position of the net) we can estimate a relative measure of each 
subject’s prior uncertainty, reliancer , which we denote by relative reliance on 
likelihood. If subjects are Bayesian optimal then 
2
reliance 2 2
c
c
r
σ
σ σ
=
+
. Hence by 
computing the slope of the linear regression between centroid of splash of 
dots (proxy for sensed cue) and estimated position (position of the net) we 
can determine a relative measure of subjects' prior uncertainty. Note that if 
subjects were sampling then, on average, their response would also be 
optimal but noisier. This means that we can expect 
2
reliance 2 2
c
c
r
σ
σ σ
=
+
    , and 
hence that reliancer  to be a relative measure of reliance in likelihood (thus a 
proxy for prior uncertainty) independently of whether subjects are using a 
MAP or sampling strategy. 
 
Measuring subject’s mean of the prior. We can also infer subjects’ mean of 
the prior using the same data. For that, notice that we can re-arrange the 
equation above in the following way 
( )
2 2
2
ˆs sc
c
c c c
σ σ
µ
σ
+
= + −  
We can hence use as estimate of the subjects’ mean of the prior, µ , the 
intercept of linear regression of 
s
c  as a function of  ˆsc c− . 
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2AFC task.  
The 2AFC trials can be separated into two different kinds; trials where both 
likelihoods (splashes) had the same standard deviation (regular 2AFC 
trials), and trials where the standard deviations were different (control 2AFC 
trials). Trials with equal standard deviations were used to measure subjects' 
JND and this was done by fitting a regular psychometric function (with lapse 
correction, see below). Trials with different standard deviations were used to 
infer whether subjects where using, during the 2AFC trials, the same prior 
they learned in the estimation trials (see below). 
Psychometric function. Psychometric curve fitting for 2AFC tasks finds a 
relationship between stimuli's discrepancy and the subject’s response. 
Given the uncertainty and noise inherent to the task, the psychometric curve 
describes the probability of a response given a pair of stimuli. There are 
multiple functions that can be used to define the probability of response in a 
psychometric curve. Here we use a cumulative Gaussian function to make it 
coincide with the theoretical derivations shown in Results and Supp. 
Information. We could use an alternative functional form for the 
psychometric curve (e.g. Weibull or logistic) but the cumulative Gaussian 
function simplifies our exposition substantially. 
The psychometric function used in our analysis is  
( )1 2 2 1 JND( 1 , ) ;PSE,p z c c c c σ= = Φ −∣ , 4.4 
 where 1c  is the reference cue, 2c  is the probe cue, and Φ  is the 
cumulative Gaussian function with mean PSE and standard deviation JNDσ  . 
We refer to 2 1c c−   as the experiments' cue discrepancy---as opposed to 
2 1
s sc c− , the subjects sensed cue discrepancy.  
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2AFC trials with same likelihood standard deviation. In these trials we are 
interested in quantifying subjects' JND. We fit the psychometric function in 
order to determine the PSE  and JNDσ̂ . We use a psychometric curve with 
lapse, a small variation of the psychometric curve (see below). 
Control 2AFC trials; different likelihood standard deviation. In this case, the 
PSE (see Equations 4.6, 4.8 and 4.10 in Supp. Information, but not the JND 
see Equations 4.7 and 4.9 in Supp. Information), depends on the absolute 
position of the cues. The psychometric curve is thus a two-dimensional 
surface; effectively we get a different psychometric curve for different 
positions of the reference cue. Importantly, both the MAP and the sampling 
hypothesis have the same prediction for how changes in prior uncertainty 
affect how the PSE values depend on the position of the reference cue. 
Specifically, they predict that the PSE changes linearly with the position of 
the reference cue 1c  (see Supplemental Information for details): 
2 2
2 1
1 12 2
1
( )
c
PSE c c
σ σ
σ σ
−
=
+
   4.5 
In the analysis of these 2AFC trials we chose the reference cue, 1c , to be 
the cue with higher standard deviation ( 1 2σ σ> ). Hence the linear term 
( ) ( )2 2 2 22 1 1/ cσ σ σ σ− +  is expected to be negative and its absolute value is 
expected to increase as the uncertainty of the prior ( cσ ) decreases. 
Quantifying this linear relationship thus allows us to examine whether or not 
subjects use the prior learned during the estimation trials to make the 2AFC 
judgments. 
When fitting the psychometric function to data from these trials we assume 
that PSE equals bias ref 1
e
cβ β+ , i.e., we assume a bias term just like in the 
regular psychometric curve fitting, plus a linear dependence on the 
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reference cue as predicted in Equation 4.5. Note that if we set ref 0β =   we 
recover the psychometric curve fitting used for the same likelihood standard 
deviation trials data. As in the simple psychometric function fitting, it is 
possible to find biasβ , refβ , and JNDσ̂  optimally by framing the problem within 
a generalized linear model framework.  
 
Psychometric curve with lapse. Equation 4.4 assumes that subjects make 
no distraction mistakes; given a sufficiently large discrepancy between the 
cues, the cumulative Gaussian converges on both sides to a 100% 
discrimination rate. However, to account for occasional mistakes that 
subjects may produce, we add a lapse parameter that can be interpreted as 
a small but not negligible change that subjects commit errors and respond 
randomly, independent of the discrepancy, with λ  probability. The 
psychometric curve can be then modified to accommodate this change as 
follows  
( )1 2 2 1 JND( 1 , ) (1 2 ) ;PSE,e e e ep z c c c cλ λ σ= = + − ⋅Φ −∣ , 
 where now the curve is bounded between %λ  and (1 )*100%λ−  
accuracy. We find the parameters jointly by likelihood maximization. 
For estimating, for each subject, the slope of PSE, JND, reliance in 
feedback and mean of the prior, we used only trials after trial 500 for the first 
day and after trial 100 for the other days. Confidence intervals were 
computed using 1000 bootstrap samples.  
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4.6 Supplemental Information 
 
We start by assuming that the prior over cues, ( )P c , and the likelihoods, 
1 1( | )P s c , 2 2( | )P s c  are Gaussian functions defined in the following way: 
Prior: 2( ) ( , )cP c µ σ= N  
Likelihoods: 21 1 1 1( | ) ( , )P s c c σ= N  and  
2
2 2 2 2( | ) ( , )P s c c σ= N  
Hence, the posterior 1 1( | )P c s  is given by: 
2 2 2 2
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1 1
( | ) ( | ) ( ) / ( ) ,c c
c c
s
P c s P s c P c P s
µσ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ
 +
= =  
+ + 
N  
 analogously for 2 2( | )P c s . 
  
MAP Derivations 
For maximizing, the subject's response variable, z  is a random variable, 
equal to 1 if the maximizer of 2 2( | )P c s  is greater than the maximizer of 
1 1( | )P c s ,  
[ ] [ ]2 2 1 1
1 2
1 if E P(c |s ) -E P(c |s ) 0
( , )
0 otherwise
z s s
 ≥
= 

 
where, for normal distributions,  
[ ] [ ]
2 2 2 2
2 2 1 1
2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2
2 1
E ( | ) ( | ) c c
c c
s s
P c s E P c s
µσ σ µσ σ
σ σ σ σ
+ +
− = −
+ +
 
100 
 
where for notational simplicity, we refer to this difference as δ . Therefore, a 
subject's response is determined through the random variable, δ , which is 
defined by the two random sensory inputs, 1s , and 2s . From 1 2( | , )P s sδ , 
and using 1 1( | )P s c   and 2 2( | )P s c , we can integrate out 1s  and 2s  to obtain 
the probability distribution for δ  in terms of the two experimental variables, 
1
e
c , 2
e
c .  
2 2 2 2
21 1 2 2 1 2
1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
( ) ( )
( | , ) ,
( ) ( )
e e
e e e e
c
c c c c
c c
P c c c c
µ σ µ σ σ σ
δ σ
σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ
  − −
= − + + +   + + + +  
N
 
We can then compute the probability of a subject's response, given the two 
cue locations, 1
e
c , 2
e
c . 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 2
0
1| , 0 | , | ,e e e e e eP z c c P c c P c c dδ δ δ
∞
= = ≥ = ∫  
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 2 1 1 2
1 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 2 1
( ) ( ) ( )1
( 1| , ) 1 erf
2 2 ( ) ( )
e e
e e c c
c c
c c
P z c c
µ σ σ σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ σ σ
  − + + − +  = = +
  + + +  
 
this equation, defines the psychometric curve, the probability of the subject 
responses given the experimentally manipulated cues. First we note a few 
important features of this curve. In this most general case, where the two 
sensed cues have different likelihoods, the psychometric curve is a function 
of the two cues, 1
e
c , 2
e
c , and cannot be rewritten in terms of the difference 
between cues 2 1
e e
c c− . The psychometric curve is a function of not only of 
the discrepancy between the two cues, but also their absolute values. To 
see this, note that the point of subjective equality (PSE) is found when, 
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 2 1 2 1( ) ( )
e e
c cc cσ σ µσ σ σ µσ+ + = + +  4.6 
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and the just-noticeable-difference, or JND is found to be, 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 2 1
JND 2 2
1
( ) ( )c c
c
σ σ σ σ σ σ
σ
σ σ
+ + +
=
+
 4.7 
If, however, the two likelihoods have the same variance, i.e., 1 2σ σ σ= = , 
then the psychometric curve collapses to the more familiar form: 
2 1
1 2
1
( 1| , ) 1 erf
2 2
e e
e e c c
P z c c
σ
  −
= = +  
  
 
where the PSE zero, and the JND is hence 
JND 2σ σ=  
  
Sampling derivations 
According to the sampling hypothesis, the subject's response is based on 
two estimates of the mean, 1̂
k
c  and 2ˆ
k
c , computed using k  samples from 
the corresponding posterior distributions, 1 1( | )P c s  and 2 2( | )P c s , i.e., 
1 1
{1,..., }
1
ˆ ˆk i
i k
c c
k ∈
= ∑  where 1 1 1ˆ ~ ( | )ic P c s , analogously for 2c . 
Hence 1̂
k
c  and 2ˆ
k
c  are random variables and  
2 2 2 2
1 1 1
1 1 2 2 2 2
1 1
ˆ( | ) ,
( )
k c c
c c
s
P c s
k
µσ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ
 +
=  
+ + 
N  
similarly for 2 2ˆ( | )
k
P c s . A subject's response variable, z, is chosen according 
to the following rule:  
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k k
2 1
1 2
ˆ ˆ1 if c -c 0
( , )
0 otherwise
z s s
 ≥
= 

 
Just as with the MAP decision, we define a random variable, 2 1ˆ ˆ
k k
c cδ = −  
which is defined by the two random sensory inputs, 1s , and 2s . Again, we 
can integrate out 1s  and 2s  using the likelihoods 1 1( | )P s c  and 2 2( | )P s c  
and obtain the probability distribution for δ  in terms of the two experimental 
variables, 1
e
c , 2
e
c : 
( )21 2( | , ) ,e eP c c δ δδ µ σ= N  
where the mean and variance are defined as: 
2 2
2 2 1 1
2 1 2 2 2 2
2 1
( ) ( )e ee e
c c
c c
c cδ
σ µ σ µ
µ
σ σ σ σ
− −
= − + −
+ +
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2
2 1 2 1 2 1 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
2 ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
c c c c
c c c c
k
δ
σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ
σ
σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ
+ +
= + +
+ + + +
 
We can then compute the probability of a subject's response, given the two 
cue locations, 1
e
c , 2
e
c : 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 2
0
1| , 0 | , | ,e e e e e eP z c c P c c P c c dδ δ δ
∞
= = ≥ = ∫  
1 2
1
( 1| , ) 1 erf
2 2
e e
P z c c δ
δ
µ
σ
  
= = +   
   
 
Also in this case, as with the MAP decision hypothesis, the psychometric 
curve is not translation invariant, i.e. it cannot be written in terms of the 
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difference between 1
e
c , 2
e
c  . The PSE is, as in the MAP case (Equation 4.6), 
obtained when 
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 2 1 2 1( ) ( )
e e
c cc cσ σ µσ σ σ µσ+ + = + +   4.8 
On the other hand, the just-noticeable-difference is different from the MAP 
case, given by 
2 2 2 4 2 4 2 2 2 4 2 2
1 1 2 1 2 1 2
JND 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
( ) 2 ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
c c c c c
c c c c c
k
σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ
σ
σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ
+ + +
= + +
+ + + +
4.9 
When the two likelihoods have the same variance, σ  then the psychometric 
curve collapses to, 
2 1
1 2
2 2
( )1
( 1| , ) 1 erf
2 2 ( 1)
e e
e e c
c
c c k
P z c c
k
σ
σ σ σ
  −  = = +
  + +  
 
where the PSE is zero, and the JND is: 
2 2
JND
( 1)
2
c
c
k
k
σ σ
σ σ
σ
+ +
=  
 
Using the PSE to investigate if subjects transfer the prior to the 2AFC 
task 
When the likelihoods of the two cues displayed during the 2AFC task have 
different standard deviations – different-likelihood 2AFC trials --, the 
psychometric curve and, in particular, the PSE, are a function of not only the 
cue discrepancy but also of the cues’ absolute position. For fixed standard 
deviations of the two cues, we can thus compute the PSE as a function of 
the reference cue position. We now show that both MAP and Sampling 
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theories predict the PSE to change linearly with the position of the reference 
cue, and that this linear relationship depends - in the same way for both 
theories - on the variance of the prior. 
We have seen above (Equations 4.6 and 4.8) that for both the MAP and the 
Sampling hypothesis the PSE -- by definition the discrepancy 2 1
e e
c c−  that 
makes 1 2( 1| , ) 0.5
e e
P z c c= = -- is given by: 
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 2 1 2 1( ) ( )
e e
c cc cσ σ µσ σ σ µσ+ + = + +  
Let 1
e
c  be the cue with large variance and chose it to the reference cue. Let 
2
e
c  hence be the probe cue. We can rearrange the previous equation and 
observe how cue discrepancy 2 1
e e
c c−  at the point of subjective equality 
(PSE) changes linearly with the position of the reference cue 1
e
c : 
2 2
2 1
1 1 2 2
1
PSE( )e e
c
c c
σ σ
σ σ
−
=
+
  4.10 
Importantly we can see how this linear relationship changes with the 
variance of the prior. This can be used to check whether, during the 2AFC 
task, subjects are using the prior they have learned in the estimation task; if 
the linear relationship between PSE and absolute position of the reference 
cue changes from one learned prior to the other. This way we can exclude 
an alternative explanation for an eventual absence of change in the JND, 
specifically, that subjects might be using a different prior in the 2AFC task 
than the one learned in the estimation task. 
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5.1 Summary 
The frontal eye-field (FEF) plays a central role in saccade selection and 
execution. Using artificial stimuli, many studies have shown that the activity 
of neurons in the FEF is affected by both visually salient stimuli in a 
neuron’s receptive field and upcoming saccades in a certain direction. 
However, the extent to which visual and motor information is represented in 
the FEF in the context of the cluttered natural scenes we encounter during 
everyday life has not been explored. Here we model the activities of 
neurons in the FEF, recorded while monkeys were searching natural 
scenes, using both visual and saccade information. We compare the 
contribution of bottom-up visual saliency (based on low-level features such 
as brightness, orientation, and color) and saccade direction. We find that, 
while saliency is correlated with the activities of some neurons, this 
relationship is ultimately driven by activities related to movement. Although 
bottom-up visual saliency contributes to the choice of saccade targets, it 
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does not appear that FEF neurons actively encode the kind of saliency 
posited by popular saliency map theories. Instead, our results emphasize 
the FEF’s role in the stages of saccade planning directly related to 
movement generation. 
 
5.2 Introduction 
One of the most frequent decisions in our lives is where to look next. How 
the nervous system makes this decision while free-viewing or searching for 
a target in natural scenes is an ongoing topic of research in computational 
neuroscience (Ehinger et al., 2009; Elazary and Itti, 2008; Foulsham et al., 
2011; Kayser et al., 2006; Koch and Ullman, 1985; Yarbus, 1967; Zhao and 
Koch, 2011). The most prominent models of saccade target selection during 
free-viewing are based on the concept of bottom-up saliency maps. In these 
models, the image is separated into several channels including color, light 
intensity, and orientation, to create a set of "feature maps" (for a review see 
Cave and Wolfe, 1990; Itti and Koch, 2000, 2001b; Koch and Ullman, 1985; 
Schall and Thompson, 1999; Treisman, 1988). For example, the horizontal 
feature map would have high values wherever the image has strong 
horizontal edges. After normalizing and combining these feature maps the 
output indicates locations in an image containing features that are different 
from the rest of the image. The more dissimilar an image region is from the 
rest of the image the more salient or “surprising” it is (Itti and Baldi, 2006). 
Saliency models for saccade target-selection predict that human subjects 
are more likely to look at locations that are salient in the sense of being 
different from the rest of the image. Models based on these ideas have 
successfully described eye-movement behavior in both humans and 
monkeys (Berg et al., 2009; Einhäuser et al., 2006; Foulsham et al., 2011). 
How the brain may implement such algorithms is a central question in eye-
movement research. 
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The involvement of cerebral cortex in this selection of eye 
movements has been recognized since the late 19th century when David 
Ferrier reported that eye-movements could be evoked from several regions 
of the rhesus monkey's cerebral cortex by using electrical stimuli (Ferrier, 
1875). One of these regions included an area of cortex now known as the 
frontal eye field (FEF). The visual and movement-related response field 
properties of different classes of neurons in the FEF have been carefully 
characterized using physiological and behavioral methods (Bichot et al., 
1996; Bizzi, 1968; Bizzi and Schiller, 1970; Bruce and Goldberg, 1985; 
Burman and Segraves, 1994; Dias et al., 1995; Dias and Segraves, 1999; 
Everling and Munoz, 2000; Fecteau and Munoz, 2006; Mohler et al., 1973; 
Phillips and Segraves, 2010a; Ray et al., 2009; Sato and Schall, 2003; 
Schall, 1991; Schall and Hanes, 1993; Schall et al., 1995; Schiller et al., 
1980; Segraves, 1992; Segraves and Goldberg, 1987; Segraves and Park, 
1993; Serences and Yantis, 2006; Sommer and Tehovnik, 1997; Sommer 
and Wurtz, 2001; Suzuki and Azuma, 1977; Thompson and Bichot, 2005). In 
addition to eye-movement related activity, FEF firing rates are thought to be 
affected by simple image features (Peng et al., 2008), by task-relevant 
features (Bichot and Schall, 1999; Murthy et al., 2001; Thompson et al., 
1997; Thompson et al., 1996), and by higher-order cognitive factors 
including memory and expectation (Thompson et al., 2005). During the 
period of fixation between saccades, the initial visual activity of FEF neurons 
is not selective for specific features such as color, shape, or direction of 
motion (Schall and Hanes, 1993). Later activity, however, is more closely 
related to saccade target selection, and appears to be influenced by both 
the intrinsic, bottom-up saliency of potential targets as well by their similarity 
to the target (Murthy et al., 2001; Thompson and Bichot, 2005; Thompson et 
al., 2005). Several studies have suggested that the pre-saccadic peak of 
FEF visual activity specifies the saccade target (Bichot and Schall, 1999; 
Schall and Hanes, 1993; Schall et al., 1995) and that this visual selection 
signal is independent of saccade production (Murthy et al., 2001; O'Shea et 
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al., 2004; Sato et al., 2001; Thompson et al., 1997). In summary, activity in 
FEF has been linked to information about perception, decision making, 
planning, and action, increasing the difficulty of identifying a precise 
computational role for this area. 
Although it has been suggested that FEF neurons encode a visual 
saliency map, the definition for visual saliency in this context is typically 
largely subjective, non-uniform across studies, not always explicitly defined, 
and based primarily upon the likelihood that a feature in visual space will 
become the target for a saccade (Thompson and Bichot, 2005). From a 
computational perspective, the prevalent interpretation of saliency in the 
oculomotor field includes the fundamental visual features contributing to the 
objective definition of visual saliency as well as other factors determining 
saccade target choice including relevance or similarity to the search target 
and the gist - the likelihood that the target will be found at a particular 
location (Itti and Koch, 2000; Land and Hayhoe, 2001; Oliva et al., 2003; 
Turano et al., 2003). In this study, we use a precise bottom-up definition of 
saliency, a definition that is independent of task objective or gist, based only 
upon the basic physical image features. Examining FEF activity in the light 
of a formal definition will advance our understanding of both the process for 
saccade target choice as well as the role of the FEF in that process.  
It is unclear whether results from earlier studies using artificial stimuli 
will hold for natural scenes, and exactly how visual and motor information 
are represented in FEF during naturalistic eye movements. To understand 
how the brain works ultimately implies understanding how it solves the kinds 
of tasks encountered during everyday life (Kayser et al., 2004). Following 
that philosophy, multiple communities have begun to analyze the brain using 
natural stimuli (Rolls and Tovee, 1995; Sharpee et al., 2004; Smyth et al., 
2003; Theunissen et al., 2001; Vinje and Gallant, 2002; Wainwright et al., 
2002; Weliky et al., 2003; Willmore et al., 2000) and have quantified the 
statistics of natural scenes and movements (Bell and Sejnowski, 1997; 
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Howard et al., 2009; Hyvarinen et al., 2003; Ingram et al., 2008; Lewicki, 
2002; Möller et al., 2003; Olshausen and Field, 1996; Schwartz and 
Simoncelli, 2001; Smith and Lewicki, 2006; Srivastava et al., 2003; Van 
Hateren and van der Schaaf, 1998). Importantly, these studies show 
experimentally that surprising nonlinear aspects of processing become 
apparent as soon as natural stimuli are used (Kayser et al., 2003; MacEvoy 
et al., 2008; Theunissen et al., 2000). For example, input to regions outside 
of the classical receptive field during natural scene viewing increases the 
selectivity and information transfer of V1 neurons (Vinje and Gallant, 2002). 
It is thus important to analyze FEF activity using natural stimuli. 
Although a complete understanding of the FEF’s role in eye 
movement control will depend upon the use of natural stimuli, analyzing 
neural activities during the search of natural images is a difficult problem. 
The main factor contributing to this difficulty is the fact that most variables of 
interest are correlated with one another. It is known that monkeys tend to 
look at visually salient regions of images (Berg et al., 2009; Einhäuser et al., 
2006). This means, that a purely movement related neuron would have 
correlations with bottom-up saliency. In an extreme example, eye muscle 
motor neurons responsible for moving the eyes to the right, would on 
average have more activity during times where the right side of the image 
has high saliency, and would thus appear to encode high saliency in the 
right visual field. We clearly would not want to conclude that the motor 
neuron encodes saliency. This emphasizes the need for a way of dealing 
with the existing correlations. 
To deal with such cases, statistical methods have been developed 
that enable “explaining away” (Pearl, 1988). In natural scene search, the 
correlations are not perfect - the subject may not always look to the right 
when the rightward region is salient. These divergences enable us to identify 
the relative contributions of visual and motor activation to neuron spiking. 
The basic intuition is the following: For the case of a neuron that is tuned 
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only to saliency, its activity may also be correlated with eye movement 
direction due to the imperfect correlation of saliency and saccade direction 
during natural scene search. Once we subtract the best prediction based on 
saliency, however, any correlation with movement would be gone. The 
opposite would not be true. If we subtract the best prediction based on 
movement, a correlation with saliency would still exist. Over the past few 
years, generalized linear models (GLMs), have proven to be powerful tools 
for solving such problems, modeling spike trains when neural activity may 
depend on multiple, potentially correlated, variables (Pillow et al., 2008; 
Saleh et al., 2010; Truccolo et al., 2005).  
Here we recorded from neurons in the frontal eye field (FEF) while a 
monkey searched for a small target embedded in natural scenes. We then 
analyzed the spiking activity of these neurons using GLMs that treat both 
bottom-up saliency and saccades as regression variables. Almost all 
neurons had correlations with upcoming saccades and most also had 
correlations with bottom-up saliency. However, after taking into account the 
saccade related activities, the correlations with saliency were explained 
away. These results suggest that conventional, bottom-up saliency is not 
actively encoded in the FEF during natural scene search. 
 
5.3 Materials and Methods 
The animal surgery, training, and neurophysiological procedures used in 
these experiments are identical to those reported in (Phillips and Segraves, 
2010). All procedures for training, surgery, and experiments were approved 
by Northwestern University’s Animal Care and Use Committee. 
 
Animals and Surgery 
Two female adult rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were used for these 
experiments, identified here as MAS14 and MAS15. Each monkey received 
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preoperative training followed by an aseptic surgery to implant a 
subconjunctival wire search coil for recording eye movements (Judge et al., 
1980; Robinson, 1963), a Cilux plastic recording cylinder aimed at the 
frontal eye field (FEF), and a titanium receptacle to allow the head to be 
held stationary during behavioral and neuronal recordings. Surgical 
anesthesia was induced with the short-acting barbituate thiopental (5-7 
mg/kg IV), and maintained using isoflurane (1.0-2.5%) inhaled through an 
endotracheal tube. The FEF cylinder was centered at stereotaxic 
coordinates anterior 25 mm and lateral 20 mm. The location of the arcuate 
sulcus was then visualized through the exposed dura and the orientation of 
the cylinder adjusted to allow penetrations that were roughly parallel to the 
bank of the arcuate sulcus. Both monkeys had an initial cylinder placed over 
the left FEF. Monkey MAS14 later had a second cylinder place over the right 
FEF. 
 
Behavioral Paradigms 
We used the REX system (Hays et al., 1982) based on a PC computer 
running QNX (QNX Software Systems, Ottawa, Ontario, Ca), a real-time 
UNIX operating system, for behavioral control and eye position monitoring. 
Visual stimuli were generated by a second, independent graphics process 
(QNX – Photon) running on the same PC and rear-projected onto a tangent 
screen in front of the monkey by a CRT video projector (Sony VPH-D50, 
75Hz non-interlaced vertical scan rate, 1024×768 resolution). The distance 
between the front of the monkey’s eye to the screen was 109.22cm (43 
inches). 
 
Visually guided and memory-guided delayed saccade tasks 
Monkeys fixated a central red dot for a period of 500-1000 ms. At the end of 
this period, a target stimulus appeared at a peripheral location. On visually 
guided trials, the target remained visible for the duration of the trial. On 
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memory-guided trials, the target disappeared after 350 ms. After the onset 
of the target, monkeys were required to maintain central fixation for an 
additional 700-1000 ms until the central red dot disappeared, signaling the 
monkey to make a single saccade to the target (visually guided) or the 
location at which the target had appeared (memory-guided). The delay 
period refers to the period of time between the target onset and the 
disappearance of the fixation spot. These two tasks were used to 
characterize the FEF cells by comparing neural activity during four critical 
epochs (see Data Analysis). Typically, trials of these types were interleaved 
with each other, and with the scene search tasks described below.  
 
Scene search task 
This task was designed to generate large numbers of purposeful, self-
guided, saccades. Monkeys were trained to find a picture of a small fly 
embedded in photographs of natural scenes. After monkeys learned the 
standard visually guided and memory-guided search tasks, the target spot 
was replaced with the image of the fly. After 30 minutes the scene task was 
introduced. Both monkeys used in this experiment immediately and 
successfully sought out the fly. After a few sessions performing this task, it 
became obvious that monkeys were finding the target after only one or two 
saccades. We therefore used a standard alpha blending technique to 
superimpose the target onto the scene. This method allows for varying the 
proportions of the source (target) and destination (the background scene) 
for each pixel, and was used to create a semi-transparent target.  Even after 
extensive training, we found that the task was reasonably difficult with a 
65% transparent target, requiring the production of multiple saccades while 
the monkeys searched for the target. Monkeys began each trial by fixating a 
central red dot for 500-1000 ms, then the scene and embedded target 
appeared simultaneously with the disappearance of the fixation spot, 
allowing monkeys to begin searching immediately. The fly was placed 
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pseudo-randomly such that its appearance in one of eight 45° sectors of the 
screen was balanced. Within each sector its placement was random 
between 3 and 30 degrees of visual angle from the center of the screen. 
Trials ended when the monkeys fixated the target for 300 ms, or failed to 
find the target within 25 saccades. Images of natural scenes were pseudo-
randomly chosen from a library of >500 images, such that individual images 
were repeated only after all images were displayed. An essential feature of 
this task is that, although they searched for a predefined target, the 
monkeys themselves decided where to look. The location where the target 
was placed on the image did not predict the amplitudes and directions of the 
saccades that would be made while searching for it nor the vector of the 
final saccade that captured it. 
 
Image database 
The set of images was collected by one of the co-authors (ANP) for the 
purpose of conducting the experiment in Phillips and Segraves (2010), and 
is available for download. The photographs were taken using a digital 
camera, and included scenes with engaging objects such as animals, 
people, plants, or food. The images were taken by a human photographer 
and thus may contain biases not present in truly natural visual stimuli 
(Tseng et al., 2009). For instance, the center of the image tends to be more 
salient than the edges (as presented in Results, Figure 5.2A and B). 
 
Neural Recording 
Single neuron activity was recorded using tungsten microelectrodes (A-M 
Systems, Inc., Carlsborg, WA). Electrode penetrations were made through 
stainless steel guide tubes that just pierced the dura. Guide tubes were 
positioned using a Crist grid system (Crist et al., 1988, Crist Instrument Co., 
Hagerstown, MD). Recordings were made using a single electrode 
advanced by a hydraulic microdrive (Narashige Scientific Instrument Lab, 
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Tokyo, Japan). On-line spike discrimination and the generation of pulses 
marking action potentials were accomplished using a multi-channel spike 
acquisition system (Plexon, Inc., Dallas, TX). This system isolated a 
maximum of 2 neuron waveforms from a single FEF electrode. Pulses 
marking the time of isolated spikes were transferred to and stored by the 
REX system. During the experiment, a real-time display generated by the 
REX system showed the timing of spike pulses in relationship to selected 
behavioral events. 
The location of the FEF was confirmed by our ability to evoke low-
threshold saccades from the recording sites with current intensities of 
≤50 μA, and the match of recorded activity to established cell activity types 
(Bruce and Goldberg, 1985). To stimulate electrically, we generated 70 ms 
trains of biphasic pulses, negative first, 0.2 ms width per pulse phase 
delivered at a frequency of 330 Hz. 
 
Data Analysis – General Analysis  
FEF cell characterization 
We examined average cell activity during four critical epochs while the 
monkey performed the memory-guided delayed saccade task to determine if 
the cell displayed visual or pre-motor activity. If not enough data was 
available from this task, data from the visually guided delayed saccade task 
was used. The baseline epoch was the 200 ms preceding target onset, the 
visual epoch was 50-200 ms after target onset, the delay epoch was the 150 
ms preceding the disappearance of the fixation spot, and the pre-saccade 
epoch was the 50 ms preceding the saccade onset. FEF cells were 
characterized by comparing epochs in the following manner using the 
Wilcoxon sign-rank test. If average firing rates during the visual or delay 
epochs was significantly higher than the baseline rate, the cell was 
considered to have visual or delay activity respectively. If the activity during 
the pre-saccade epoch was significantly greater than the delay epoch, the 
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cell was considered to have pre-motor activity. These criteria are similar to 
those used by Sommer and Wurtz (2000). The selection of neurons for this 
study was biased towards those with visual activity and our sample does not 
include any neurons with only motor activity. 
 
IK-Saliency 
We considered the Itti-Koch (IK)-saliency (Itti and Koch, 2000; Walther and 
Koch, 2006) as the definition of saliency (see Supp. Mat. and Figure 5.9A). 
This method provides a bottom-up definition of saliency based only on basic 
image features and independent of task objectives. We used the publicly 
available toolbox (Walther and Koch, 2006) for computing IK-saliency with 
the default parameter values and considered three, equally-weighted, 
channels: color, intensity and orientation. IK-saliency for each image was 
centered by subtracting the mean of the IK-saliency of that image. To 
account for a possible imprecision of eye position tracking, we low-pass 
filtered the IK-saliency using a 5 degree standard deviation 2D-Gaussian 
(some examples are shown in Results, Figure 5.2A). We redid the analysis 
either without centering or without low-pass filtering the definition of IK-
saliency and show that the conclusions of this study are the same (these 
results are shown in Supplementary Material, Figure 5.13).  
 
ROC curve  
To compute the Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve for IK-
saliency as an eye fixation predictor we considered all the saccades for both 
monkeys in the interval between 200ms and 2000ms of each trial. We 
varied a threshold across the domain of possible values of IK-saliency and 
determined the fraction of fixations that fell on pixels with IK-saliency above 
that threshold (y-axis of ROC curve). We compared this true positive rate 
across all frames to the fraction of pixels without fixations that had IK-
saliency above the threshold (the false positive rate). We bootstrapped 
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across the pixels with fixations to obtain a 95% confidence interval for the 
area under the ROC curve. 
Finally, to test for the predictive value of saliency independent of center-bias 
we compared, using Mann-Whitney test, the IK-saliency at the fixated 
locations with the IK-saliency at the same locations in all other images. 
 
Peri/Post-Stimulus time histograms (PSTHs) 
We used PSTHs to examine preferred directions for saccades as well as 
sensitivity to visual saliency. For the saccade-related PSTHs, we considered 
a time interval of 400 ms centered on saccade onset. We considered all 
saccades in the time period of 200 ms after trial start and until a maximum 
of 5000 ms into the trial (less if the trial ended before 5000 ms). We 
assigned the neuron's activity for each 400 ms perisaccadic interval to one 
of 8 PSTHs according to the saccade direction and ignoring the magnitude 
of the saccade. To construct the PSTHs, spikes were binned in 10 ms 
windows and averaged across trials. 
The PSTHs for activity driven by visual saliency were computed in 
an analogous way. Each of our analyses considers the whole distribution of 
IK-saliency over the scene to characterize neural responses. We considered 
a time interval of 400 ms centered on fixation onset. The spikes were binned 
in 10 ms windows. Activity for a fixation interval was assigned to a particular 
direction if, after convolving the IK-saliency image with one of 8 filter 
windows that corresponded to each representative direction relative to eye 
fixation, the average pixel value was positive. Unlike the saccade-related 
PSTHs where each raster was associated with only one of the 8 
representative directions, IK-saliency for a given image was often elevated 
in more than one of the 8 filter windows, and thus each raster in the visual 
saliency PSTHs could be assigned to more than one PSTH. The 8 filter 
windows were cosine functions of the angle, each with a maximum at the 
correspondent representative direction and independent of the distance to 
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fixation point. These filters were thresholded to be zero at a distance smaller 
than 3 or larger than 60 degrees. 
 
Data Analysis – Generative Model, Model Fitting and Model 
Comparison  
To explicitly model the joint contribution of saliency and saccades we 
developed a generative model for FEF spiking using a type of generalized 
linear model (GLM) -- a linear-nonlinear-Poisson cascade model. We 
specify how these multiple variables can affect neural firing rates and how 
firing rates translate to observed spikes. We then fit the model to the 
observed spikes using maximum likelihood estimation (see below). 
 
Generative model 
We considered a time interval starting 200 ms after trial start and until a 
maximum of 5000 ms into the trial. We wanted to examine three 
hypotheses: spike trains in FEF neurons encode (i) saccade-related (motor) 
information alone, (ii) bottom-up saliency alone, or (iii) both motor processes 
and bottom-up saliency. We model spike activity using a Generalized 
Bilinear Model (Ahrens et al., 2008). We will explain in detail the joint model, 
i.e., the model that considers both saccade and saliency as covariates – 
candidate predictors of FEF neuron activity. The saccade only, saliency only 
and full-saccade models are simplifications of this basic model and will be 
described after. We start by assuming that the conditional intensity 
(instantaneous firing rate), λ , of a neuron at time t is a function of the eye 
movements ms , visual stimuli, vs , as well as the time relative to saccade 
onsets, mτ , and time relative to fixation onsets, vτ : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )| , , , exp , ,M m V vm m m v v vt f s f f s f f sλ τ α α τ τ τ τ= + + + +  
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We assume that there are two spatio-temporal receptive fields (STRFs) 
(.)mf  and (.)
v
f  for motor (saccade) and for visual (saliency) covariates, 
respectively. To account for possible non-spatially tuned responses (e.g. 
untuned temporal modulation preceding fixation onset in a saliency 
encoding neuron or saccade-locked untuned firing rate change) and for the 
fact that saccades do not have a fixed duration (a histogram of saccade 
durations is shown in Figure 5.10B), we also allow for the possibility of a 
purely temporal response – independent of direction of saccade or of 
saliency stimuli – defined by temporal receptive fields (TRFs) at beginning of 
saccade, (.)
M
f  and at end of saccade/beginning of fixation, (.)
V
f . We 
assume that these STRFs and TRFs combine linearly and, to ensure that 
the firing rate is positive, the output of this linear combination is then passed 
through an exponential nonlinearity. To simplify, we assume that the STRFs 
are space-time separable 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )| , , , , exp M m m V v vm m m v v vt g h s f g h s f g h sλ τ α α τ τ τ τ= + + + +
 
and that both the TRFs and the STRFs are linear in some basis, such that 
they can be rewritten as a sum of linear and bilinear forms, 
( ) ( )| , , , exp ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )M M m m m V V v v vt t t t tλ α α= + + + +X w b w X w X b w X w X b     
The vectors mw  and vw  define the temporal components of the 
STRFs, while mb  and vb  define the respective spatial components. The 
parameter α  defines the baseline intensity and mw  and vw  are the 
parameters for the purely temporal responses centered at saccade and 
fixation onset, respectively. These parameters, together with the motor 
parameters mw  and mb , as well as the saliency parameters vw  and vb  of 
the STRF, fully define the neurons firing rate. Notice that the bilinear 
components of the model are not strictly linear in the parameters unless we 
consider the temporal components and the spatial components separately.  
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Finally, we assume that the observed spikes are drawn from a 
Poisson random variable with this rate:  
( )( )spikes( ) ~ Poisson | , , ,n t tλ αX w b . 
Hence if [ , [N t t t+∆  is the number of spikes during the interval [ , [t t t+ ∆ , 
( )( )[ , [ spikes spikesN ( ) ( ) ~ Poisson | , , ,t tt t t
t
n t t n t t dtλ α
+∆
+∆ = + ∆ − ∫ X w b . 
We binned the data in t∆ = 10 ms intervals and we assume constant firing 
rate [ , [t t tλ +∆  within each time bin then 
( )( )[ , [ [ , [| , , ,N ~ Poissont t t t t t tαλ+∆ +∆ ∆X w b  
For notational convenience, in the remainder of the Methods t will denote an 
index representing the time bin [ , [t t t+ ∆ , with t∆ = 10 ms. 
 
Parametrization of the receptive fields 
The form of the STRFs depends on how we construct mX  and vX , that is, 
how we parameterize the spatial and temporal components of the saccade 
and saliency receptive fields. We parameterize the spatial receptive field for 
saccades by assuming that the activity of the neuron is cosine tuned for 
saccade direction, i.e., its firing rate is a function of the cosine of the angular 
difference between the direction of saccade and some fixed direction, the 
neuron’s preferred direction (Georgopoulos et al., 1982; Hatsopoulos et al., 
2007). Specifically, for each time index t we define a vector ( )td  as: 
[ ]( ) cos( ( )) sin( ( ))t t tθ θ=d

 
if a saccade with direction ( )tθ  occurred at time index t,  otherwise ( )t =d 0
. For notation convenience we define a matrix ,( ) [ ]t jt d=D , where 
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, ( )t j jd t= d . This matrix incorporates the spatial component of the saccade 
covariates for each of the spatial basis functions for all time points. Although 
there is some evidence that FEF neurons may be tuned to saccade 
magnitude (Bruce and Goldberg, 1985), we focus on directional tuning here, 
which appears to be the dominant factor. The construction of MX  and VX , 
which defines the form of the TRFs, is done in an analogous way by defining 
vector ( )td  as 1  (one dimensional) if a saccade occurred at time index t 
and 0  otherwise. To model temporal variation near the time of saccade 
and fixation onset we parameterized temporal receptive fields with a set of 5 
basis functions. Since saccades and fixations are defined by very specific 
points in time, we restrict ourselves to finite windows 200 ms before to 300 
ms after saccade or fixation onset. Specifically, our set of temporal basis 
functions are 5 truncated Gaussians with standard deviation of 50 ms: 
( ) [ 200,300]( ) ,50 ms ( )k kt tµ −= ×f 1N , 
where (.)A1  is the indicator function, and the k =5 means kµ  are equally 
spaced such that they partition the interval between -200 ms and 300 ms 
into 6 subintervals: [ 200 : : 300 ]kµ τ τ τ= − + ∆ ∆ − ∆  ms with τ∆ =500/6 ms.  
We incorporate temporal information by convolving each column of matrix 
D  with each basis function that parameterizes the temporal receptive fields. 
Finally, we define, for each time index t, the matrix , 5 2( ) [ ( )]m k jt x t ×=X  
where 
( ), ( ) * ( )k j j kx t t= D f . 
The matrix ( )M tX  is defined in an analogous way and is hence a 5-by-1 
matrix. 
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For the visual/saliency basis we assume a similar model where the 
neuron has a preferred direction for the saliency surrounding the eye fixation 
position. This model is based on the entire saliency distribution across the 
scene. The parameterization is analogous to the saccade spatial receptive 
field: 
( ) ( )fix fix fix fix2 2 2 2
, ,
( ) IKS ( ), ( ) IKS ( ), ( )
x y x y
x y
t x x t y y t x x t y y t
x y x y
 
 = − − − −
+ +  
∑ ∑d

 
if a fixation started at time t and ( ) 0t =d  otherwise. IKS  denotes the IK-
saliency of the current image and the sum is over all pixel positions ( , )x y  in 
a window centered at the eye position during fixation (see Supp. Mat. and 
the description above and (Itti and Koch, 2000; Walther and Koch, 2006) for 
details). Similarly to the cosine tuning to saccade direction used above, this 
representation provides a directional tuning to average saliency. We 
considered the median eye position during the fixation period as the value of 
eye position during the ith fixation, ( )fix fix( ), ( )x t y t . The construction of 
matrices vX  and VX  is then analogous to the construction of mX  and 
( )
M
tX .  
The STRFs for saccades and saliency allow us to model directional 
dependence that is then modulated by an envelope around the time of 
saccade or fixation onset. Note that the STRFs for saliency and saccades 
are allowed to be completely unrelated under this model, and the same is 
true for the TRFs, the purely temporal responses around saccade and 
fixation onset. The joint model has a total of 25 parameters: α  for the 
baseline (1), Mw  and Vw  for the TRFs (5+5), mw  and vw  for the temporal 
response of the STRFs (5+5) and mb  and vb  for spatial component of the 
STRFs (2+2). In addition to the joint model we consider a saccade-only 
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model ( Vw = 0, vw = 0 and vb = 0, 13 parameters) and a saliency-only 
model ( Mw = 0, mw = 0 and mb = 0, 13 parameters). Finally we consider 
also the full-saccade model ( vw = 0 and vb = 0, 18 parameters) which can 
account for saccade duration variability and some possible temporal 
representation of the end of the saccade. 
 
Fitting algorithm 
To estimate the parameters α , Mw , mw , mw , Vw , vw , mb  and vb , we 
use maximum likelihood estimation and coordinate ascent. By coordinate 
ascent we mean that we alternate between fitting one subset of parameters 
and another. We do this because the model is linear only when we consider 
the temporal and spatial parameters of the bilinear terms separately. We 
first fit the baseline, the purely temporal parameters and the temporal 
parameters of the bilinear terms holding spatial parameters fixed, which 
reduces the problem to a GLM: 
( ) ( )ˆ ˆ, ,exp ( ) ( ) ( () )m vM M m V V vm vt t t t tλ α= + + + +b bw X w X w X w X
   
 
where 
ˆ
mb  
and ˆ
vb  
are fixed parameters for the spatial receptive field and 
ˆ,
( )
mm
t
b
X = ˆ( )m mtX b  
 and ˆ,
( )
vv
t
b
X = ˆ( )v vtX b . We then repeat the procedure 
and fit the baseline, the purely temporal parameters and the spatial 
parameters holding the temporal parameters of the bilinear terms fixed: 
( ) ( )ˆ ˆ, ,exp ( ) ( ) ( )( )m vM M m m V V v vt tt t tλ α= + + + +w ww X X b w X X b
 
 
where 
ˆ
m
w
 
and ˆ vw  
are fixed parameters for the temporal response of the 
spatially modulated component of the receptive field and
 ˆ,
( )
mm
t
w
X =
ˆ ( )m m tw X
  and ˆ, ( )vv twX =
ˆ ( )v v tw X
 . 
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We alternate between fitting one set of parameters and the other until the 
log-likelihood converges. Since both likelihood functions are log-concave it 
is reasonable to expect that it converges to the optimal solution (Ahrens et 
al., 2008), and, in practice, random restarts converge to the same STRF 
solutions. 
 
Model comparison 
To compare the joint model, the saccade-only, and saliency-only models we 
computed, using 10-fold cross-validation, the pseudo R2 for each model 
(Haslinger et al., 2012; Heinzl and Mittlböck, 2003) and the relative pseudo 
R2. Note that we should not use the traditional R2 to quantify the spike 
prediction accuracy of the model since while that measure assumes 
Gaussian noise, the number of spikes is non-negative and discrete signal. 
Instead we use an extension of the traditional R2 measure to Poisson 
distributions; the pseudo R2. The pseudo R2 can be interpreted as the 
relative reduction in deviance due to the additional covariates a model and 
is defined as: 
2
ˆlog L( ) log L( )
(model) 1
log L( ) log L( )
D
n
R
n n
λ−
= −
−
 
where ˆlog L( )λ  is the log-likelihood of the model under consideration, 
log L( )n  is the likelihood of the saturated model and logL( )n  is the 
likelihood of the homogenous model. The homogeneous model is the model 
that assumes a constant firing rate, specifically, the average firing rate of the 
training set. The saturated model provides an upper-bound on prediction 
accuracy by assuming that the firing rate in a certain time bin is exactly 
equal to the observed firing rate in that time bin. 
In order to compare between models 1 and 2, where model 1 is a model 
nested in model 2 – for example, the saccade-only model is nested in the 
joint model - we use the relative pseudo R2 which is defined analogously: 
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2 2
1
ˆlog L( ) log L( )
(model 2, model 1) 1
ˆlog L( ) log L( )
D
n
R
n
λ
λ
−
= −
−
 
Where 1
ˆlog L( )λ  and 2
ˆlog L( )λ  are the log-likelihood of models 1 and 2, 
respectively. The relative pseudo R2 can hence be interpreted as the relative 
reduction in deviance due to the extra set of covariates included in model 2. 
Note that 2 (model 1)DR =
2 (model 1, homogeneous model)DR . 
It is important to recognize that we are not able to obtain unbiased variance 
estimates for the pseudo-R2 obtained using 10-fold cross-validation since 
the correlations due to the overlap of the testing sets typically leads to 
underestimating the variance (Bengio and Grandvalet, 2004). However, by 
bootstrapping across the whole population of recorded neurons and within 
each subpopulation of visuomotor and visual neurons, we can obtain 95% 
confidence intervals on the average pseudo R2 for each population and sub-
population of neurons.   
There are other measures that we could have used such as bits per spike 
(Harris et al., 2003; Pillow et al., 2008) which is defined as the log (base 2) 
of the likelihood ratio between the model and the baseline model, divided by 
the number of spikes. The bits per spike measure gives the reduction in 
entropy (mutual information) due to the covariates. The pseudo R2 measure 
that we use is, apart from the different basis of the logarithm, the bits per 
spike measure normalized by the amount of bits per spike of the saturated 
model. Hence the two measures are closely related. It is important to note 
that, although the pseudo-R2 measure has the advantage of being upper-
bounded by 1, this bound is impossible to achieve in practice unless every 
spike is perfectly predicted. 
 
Overfitting 
We checked for overfitting for every neuron considering all trials and for a 
particular neuron (neuron 4) as a function of the number of trials. We 
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computed, for the joint model and for a particular neuron (neuron 4), the 
pseudo R2 on test data and on training data as a function of the number of 
trials used in the analysis. For each set of trials considered we randomly 
partitioned the data into 10 subsets. We fitted STRFs for all combinations of 
9 subsets (the training set) of this partition and computed the pseudo R2 on 
the training set and on the remaining 10% (the test set). Finally we 
computed the mean across 10-folds and obtained an average of spike 
prediction accuracy on test data and on training data. To check for 
overfitting for all neurons we repeated the same procedure for every neuron 
considering all trials. 
 
Simulations 
To verify the ability of the model to dissociate saliency and saccade-related 
spiking we simulated 3 typical kinds of neurons, saccade only, saliency only 
and joint dependence. We used the behavioral data from one particular 
neuron in our dataset to simulate spikes, assuming the same STRF for this 
set of simulations (as presented in Results, Figure 5.7A), and using 
smoothed IK-saliency as the definition of saliency. We assumed that each 
model had the same saccade/saliency STRF. This STRF was obtained by 
fitting the saccade-only model to the data of a particular neuron (neuron 4). 
To compute confidence intervals for recovered angle and recovered 
temporal filter we split the dataset into a partition of 10 sets of trials with an 
equal amount of trials. We computed the pseudo R2 confidence interval 
using 10-fold cross-validation. 
For the next set of simulations (as presented in Results, Figure 5.8) 
we used data from a particular neuron (neuron 4) and we fitted the receptive 
fields using the saccade only model. We then used baseline and the STRF 
terms to simulate spike data for a new set of simulated neurons. We tested 
how adding Gaussian white noise to the IK-saliency affected how well we 
could recover saliency encoding (as measured by relative pseudo R2 
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between the joint model and the saccade only model). We matched the 
variance of the noise to the variance of the IK-saliency image. Finally, we 
simulated neurons that lie in the range between only saccade encoding 
neurons and neurons that encode equal amounts of saccade and saliency, 
and again tested how well we could recover saliency encoding. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Behavioral task and data from a typical trial. (A) Monkeys were 
rewarded for finding the picture of a fly (not shown) embedded in natural scenes. 
(B) Eye position and spike trains were recorded for each trial, allowing us to model 
dependencies between image features, eye movement, and neural responses. 
Vertical dashed line marks beginning of fixation of a dot appearing at the center of 
the tangent screen. Blue vertical line marks the appearance of the image with 
embedded target. Red and yellow dots mark the beginning and end of saccades. 
Saccade endpoints correspond to the beginning of a new period of fixation between 
saccades. 
 
5.4 Results 
We recorded from single neurons in the frontal eye field (FEF) of behaving 
monkeys while they searched for a small inconspicuous target embedded in 
a natural image stimulus (Figure 5.1, target not shown, see Methods). Eye 
movements where monitored and the monkey was rewarded with water for 
successfully finding the target. In the following analysis we examine the 
activity of 52 FEF neurons recorded from 2 rhesus monkeys (MAS14, n = 
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30; MAS15, n = 22) categorized, using visual and memory-guided saccade 
tasks, as visual (n = 37) or visuomovement (n = 15) neurons; visual neurons 
have strong responses after target onset in the receptive field and 
visuomovement neurons are visual neurons that also have strong activity 
during the pre-saccade epoch (see Methods - FEF cell characterization). A 
previous study examined saccade tuning in these data, ignoring visual 
information (Phillips and Segraves, 2010). Here we analyze how the activity 
of the neurons relates to aspects of both saccades and features of the 
natural scene stimuli, more specifically to a bottom-up definition of saliency. 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Saliency maps and saccade prediction. (A) Three typical images from 
the natural scene search task, along with their IK-saliency maps, and smoothed IK-
saliency maps (filtered with an isotropic Gaussian with a standard deviation of 5 
deg). (B) (top) Average IK-saliency map across all images used in the task along 
with the average smoothed IK-saliency. Note that there is a bias towards the center 
of the image being more salient than the edges. (bottom) Corresponding image 
histograms. (C) ROC curve for smoothed IK-saliency as an eye fixation predictor. 
Area under the curve (median and 95% confidence interval, boostrap) is shown. 
 
We use the definition of saliency (IK-saliency) developed by Itti and 
Koch (Itti and Koch, 2000). The IK-saliency is a traditional, bottom-up 
saliency map algorithm that converts images into saliency maps based upon 
color, intensity and orientation on multiple spatial scales  (see (Itti and Koch, 
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2000), Methods and Supp. Mat. for details). For each of the maps, the 
algorithm computes how different each location or pixel is from its surround, 
and the map is then normalized. This leads to conspicuity maps which are 
then added together to define the overall saliency map. Points that are 
similar to the rest of the image will have low saliency while, potentially 
interesting points that are different from the rest of the image have high 
saliency (Figure 5.2A and B). The resulting saliency map tends to be highly 
sparse with most regions of the image being unsurprising (Figure 5.2A). 
There is a non-negligible center bias where the center of the image is more 
salient than the borders (Figure 5.2B), an effect that is due to human 
photographers having a bias in their choice of pointing direction (Tseng et 
al., 2009). Saliency maps summarize the high dimensional properties of an 
image with a single dimension; the saliency or interestingness of the image 
as a function of space. 
We first wanted to check if, as predicted by previous publications 
(Berg et al., 2009; Einhäuser et al., 2006), monkeys look more often at 
regions of the image that have high saliency. We thus plotted the standard 
ROC curve which quantifies how well the saccade targets can be predicted 
from the saliency map (Figure 5.2C). We found the area under the ROC 
curve to be 0.587 (0.584, 0.590)  (median and 95% confidence interval, 
bootstrap, see Methods for details) – somewhat lower than in previous 
monkey free-viewing saccade experiments but above the chance level of 
0.50  (Einhäuser et al., 2006). However, in our experiment the monkey was 
not free-viewing the images but had a specific task: it was searching for an 
embedded target. This top-down goal likely makes the saccades less 
predictable compared to the case when only bottom-up saliency information 
is considered. To test if the predictive values of saliency were only due to 
the center bias, we compared the saliency of image locations where 
fixations occurred with the average saliency for that location for the 
remainder of the image set. We found that saliency at the fixated locations 
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tends to be higher than at the same location in the other images (p<10-10, 
Mann-Whitney test), demonstrating that the predictive value of saliency for 
fixation choice is due to more than just center-bias. Algorithms that calculate 
bottom-up saliency predict some aspects of fixation behavior but tend to be 
somewhat imprecise. When the task is not a free-viewing task but involves 
target search the predictions of bottom-up saliency maps become even 
more imprecise. Regarding attempts to understand how saliency relates to 
the activities of FEF neurons, many methods such as post/peri-stimulus time 
histograms (PSTH) rely on a well-controlled stimulus or trigger. For those 
methods, it would be advantageous if saliency did not predict eye 
movements. Here we use a model-based, multivariate regression approach 
where saliency and eye movements are not required to be independent. 
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Figure 5.3. Saccade encoding. (A) Rasters sorted by direction of saccade, centered 
on saccade onset and the correspondent peri-stimulus time histograms (PSTHs) for 
a particular neuron (neuron 4). (B) Overlapping colored PSTHs (left), the fitted 
spatial and temporal receptive fields (right, insets) and correspondent reproduced 
PSTHs (right). Actual PSTHs were constructed using all the trials. Parameters were 
fitted to randomly chosen 90% of the trials and fitted PSTHs were constructed using 
those 90% of the trials. Blue and purple curves (right, inset) correspond to the 
temporal gains in the directions of lower (blue arrow) and higher (purple arrow) 
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modulation of the spatio-temporal receptive fields (STRFs). (C) Spike prediction 
quality for each neuron: Pseudo R
2
 (±2SEM, 10-fold cross-validation for each 
individual neuron; 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for the averages across the 
recorded population and subpopulations) of the saccade encoding model. Neurons 
previously classified as visuomovement and visual and respective averages (95% 
CI, bootstrap across neurons) are shown in black and grey, respectively (see 
Methods). Global average (95% CI, bootstrap across neurons) is represented in 
red. Arrow signals neuron number 4, the example neuron in panels A and B. 
 
 
Saccade Representation 
One of the well-established characteristics of many FEF neurons is that they 
are tuned to the direction of upcoming movements. To quantify this 
dependence on saccade direction, and test if it may be affected by search in 
natural images, we estimated each neuron’s spatio-temporal tuning to 
direction of movement. The saccade-triggered PSTH for eye-movements to 
various octants shows that, indeed, some neurons do have substantial 
tuning to the direction of saccade (Figure 5.3A). 
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Figure 5.4. Saliency encoding. (A) Rasters and post-stimulus time histograms 
(PSTHs) for a particular neuron (neuron 42). Data are aligned on fixation onset, and 
assigned to a raster/PSTH based upon the directions where IK-saliency was 
elevated during the fixation interval (see Methods for additional detail and Figure 
5.11 for the analogous saccade-onset PSTHs for this neuron). (B) Overlapping 
colored PSTHs (left), the fitted spatial and temporal receptive fields (right, insets) 
and correspondent reproduced PSTHs (right). Actual PSTHs were constructed 
using all the trials. Parameters were fitted to randomly chosen 90% of the trials and 
fitted PSTHs were constructed using those 90% of the trials. Blue and purple curves 
(right, inset) correspond to the temporal gains in the directions of lower (blue arrow) 
and higher (purple arrow) modulation of the STRFs. (C) Spike prediction quality for 
each neuron: Pseudo R
2
 (± 2SEM, 10-fold cross-validation for each individual 
neuron; 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for the averages across the recorded 
population and subpopulations) for the vision/saliency encoding model. Neurons 
previously classified as visuomovement and visual and respective averages 
(±2SEM) are shown in black and grey, respectively (see Methods). Global average 
(±2SEM) is represented in red. Arrow signals neuron 42, the example neuron in 
panels A and B. (D) Scatter plot for spike prediction quality (±2SEM, 10-fold cross-
validation) of saccade model (same data as Figure 5.3C) and saliency (same data 
as Figure 5.4C) for each neuron. 
 
We then used a generalized linear model (GLM, see Figure 5.9B 
and Methods) to explicitly model the spatio-temporal tuning to saccade 
direction of the neurons. The model used here (space-time separable STRF 
with cosine direction dependence) accurately captures the properties of the 
example neuron (Figure 5.3B), and allows us to quantify how well-tuned 
each neuron is to saccades in each direction (Figure 5.3C). Most of the 
neurons we recorded from appear to have strong saccade-related 
modulation, similar to previous descriptions of neurons in the FEF during 
simple visual tasks (e.g. Bruce and Goldberg, 1985). 
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Vision/Saliency Representation 
We next wanted to see if the same neurons might also be tuned for visual 
saliency. Using fixation-triggered PSTHs divided by the direction with the 
highest IK-saliency, we found that, indeed, some neurons seem to have 
substantial tuning to directions in which there are salient stimuli (Figure 
5.4A, but see below). Similar to the saccade direction dependence shown 
above, we found that a GLM based on tuning to IK-saliency accurately 
captured the properties of this neuron (Figure 5.4B) and allowed us to 
quantify how well each neuron was tuned to the saliency of the stimuli 
(Figure 5.4C). Using this saliency model, it appears that some of the 
neurons we recorded from do have significant tuning for salient stimuli in a 
particular direction. 
 
Explaining Away Saliency Representation 
So far we have found that some neurons do appear to have tuning to 
saccade and also tuning to the direction in which there are salient stimuli. 
For most neurons, saccade direction alone provides a better model of 
spiking than saliency alone (Figure 5.4D), however, since these two 
variables are correlated, the independent analyses above may be 
confounded. We have shown that monkeys tend to make saccades towards 
more salient targets, even during natural scene search. This means, that if 
FEF neurons encode only saccade movement, their activity might still be 
correlated with saliency. Furthermore fixation onset times and saccade 
onset times are also highly correlated, which may make it difficult to 
disambiguate the effects of saccades and saliency on spiking activity. 
We thus implemented a GLM that predicts spikes based on saccade 
and saliency at the same time. This approach allows us to take advantage 
of a statistical effect called explaining away. If the spikes could be fully 
described by saliency then the system would put no weight on saccade and 
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vice versa. Since the saccades and saliency are not perfectly correlated, 
such a joint model will determine which of the two factors is, statistically, a 
more direct explanation of a neuron’s firing. 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Explaining away. (A) Scatter plots of the spike prediction accuracy 
(±2SEM, 10-fold cross-validation, see Methods) under the saliency-only (left)/ 
saccade-only (center)/ full-saccade (right) and joint models. The saccade-only, 
saliency-only and full-saccade models are represented on the x-axis and the joint 
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saccade in the y-axis. “n4” and “n42” denote neurons 4 and 42, the example 
neurons of Figure 5.3 and 5.4, respectively. (B) Relative pseudo R
2
 between the 
joint model and the saliency model (left)/ saccade model (center)/ full saccade 
model (right) (±2SEM, 10-fold cross-validation for each individual neuron; 95% 
bootstrap confidence intervals for the averages across the recorded population and 
subpopulations). Arrows signal neurons 4 and 42, the example neurons of Figure 
5.3 and 5.4 respectively. Note different y-axis scales for left versus center and right 
panels. (C) Actual spikes and PSTHs (1
st
 column) and predicted firing rates and 
PSTHs for saliency only model (2
nd
 column), joint model using saliency covariates 
only (3
rd
 column) and joint model using saccade covariates only (4
th
 column) for the 
example neuron of Figure 5.4 (neuron 42). Parameters were fitted to 50% of the 
trials and the data shown (both actual spikes and predicted firing rates) correspond 
to spikes and covariates of the remaining 50% of data (testing set). Upper panels 
show raw data and predicted firing rates from 340 fixations of the test set where the 
IK-saliency in the lower-left octant area of the image relative to the point of fixation 
was positive (see Methods). Lower panels show PSTHs for all directions. 
 
For essentially all of the recorded neurons, we find that adding a spatio-
temporal saliency receptive field to the saccade model does not improve the 
spike prediction accuracy (Figure 5.5). A model that uses only saccade and 
a model that uses both saccade and saliency perform almost equally well 
(Figure 5.5A and B, center panels) - in contrast, considering both saccade 
and saliency improves the performance relative to considering only saliency 
(Figure 5.5A and B, left panels). In fact, the apparent saliency related 
modulation (Figure 5.4A, B and Figure 5.5C, 1st and 2nd columns) can be 
reproduced using motor information only (Figure 5.5C, 4th column). 
Saccade covariates of the joint model can capture the trial-by-trial variability 
better than the saliency only model which just smears the spiking activity 
(Figure 5.5C, 4th and 3nd columns, respectively). As saccade duration has 
some variability (see Figure 5.10B) we tested a GLM that adds a purely 
temporal response centered at the end of the saccade to the saccade-only 
model: the full-saccade model. We find that it completely explains away – 
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for all neurons – the saliency modulation (Figure 5.5A and B, right panels) – 
the saliency related covariates do not add any predictive power to the full-
saccade model. In other words, when modeling activities carefully, there is 
absolutely no sign of bottom-up saliency (Itti and Koch, 2000) encoding. 
 
 
Figure 5.6. Model sensitivity and overfitting analysis. (A) Average of spike 
prediction accuracy (±SEM, 10-fold cross-validation) for the joint model on test data 
and on training data, as a function of the amount of data used. Total number of trials 
for this specific neuron is 328. Dashed vertical lines indicate thresholds for 50% and 
90% for the trials. (B) Over-fitting analysis for the whole population. Error bars in 
both dimensions are ±2SEM. 
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The absence of improvement in spike prediction accuracy was not 
caused by the higher number of parameters in the joint model, since there is 
minimal overfitting (Figure 5.6A and B). Even though the full-saccade 
model explains away the saliency tuning modulation at fixation onset, it does 
not completely explain away saccade direction modulation at the end of the 
saccade (also see Supp. Information. and Figure 5.12). Furthermore, we 
checked that explaining away is robust within a considerable range of 
parameterizations of the temporal receptive fields (Figure 5.13). Thus, our 
finding that saliency is not represented in the FEF is not due to overfitting. 
We observed that, for most of the neurons, saliency information 
alone allows some prediction of neural activity (Figure 5.4C). In fact, the 
spatio-temporal terms of the saliency model add predictive power (as 
measured by the pseudo R2, p<0.05, bootstrap), to a model that considers 
only the purely temporal terms centered at fixation onset. However, the 
modulation related to saliency was explained away by including saccade 
information (Figure 5.5A and B). The fact that saliency related tuning is 
explained away seems surprising, since the relationship between saccades 
and saliency, although present, is fairly weak in our natural scene search 
task (Figure 5.2C). Even the apparently large effects in the saliency PSTHs 
(Figure 5.4A and B) and spike prediction (Figure 5.4C and 5.5A) seem to 
be well explained based on these correlations (Figure 5.5A-C). Part of the 
directional tuning may be explained by the fact that the center of images 
tends to be more salient than the periphery (Figure 5.2B), and when fixation 
is at the edge of the image saccades toward the center become more likely. 
Furthermore, saccade onset and fixation onset happen close in time and 
saccade durations have some variability (Figure 5.10B). Neural responses 
are driven by a range of different factors. Ignoring some factors may lead us 
to draw wrong conclusions, but by modeling these factors together we can 
disambiguate which factors truly relate to the responses. 
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Figure 5.7. Simulations. (A) Simulated spatial and temporal filters for the three 
different kinds of neurons: purely saccade, purely saliency and both saccade and 
saliency encoding. We used a fixed temporal filter (triggered on saccade onset for 
saccade responses and on fixation onset for saliency responses) and a fixed 
preferred direction (represented by the circles with shades of grey – preferred 
direction corresponds to the lighter shades). Blue and purple curves correspond to 
the temporal gains in the directions of lower (blue arrow) and higher (purple arrow) 
modulation of the spatio-temporal receptive fields (STRFs). We simulated spikes 
using behavioral data corresponding to one neuron of our data set. (B) Recovered 
temporal filters (shaded area interval corresponds to ±2SEM) and preferred 
directions (±2SEM, 10-fold cross-validation. Black dashed line in error bar plot 
corresponds to the simulated/true preferred direction: direction of lighter shades of 
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grey signaled by the purple arrow in Panel A) for saccade and for saliency using the 
joint model for each of the simulated neurons of Panel A. (C) Cross-validated (± 
2SEM, 10-fold) pseudo R
2
 for each of the 4 models (saccade only, saliency only, 
full-saccade and joint model) for each of the 3 simulated neurons (saccade only, 
saliency only and both saccade and saliency). 
 
Simulations 
It could be that we failed to find true saliency responses in FEF because our 
data analysis routines did not correctly handle the correlations between the 
variables. We thus simulated equivalent amounts of data using a range of 
models: a purely saccade neuron, a purely saliency neuron and a neuron 
that encodes saccade and saliency simultaneously (Figure 5.7A, see 
Methods for details). We then asked if our methods would be able to recover 
the spatio-temporal tuning of these simulated neurons. Using the same GLM 
approach as above, we find that we can readily detect tuning to preferred 
saccade direction or saliency direction (Figure 5.7B and C) and the spatially 
and non-spatially dependent temporal responses. If the neurons in the 
actual FEF sample were truly tuned to the definition of saliency we are 
using, then these simulations demonstrate that we should have been able to 
reconstruct this dependence. 
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Figure 5.8. Statistical power analysis. (A) Relative pseudo R
2
 between the joint 
model and the movement model, (±2SEM) as a function of the signal-to-noise ratio 
of the saliency definition, for a saccade only neuron and for a neuron that encodes 
saccade and saliency. (B) Relative pseudo R
2
 between the joint model and the 
movement model (±2SEM), as a function of the amount of saliency that the neuron 
encodes relative to movement. 
 
Lastly, it might simply be that our analysis was underpowered and 
more data would have been necessary to observe modulations in firing rate 
due to saliency. To test for this possibility we simulated neurons using the 
STRF component of the fitted receptive field to data of a particular neuron 
(neuron 4, Figure 5.4B; see Methods for details). We degraded the signal 
quality in our simulated neurons in two ways: (1) We made the definition of 
saliency used in the models worse by adding noise to the IK-saliency 
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definition and (2) We simulated neurons that were mostly tuned to saccade 
movement with progressively weaker modulation due to saliency. We found 
that even if saliency signals were highly corrupted (SNR~0.1) the amount of 
data available here should have been sufficient to resolve saliency related 
tuning (Figure 5.8A). We also found that even if the saliency tuning is 
substantially smaller than saccade tuning (by a factor of ~3) these effects 
should have been picked up (Figure 5.8B). Concretely, we can say that if 
IK-saliency had at least 25% influence on the neural activity of this neuron 
then we should have had more than 95% probability of finding it.  
 
5.5 Discussion 
In this study, we examined the activity of frontal eye field neurons to 
determine whether or not they represent bottom-up saliency while a monkey 
searches for small targets embedded in natural scenes. We found that 
saliency is mildly predictive of eye-movement direction during natural scene 
search but it appears not to be a determinant of FEF activity when other 
correlated, saccade-related covariates are properly taken into account. Our 
finding that FEF does not appear to represent bottom-up saliency suggests 
that the activity of the FEF may be dominated by top-down target-selection 
and saccade planning. 
 Our study has used eye movements during natural scene viewing to 
ask if neurons in the FEF represent bottom-up saliency. There are, of 
course, factors that limit the interpretation of our results. 
Caveat 1: Our definition of saliency may differ from the actual 
representation of bottom-up saliency used by the FEF. We have employed a 
commonly used definition of bottom-up saliency (Itti and Koch, 2000). Past 
research has shown that most definitions of bottom-up saliency lead to 
saliency maps that are highly correlated with one another and are often 
difficult to disambiguate behaviorally (Borji et al., 2012). This is because 
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most computational definitions of bottom-up saliency effectively ask how 
dissimilar image patches are from the rest of the image and the specific 
metric of similarity often has little influence in such cases (Schölkopf and 
Smola, 2002). Therefore, it seems unlikely that other definitions of bottom-
up saliency would have improved our ability to observe saliency tuning in 
FEF neurons. 
 Caveat 2: Our results show that if bottom-up saliency is represented 
in the FEF during natural scene search it is only explaining a tiny proportion 
of the overall activity. This does not imply that there is no representation of 
bottom-up saliency, nor does it imply that this proportion would be as small if 
it was a free-viewing task; just that our results support a weak 
representation. However, given that activity in the FEF is sufficiently strongly 
dominated by planning, it appears that bottom-up saliency representation is 
not a central function of FEF. 
Previous research using artificial stimuli has suggested that 
significant activity in the FEF is devoted to the representation of visual 
saliency, noting that salient objects within the receptive field of an FEF cell 
may elicit high activity even without a saccade that actually ends in the 
receptive field (Bichot and Schall, 1999; Murthy et al., 2001; Thompson et 
al., 1997 ; Thompson et al., 1996). However, our results suggest that 
bottom-up saliency is not represented in the FEF. Furthermore, other 
studies using natural scenes suggest that visual cells do not respond to 
stimuli unless their receptive field contains the target of a future saccade 
(Burman and Segraves, 1994; Phillips and Segraves, 2010). How can this 
difference be explained? We suggest a couple of possible explanations for 
this apparent contradiction. 
 First, the eye-movement field has had some difficulty to adhere to a 
uniform definition of saliency, and generally includes a combination of 
bottom-up and top-down — including target relevance and the probability of 
a saccade — factors within the realm of saliency (but see Melloni et al., 
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2012). This ambiguity makes it difficult to directly relate bottom-up saliency 
to activity in the FEF.  
Second, we expect activity to be much higher for non-targets in a 
search task where the number of distractors is small (see McPeek and 
Keller, 2002). Given the small number of targets and the exceptionally high 
levels of saliency used in typical experiments, results may not generalize to 
search in natural scenes. Furthermore, it may be that highly salient stimuli 
trigger implicit planning of saccades that is later aborted, and hence, that the 
activity of a visual cell represents the amount of covert attention allocated to 
that location. Future work should directly compare the responses of FEF 
neurons to the traditional artificial salient stimuli and to more natural stimuli. 
There are many computational definitions of the top-down factors 
that are likely to be represented in the FEF. The oculomotor system takes 
into account what the task-relevant target looks like (the relevance) (Serre et 
al., 2007) and the likely locations of the target given the scene context (the 
gist) (Torralba et al., 2006; Vogel and Schiele, 2007). Several studies have 
shown that most of search is driven by task-demands (Yarbus, 1967) and 
that it can override sensory-driven (bottom-up) saliency almost entirely 
(Einhäuser et al., 2008). In our task the monkey was not free-viewing but 
searching for an embedded target. Looking for representations of these top-
down influences is possible with the methods presented here and would be 
an exciting topic for future research.  
If bottom-up saliency is not represented in the FEF but it is important 
for the selection of saccades, it should be represented somewhere else. A 
model of a processing stream for visual saliency suggests a succession of 
stages in the visual-motor pathway from V1 to extrastriate visual cortex and 
on to areas LIP and FEF (Soltani and Koch, 2010). A recent imaging study 
has suggested that V1 represents bottom-up saliency while FEF is involved 
with target enhancement (Melloni et al., 2012). There have been reports 
supporting the existence of visual saliency maps in V4 (Burrows and Moore, 
145 
 
2009; Mazer and Gallant, 2003; Zhou and Desimone, 2011), LIP (Arcizet et 
al., 2011; Constantinidis and Steinmetz, 2005; Gottlieb et al., 1998), and 
FEF (Schall and Thompson, 1999; Thompson and Bichot, 2005; Wardak et 
al., 2010). A true bottom-up saliency map must represent the conspicuity of 
stimuli in the visual field, independent of the individual stimulus features 
themselves. However, given our results about the subtle ways by which 
apparent saliency tuning may arise, it seems fair to state that the question of 
if and where the brain represents saliency has not yet received a sufficient 
answer. It is not clear where in the visuomotor system relevance/target-
matching is computed, but this study provides a counter-point to the hyper-
salient tasks used in artificial experiments. 
The approach taken here provides a template for how multiple 
factors that simultaneously might affect neural responses can be analyzed. 
Specifically, our analysis attempts to define what it means to say that the 
FEF encodes saliency when other correlated variables, such as saccade 
planning, may also be encoded by the same neurons. Here we used a 
precise definition of bottom-up saliency from the computational literature to 
quantify the extent to which FEF neurons represent bottom-up visual 
saliency during natural scene search. We found that it is not strongly 
represented. Instead, saccade planning and execution dominate the neural 
responses. This emphasizes the role of the FEF as a premotor structure, 
where neural activity encodes information about the importance of various 
spatial locations as potential saccade targets, independent of the visual 
properties of those locations.  
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5.6 Supplemental Information 
 
Description of IK-Saliency algorithm and generalized linear model 
We considered IK-saliency (Itti L and C Koch 2000; Walther D and C Koch 
2006) as our definition of saliency. This is a bottom-up definition of saliency, 
i.e. based only on basic image features, independent of task objectives (see 
Figure 5.9A): (a) A total of 7 vision features (color channels tuned to 
red/green and blue/yellow hues, four orientations and brightness) are 
computed; (b) Each is computed at several different spatial scales using 
Gaussian pyramids as linear filters which consist of progressively low-pass 
filtering and subsampling; (c) This is followed by center surround differences 
across spatial scales, which compute local spatial contrast in each feature 
generating 6 maps for each feature - a total of 42 maps; (d) Non-linear 
iterative lateral inhibition incorporates center surround competition within 
each map. This iterative scheme uses Differences-of-Gaussians followed by 
a negative shift and half-wave rectification in order to suppress areas that 
are balanced in terms “excitation” and “inhibition” (with values near zero 
after the Differences-if-Gaussians is applied) and set every pixel to a non-
negative value; (e) After competition, feature maps are combined into a 
single conspicuity map for each of the 3 feature types (color, intensity and 
orientation) and step d) - center surround competition - is repeated for each 
of the three conspicuity maps;  (f) The three conspicuity maps are finally 
summed into the single map, the saliency map. We used the publicly 
available toolbox (http://www.saliencytoolbox.net/index.html (Walther D and 
C Koch 2006)) for computing IK-saliency for each image with the default 
parameter values and considered the three, equally-weighted, channels: 
color, intensity and orientation. 
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Figure 5.9. IK-saliency and generative model. (A) IK-saliency algorith. Scheme of 
the several steps of the the computation of IK-saliency (see description in the text 
above). (B) Generative model. We assume that the firing rate of the neuron 
depends on eye movement (saccades) and/or on the saliency of the image 
surrounding the fixation point. Each neuron has a preferred direction for saccade 
and a preferred direction for saliency. Also, each neuron has a temporal reaction to 
saccades and another one for saliencies that are centered on saccade onset and 
fixation onset respectively. We assume that the spiking activity is Poisson 
generated from the firing rate. 
 
Saccade statistics and saccade modulation 
  
 
Figure 5.10. Saccade statistics. (A) Distribution of the number of saccades for the 
trials of one of the example neurons (neuron 42) using all the data (black) or only 
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the saccades that we considered (grey; the ones in the interval [200 ms, 5000 ms]). 
(B) Variability in saccade duration. Histogram of saccade durations for the eye 
movements during the trials for neuron 42. This variability could be the reason why, 
even for neurons only encode saccade, the saccade only model fails to completely 
explain away the joint model (see Figure 5.5A and B, center panels and Figure 
5.12). 
 
 
Saccade PSTH for example neuron number 42 
For completeness we show the PSTH centered at saccade onset for neuron 
42 (see Figure 5.11), the example neuron in Figure 5.4A, B and 5.5C. 
 
Figure 5.11. Saccade PSTH for neuron 42. Rasters sorted by direction of saccade, 
centered on saccade onset and the correspondent peri-stimulus time histograms 
(PSTHs) for neuron 42 from Figure 5.4A, B and Fig. 5.5C. 
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Full-saccade model doesn’t explain away saccade spatial modulation 
at end of saccade  
We tested an extra model - the complete saccade model- similar to the joint 
model but with saccade direction modulation at end of saccade/beginning of 
fixation instead of saliency modulation. We then computed the relative 
pseudo R2 of the complete saccade model relative to the full saccade model 
and observed that the full saccade model does not completely explain away 
the direction of saccade modulation at end of saccade/beginning of fixation. 
In other words, saccade direction information at end of saccade adds 
predictive power to the model. This suggests that saccade duration 
variability (see Figure 5.10B) is what prevents the saccade model from 
completely explaining away the joint model.   
 
 
Figure 5.12. Predictive power of end of saccade modulation terms. Relative pseudo 
R2 between the complete saccade model and the full saccade model (±2SEM, 10-
fold cross-validation for each individual neuron; 95% bootstrap confidence intervals 
for the averages across the recorded population and subpopulations).  Arrows 
signal neurons 4 and 42, the example neurons of Figure 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. 
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Figure 5.13. Robusteness of expaining away to change in some of the parameters. 
Pseudo R2 for the saccade, saliency, joint and full saccade models and relative 
pseudo R2 between the joint model and the full saccade model (95% confidence 
intervals, bootstrap across neurons). We considered not smoothing or not centering 
the IK-saliency definition and also several values for the parametrization of the 
temporal receptive fields, namely the number and standard deviation of the 
temporal basis functions. 
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Robustness of explaining away to changes in the parameters  
We tested the robustness of our results to changes in the parameters of the 
models, specifically to width and number of basis functions that 
parameterize the temporal responses. We also tested whether centering 
(subtracting the mean) or smoothing (low-pass filtering) the IK-saliency 
definition had any influence in the conclusions of our analysis. We find that 
our results are robust to all these changes (see Figure 5.13). 
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6. Final Discussion 
 
In this dissertation we have explored several approaches that aim at 
understanding decision making. The dissertation has essentially two parts; 
in a first part we use psychophysics and exclusively human behavioral data 
to characterize the generalization of prior expectations and to test prominent 
decision-making hypothesis (Chapters 2, 3 and 4). In a second part we use 
electrophysiology recordings to test the representation of relevant 
algorithmic variables in neural activity for making eye-movement decisions 
(Chapter 5). 
 
6.1 Generalization and uncertainty 
We started the dissertation by looking into generalization under uncertainty 
and of uncertainty itself. We did that by extending previous traditional motor-
control generalization studies (Krakauer et al., 2000) to include uncertainty 
(Körding and Wolpert, 2004). In biology and in neuroscience in particular, 
the dream of finding physics-like general laws has always existed. Both 
generalization (Shepard, 1987) and Bayesian principles (Trommershäuser 
et al., 2011) have at a certain time been proposed as possible candidates 
for satisfying this utopian endeavor. It is thus exciting to bring them together 
in the research presented in Chapters 2 and 3. 
We found that while uncertainty in the prior (the variance of a learned 
imposed perturbation) does not affect the generalization of the mean 
(Chapter 2), the mean does affects the generalization of uncertainty 
(Chapter 3). We show that, while also having a local component, uncertainty 
generalizes with a global component, and that manipulating the mean 
introduces an interesting asymmetry in the generalization of uncertainty 
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(Chapter 3). Furthermore we show that this asymmetry is consistent with the 
use of different reference frames when generalizing; target–centered for the 
mean and visual-feedback–centered for uncertainty. 
While there are many theories about how the brain might represent or 
approximate probability distributions (Fiser et al., 2010; Hoyer and 
Hyvärinen, 2003; Ma et al., 2006), to our knowledge none of these theories 
has explicit predictions for how these probability distributions are 
learned/generalized from previous relatively similar experiences. The 
differences and interactions that we present in Chapters 2 and 3 between 
the generalizations of mean and variance constrain and pose a challenge to 
future attempts at extending these theories to generalization. 
Apart from theoretical modeling, future directions of research can include 
further behavioral experiments but also imaging and electrophysiology 
studies to understand the neural basis of the asymmetries reported here. 
Regarding behavior studies, if the generalization of uncertainty is visual-
feedback-centered then we expect the asymmetry to disappear if the mean 
of the perturbation is introduced and increased progressively. We also 
expect the location of the peak of uncertainty to change if we try different 
magnitudes of mean perturbation; e.g. the generalization pattern of a 
perturbation with a 15 degree mean should have a peak closer to the 
learning direction than of a 30 or 45 degree perturbation. 
How does the brain represent the uncertainty about various quantities in 
order to generalize about them? In an imaging study using an estimation 
paradigm similar to the one used in in Chapter 4 (Vilares et al., 2012), we 
found that likelihood and prior uncertainty activated non-overlapping brain 
regions. An analogous study could look into whether mean and variance of 
the prior have non-overlapping representations in the visuomotor paradigm 
used in Chapters 2 and 3 to provide some insight on the representation of 
generalization. Recently, a similar center-out reaching paradigm has been 
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tested in non-human primates (Dekleva et al., 2013) and promises to give 
some perspective into how populations of neurons represent and learn the 
variance of prior and likelihood. 
 
6.2 Decision-making theories 
In Chapter 4 we tested a commonly implicit assumption about the two-
alternative forced choice (2AFC) paradigm; that the just-noticeable 
difference (JND) measures sensory uncertainty. We show that in doing this 
we simultaneously test decision-making theories; MAP vs. 
Sampling/Matching. While the results from our experimental paradigm favor 
the assumption that the brain uses MAP algorithm, the most important 
output of the work presented in this chapter is that it makes the assumption 
explicit and suggests a way of testing it that should be extended to other 
tasks. 
Even though in the first part of this dissertation we talk about representation 
of the value of some quantity (the mean of the prior) along with its 
uncertainty (the variance of the prior), it is important to note that these 
representations themselves are the outcome of an inference problem. For 
instance it may be argued that the retina solves an inference problem given 
photons; studies have shown that the retina already has predictive encoding 
and that the receptive fields of retinal ganglion cells can change to improve 
predictive coding under new environmental statistics (Hosoya et al., 2005). 
Similarly, the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), the primary visual cortex 
(V1) and other early visual areas may also solve inference problems, given 
retinal input – for instance, some studies suggest that prior is implicitly 
embedded in the neural tuning of sensory neurons (Ganguli and Simoncelli, 
2012)  – and so on. Hence, we are not dealing with a representation, but 
with the outcome of hierarchies of inference. At each stage the input (the 
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likelihood), is combined with the prior at that stage and this new posterior is 
the input (or likelihood?) for the next inference. While it might seem 
reasonable, assuming that prior and likelihood are two separate entities 
represented in the brain might limit the conclusions we can get from data 
and even make us draw the wrong conclusions if that assumption is not 
valid. 
Following this line of thought there is another possible caveat in this study. It 
could be that we have changed the prior upstream of the input/likelihood 
whose uncertainty the JND is measuring; if the 2AFC measures likelihood 
uncertainty, and if we change the prior (uncertainty) upstream of this 
likelihood, then this JND should change with changes in prior variance. This 
is because this likelihood/input is in fact a posterior/output of a previous 
inference process that involves the prior that we are manipulating. Hence 
the JND would be actually measuring a posterior uncertainty – which 
changes with the variance of the prior even for the MAP hypothesis. 
However, the fMRI study we mentioned above (Vilares et al., 2012) that 
uses a similar estimation task to the one we use here suggests that, at least 
for this task, the representations of prior and likelihood occur in different 
regions in the brain; while changes in likelihood uncertainty differentially 
activates earlier visual areas, changes in prior uncertainty differentially 
activate the putamen, amygdala, insula and orbitofrontal cortex. Hence, and 
even though the above mentioned hierarchical stream of inference most 
likely has recursive connections (Kok et al., 2013), we could argue that it is 
not very unreasonable to expect that, for our task, changes in prior are 
occurring mostly downstream of the likelihood of interest. 
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6.3 Neural representation of relevant variables 
In Chapters 2 and 3 we explored the generalization of visuomotor rotations 
using a center-out reaching paradigm. Our results are compatible with a 
visual-feedback-centered reference frame for generalization of uncertainty. 
The importance of visual components in traditional center-out reaching 
paradigms has been highlighted before. For example, a visual aspect of 
targets, the saliency, has been shown to influence reaches (Wood et al., 
2011). Saliency has also been shown to be a relevant variable for deciding 
where to look next (Berg et al., 2009; Einhäuser et al., 2006; Foulsham et 
al., 2011). In the second part of the thesis we looked into whether individual 
neurons of the monkey’s frontal eye field (FEF) represent bottom-up 
saliency in a natural scene searching task. We found that even though 
saliency predicts eye movement, its predictive power gets explained away 
when we take into account saccade-related covariates.  
Future research could investigate if the FEF represents other, non-bottom 
up, features that have been shown to predict fixation locations during natural 
scene, such as target related features (Ramkumar et al., 2013; Serre et al., 
2007) as well as the likely locations of the target given the scene context, 
the gist (Torralba et al., 2006; Vogel and Schiele, 2007). Furthermore, future 
studies should also verify if the apparent absence of representation of 
bottom-up saliency still holds during free-viewing of natural scenes.  
 
6.4 Concluding Remarks 
Common to the different chapters of this thesis is the attempt to bridge or 
connect paradigms or theories from different sub-fields; in Chapter 2 and 3 
we extend traditional visuomotor generalization studies in motor control to 
incorporate uncertainty by adapting a paradigm that has been used in 
several Bayesian-brain studies; In Chapter 4 we demonstrate the 
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connection between assumptions of the 2AFC paradigm and (Bayesian) 
decision-making theories. In Chapter 5 we used natural stimuli and an 
objective computational definition for testing the neural representation of 
bottom-up saliency, a relevant variable for making eye-movement decisions. 
In conclusion, this dissertation gives several contributions to decision-
making research at different levels; characterizes general principles in the 
generalization of probability distributions, tests which decision-making 
algorithms the brain might use and, finally, tests whether and how individual 
neurons represent specific variables relevant for deciding where to look 
next. 
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